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ABSTRACT
BUILDING CASTLES IN THE AIR:
A DISCUSSION OF THE ARCHITECTONIC LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
AND THE LIMITS OF POSTMODERNISM

Monica Krupinski

April 17, 2015

The purpose of this dissertation is to suggest a platform for the
investigation and discussion of the process of structuring thought in the Western
tradition through the use of architectonic language. This platform will incorporate
elements of not only physical structures but also the roles of metaphor and
particularly memory as evidence of the architecturally-based framing of our
thinking about thinking in addition to the ways in which that thinking has
changed as a result of pluralist influences. The discussion will include a tracing of
the largely uninvestigated but always present architectonic language of thought,
a discussion of the problematic nature of memory upon that structuring, and an
analysis of the role of inscription and metaphor in that same scope. It will
v

culminate in an application of the process in a comparison of two works of
memorial architecture to make evident the ways in which architecture and
thought are bound together and exhibit the elements discussed throughout the
dissertation in an attempt to situate the contemporary moment in our thinking
through a comparison of historical Modernism and Postmodernism.
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INTRODUCTION

Architecture is the reaching out for the truth. – Louis Kahn1
What people want, above all, is order. – Stephen Gardiner

In Raymond Carver’s 1983 short story The Cathedral, the main character
struggles to describe the appearance of a cathedral to a blind man. After fumbling
around with words for a time, relying only on vague descriptors like “big” and
“massive” before switching to the non-descriptive explanation that people built
them to be closer to God, at the suggestion of the blind man, he draws a cathedral
on paper. The drawing begins with a simple shape not unlike a house, but soon
windows, spires, buttresses and arches are added until the drawing approximates
the traditional structure in all its excess. Though the main character reveals
himself to be no artist, the blind man traces the completed drawing carefully with
his fingers and pronounces, “I think you got it”. What words failed to express,
form made understood.

1

Both Louis Kahn (American) and Stephen Gardiner (British) were 20 th Century architects.

1

Though this short story is not exactly about architecture, but more about
communicating and achieving perspective, it certainly illuminates the difficulty
we have in choosing adequate language without a visual or concrete reference to
reflect architectural form and, more importantly, the extent to which we rely on a
visually-recognizable structure as the foundation from which we explain our
thoughts. Explaining the form rather than already knowing the form and using it
to explain other concepts is, as the character demonstrates, not a familiar or
comfortable situation and suggests a fissure or a gap in what language is able to
express on its own. Without the use of an already-recognized structural form at
its core, expression of thought becomes unnatural, ineffective, and imprecise.

The ordering of our thoughts and the patterns of our thinking are not
structures we arrive at blindly, they are bound by analogy to a familiar form, a
visual metaphor, a symbolic taking of shape or finding of ground. Without these
methods of structure or form, without a concretely architectonic shaping of
thought, expression becomes too stunted or too loose, hardly the positions from
which significant ideas, metaphysical inquiries, and theoretical musings might be
undertaken. Just as the explanation of a cathedral in the story could only be
understood when it took the physical form of lines pressed into paper,
explanations of our own thought can best be understood when they achieve a
similar “physical” form—that of the architectural.
2

Truth and order may be the most fundamental and universal desires within
human experience, yet often only reluctantly do we acknowledge the discipline of
architecture as a base for an extension of those desires into the realm of the
metaphysical. Culturally and popularly, architecture is often considered to be
restricted by its very own purpose—the necessity of a concrete place and
grounding somehow is seen to preclude its usefulness as a foundation for
theoretical constructs—when arguably architectural language and metaphor can
be viewed as the underlying framework for the Western philosophical tradition.
Though philosophy depends heavily upon this architectonic infrastructure and
language, the positioning of architecture has historically been relegated to a
heuristic device, often acknowledged but not deeply interrogated. It is often a
means of structuring thought that is almost too obvious or universal to warrant
interrogation in its own right.

Certainly architects and philosophers have individually recognized the
intersections of their disciplines, but culturally we have little space for the
extension of those acknowledgements into our overarching mechanisms of
thinking about our own thinking. We should have a platform for the discussion
of these epistemological intersections and the ways that meaning is made as a
result of them. It is my intent only to posit such a platform for this discussion,
suggesting possible avenues of inquiry and examining possible ways of
3

acknowledging these architectonic links in our thinking, not to arrive at a tangible
conclusion or to offer any sure path toward understanding or communication. My
humble intent is only to suggest my ideas about our ways of looking at things that
could offer a ground for the recognition and exchange of many possible ways of
thinking and making meaning on a cultural and individual level.

Chapter One will begin to trace the parameters of this platform through the
historical use of an architectonic vocabulary and imagery within the discipline of
philosophy. The successful sharing of ideas and the building of an argument are
entirely dependent upon a foundation of the already familiar for their expression.
As in Carver’s short story, without a firm grounding, thought can be neither easily
conveyed nor expressed. From ancient times (and surely earlier) the Western
progression of thought has relied upon an architecturally-structured expression,
both in terms of what one might consider to be “high philosophy” all the way
down to everyday expressions and metaphors so common they remain
unexamined as evidence of the phenomenon. Think only of the lexical items used
in both disciplines—structure, foundation, building, shape, ground, form.

This first chapter very briefly traces the architectural lines in philosophy
from the ancients to postmodernism, with a nod to the interdisciplinarity of the
entire platform, incorporating psychology and history into the equation to
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demonstrate the flexibility and wide-ranging applicability of architectural
metaphor in thought. Also in this chapter two works of architecture are discussed
to offer possible means of opening the discussion using artifacts. The first of these
is a Confederate memorial on the campus of the University of Louisville, which
introduces the difficulties of historical relevance and memorialization across time,
and the second is a purely conceptual work not intended to be brought into
physical form, which introduces the emerging facet of architecture as theory and
thought more than material form.

Chapter Two begins from this point to address the intricacies of memory
and memorialization on the meaning-making process with a heuristic definition
of memory. Far from being limited to a discussion of memorial architecture only,
this analysis suggests some possibilities for our thought to be restricted and
manipulated by our own methods of processing past events, introducing
additional problems introduced by recent technologies and popular culture. An
examination of attempts at meaning making follows, with a distinction made
between elicited and spontaneous memories and the cultural hierarchy we place
upon them as a precursor to the final chapter in which two pieces of memorial
architecture are discussed in depth and these facets of unreliable and contingent
memory are discussed in terms of framing our engagement with processes of
monumentation. One thinks here of Saint Augustine’s tenth book of Confessions
5

in which he speaks of “vast palaces of memory,” and the descriptions of collecting
and storing memories in a contained space. He recognizes the importance of
architecture—calling memory a “sanctuary”—and at the same time posits what he
calls an eternal memory, for things such as shapes (and Carver’s cathedral), some
always- and already-known structure that needs only be accessed by the
individual. He suggests that memories are stored as images, forms that are
abstracted from the experience or thought into images that the mind can retain,
categorize and make available for later recall.

Imagery and memory serve as one bridge between the architectonic and the
metaphysical, and this chapter attempts to open up ways in which those processes
might be internally unreliable, via a discussion of recent studies in the field of
psychology on false memory, and subject to environmental and social influences,
using the construct of collective memory, particularly in the ways these influences
factor into historical inquiry. If memory is unreliable, the concrete form to which
it is tied can possibly provide a counterbalancing source for stability. In this
chapter I discuss the use of material—specifically, stone—in the memorializing
process and tie that material to an equally solid foundation in philosophy in
Aristotle’s four causes: the material, formal, efficient and final. The connection,
though easily recognizable, is nonetheless incomplete and remains open for
expansion and critique. Using a simple gravestone as an example, the four causes
6

provide a bridge for a discussion of the intersections of concrete elements and
memory. For example, the material cause allows us to examine familiar processes
within our experiences of memorialization. An examination of the efficient cause
reflects the focus of my project through providing a space for transition from
memory to concrete representation and back. Understanding the intent and
design of the architects through their own words will allow for the possibility of
an open investigation of thought, memory and representation.

Finally, the distinction between monument and memorial is discussed in a
similar vein, and though separation of the two can be useful in certain venues, for
the purposes of my discussion and platform, the distinction is not a primary focus.
This chapter ends with another heuristic definition, this time of a memorial, which
at least calls into question the uncertainties of what constitutes memorialization at
the same time as providing a working structure for the expansion of the
discussion.

Once the heuristic definition of a memorial is presented, I shift the
discussion in Chapter Three toward the next step in an analysis of thought and
memorialization:

metaphor and inscription.

It is at this point that the

reintroduction of the intersections of architecture and thought in the meaningmaking process become somewhat more concrete. After describing the means of
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employing metaphor in our engagement with philosophy and our structuring of
thought (and in this case not only architectural metaphors, but rather the device
in general), a reinvestigation of the definition of memorial is necessary, including
in part a consideration of the applicability of the construct of collective trauma.
One thinks here of Daniel Libeskind’s 1999 Jewish Museum in Berlin, with its
shape when viewed from above as a distorted, deconstructed, angular Star of
David scraggled along a city block. The multiple cracks in the façade of the
structure—what Libeskind calls “voids”—in conjunction with the deconstructed
Star present clear metaphorical reference to the traumas of the Holocaust. One
need only look at an image of the exterior of the Museum to appreciate what
Libeskind is able to express without words, or without a visitor even entering the
building. At this point, however, the architectural metaphor becomes insufficient
since the visitor will enter the building, or at the very least, the observer will know
the name of the structure, and be faced with the competing but equal forces of
expression through naming (or inscription) and through form alone.

Since the process of inscription or naming is necessarily one of limitation,
how this affects memorials and our memories is then introduced, including the
nature of what is absent from the inscription or name and in what ways that also
serves to provide definition instead of providing room for a more open
investigation of meaning-making. From this point it becomes necessary to discuss
8

the role of a public versus a private memorial. Arguably, every public memorial
is simultaneously a private one, but the nature of the individual engagement with
the structure is not firmly defined, and the appeal over generations and cultural
circumstances is a factor which deserves attention. Though structuring of thought
may take place using similar constructs, the avenues toward achieving meaning
are infinite and individual. It is here that the relationship between architectonic
language and philosophy (at the level of individual thinking about thinking) is
particularly beneficial, allowing for the expansion of discussion and reflection and
exchange of ideas within parameters that are opened by a recognizable and
familiar lexicon and foundations toward a meaning-making process that affords
the individual space for the filling in of gaps in the structure.

Chapter Three concludes with an expansion into the virtual world. Just as
the Green Machine in Chapter One anticipates a future in which architecture no
longer is restricted by physical form, our extensive and pervasive reliance upon
virtual imagery urges that the investigation be expanded beyond the concrete. It
is here that the platform for discussion may be fully realized since the virtual and
the philosophical must still rely upon at least a mental structuring of the concrete
in theory, even if the concrete form no longer necessarily exists.

9

In the final chapter, the analysis shifts to a discussion of two works of
memorial architecture, the World War II Memorial and the Holocaust Museum,
both of which are located in Washington DC.

Following a thick description of

each which relates design elements to structural elements within philosophy, here
again used both as a discipline and as an individual drive toward examining our
own thinking, a brief overview of the tenets of modern and postmodern
architectural theory are included as possible bridges between our ability to engage
with architecture, translate that engagement into philosophy, and arrive at a space
which encompasses the multiplicity of routes toward meaning-making.

The

difficulty in this section lies in the narrowing and delimitation of what defines
modern and especially postmodern architectural theory, but again a heuristic
application of the means in which we structure our thoughts forms the basis of my
discussion and provides a point from which I examine my own limitations, those
of theory, and those of the platform for discussion that I am suggesting.

Using perspectives from disciplines of history, psychology, architectural
theory and philosophy, my very limited intentions with this document are to
examine the mental links we have historically created between architecture and
philosophy, to suggest the extent to which these links are problematic and useful
both, and to offer a possible space for the ongoing and always-changing discussion
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of the means by which we achieve meaning, individual and cultural, through the
framework of architecture. In other words, to draw my own version of a cathedral.

11
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epistemology? Though identification of the middle ground certainly cannot be
said to reveal absolute truth, it is traditionally thought to serve as a point of
reference for advancement or at least quantification of human thought, a means of
appealing to a commonality in human experience. In American history and
philosophy, the middle ground is associated with the overlapping of white and
Native American cultures (Pratt, 592), in art history the term is used to describe
the area of a painting between the foreground and the background, and culturally
we speak of the fallacy of the middle ground, which states that a position
occupying the space between two extremes must not necessarily be the correct one,
though we often assume it is. Even the exposure of this fallacy, however, is not
enough to dispel our cultural association of the middle ground as the place where
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compromise is reached and commonality recognized, suggesting multiple
perspectives achieving some shared point of agreement. It seems that we are
continually searching for a place of commonality, of shared reference, of relation
between ourselves and the rest of the world, and the formalized results of that
search have become philosophy itself. However, philosophy is much more than a
reductive process to arrive at a common denominator in human thinking: it is the
ongoing search for meaning, not necessarily the achievement of it, that is central to
thought.

Arguably since ancient times human thought has attempted to describe,
categorize and structure itself within a commonly accessible framework, but this
framework is itself complicated by the underlying presumption that there is
commonality and shared experience altogether.

Instead of the middle ground

occupying a place of commonality, then, perhaps it can be better said to occupy a
place for possibility. It is from this place of uncertainty and indeterminacy that we
might examine the historical interdependence of philosophy and architecture, to
ask new questions, only ask them without the burden of answering them
definitively because of the difficulty of defining our own cultural moment, solving
problems or postulating theories. Or as Richard Rorty writes of his own style of
pragmatism, “to try to ignore the apparently futile traditional questions by
substituting the following new and possibly interesting questions’.” (9)
13

To

question the possibilities, the assumptions and the roles of the architectonic
language of philosophy and the ways memorial architecture are made manifest is
the scope of this project, not to answer questions or restructure theories, but only
to examine and possibly look toward a restructuring of the way questions about
those topics are formed or, to use an architectonic metaphor, to build a platform
for an open and ongoing process of questioning—in other words, to search.

As a part of this discussion, it immediately becomes necessary to define my
use of “we” and “our,” particularly in terms of thought, and especially in light of
the problematic nature of defining the current cultural moment as I see it. We
need to know who we are (and who we define as “we”) before we can begin to
analyze exactly how this platform for discussion might operate.

Who is

marginalized, excluded, uncounted within my discussion? Because I am indeed a
product of the Western androcentric cultural and intellectual tradition, I readily
acknowledge the limitations that my education and history place upon my
perspective. That being said, the limitations are not insurmountable, do not have
to be exclusionary and can still allow for—no, here I want to say welcome—the
incorporation of other and Othered perspectives. To be sure, there will likely be
those excluded from the “we” I use in this document. Though I am not able to
speak for others who are not in the position of academic privilege I enjoy, those
who do not have access to fresh and nourishing food, those who do not enjoy
14

political stability in their country, or those who suffer such acute oppression and
injustice that the luxury of thinking epistemologically is literally unthinkable in
the struggle for day-to-day survival, l would like to at least allow room in my
platform for discussion for their voices to be heard.

This is not to say that I am diminishing the importance of other perspectives
and circumstances, rather I am saying just the opposite: that consideration of a
multiplicity of perspectives is crucial in the wake of Postmodern and pluralist
critique and that we cultural scholars and historians need to arrive at a means of
acknowledging the value of other positions while acknowledging that other
positions cannot all be equally incorporated or represented adequately. Maria
Lugones refers to “differing degrees of coalescence” (Purity, 459), and I think this
provides a workable metaphor for the extent to which multiple perspectives can
assist in suggesting possibilities for developing thought without being the single
or definitive route. My search here is not for a new unity or a resurrected
Modernist one, but how we might define this moment and arrive at definitions
that must incorporate other perspectives. My contention is that we are still
learning how to do that. As Kathleen Lennon writes, paraphrasing Wittgenstein
on rules and offering her own assessment, “Agreement in the application of rules
is a practice into which we have to be initiated” (247). I feel that perhaps we are
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still at a point of drafting the rules for our current cultural moment and that that
is part of the ongoing process as well.

Before beginning to discuss the Western interlacing of architecture and
philosophy in a formal sense, it is worth noting some of the bases of widely
accepted instances of the structuring of Western Modernist and Postmodernist
thought, beginning with its architectonic and archaeological expression by Freud,
and incorporating a practical process of metahistorical inquiry by Hayden White.
Our Twenty-First Century thinking is encapsulated in and informed by both of
these processes, and it is from this starting point that my goal of the introduction
of a platform for discussion might be initially examined, anticipating the ways in
which the remaining chapters of this work allude to the recurring leitmotif of these
same factors in the structuring of our thought, in terms of philosophy, memory,
metaphor and theory. By introducing the discussion through the disciplines of
psychology and history, the philosophical and the architectonic overlap in the
demonstration of thinking about thinking.

Moving toward the end of the

Twentieth Century, challenges to these dominant modes of thinking would arise
not only as a result of Postmodernist theory, but also (and perhaps overlapping
with it) feminist and pluralist critiques, illuminating the necessity of a moreinclusive, broader base for this platform.

16

Himself a student of ancient thought, Sigmund Freud would articulate in
Civilization and Its Discontents a comparison between the archaeology of Rome and
the structure of the human psyche, both with multiple layers of varying age and
completion, both intentionally and unintentionally constructed and always in a
state of revision. Freud writes of the psyche, “These places are now occupied by
ruins, but the ruins are not those of the early buildings themselves but of
restorations of them in later times after fires and demolitions.” (4)

2

Though he

goes on to note and respond to the objection to the comparison in cases of trauma
or destruction, the analogy nonetheless holds firm in Western culture, particularly
when it comes to the issues of memory and representation of those memories, a
discussion of which will follow in a later chapter. For now, however, we may
make the comparison between this image of structuring of the mind not so much
as psyche but instead as philosophical engagement.3

Though much of

psychoanalysis as we have come to understand it describes traumatic events as
contributing to the development of the individual psyche, the idea can be

2

Of course, Michel Foucault would go on to expansively discuss the relationship between

archaeology and the acquisition and possession of knowledge, but, for the sake of brevity, the point
is well made for my purposes by Freud’s observations alone.
3

Freud would also offer the Mystic Writing Pad with its traces of what has come before to describe

the layering of meaning and experience in some permanent, if not easily consciously accessible,
form as well.
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expanded with little difficulty to encompass the collective historical traumas
experienced by humankind. While the scope of my project does not include a deep
engagement with the affective processes of trauma and trauma narratives, the
acknowledgement of the undeniable influence of trauma upon our human
philosophical development in a historical sense—in other words, that progress
always inherently involves the partial destruction and rebuilding of former
structures, of the psyche, of the memory or of concrete form—is central to my line
of discussion. Only through a re-structuring of our thought can progress, learning
or understanding be achieved.

Additionally, Freud provides us with a view of civilization as being
restrictive to the human and exploitative of nature, stating that “…a country has
attained a high level of civilization when we find that everything in it that can be
helpful in exploiting the earth for man’s benefit and in protecting him against
nature.” (15) Here Freud positions civilization and nature at odds, a positioning
which deserves mention within the discussion of the intersecting realms of
philosophy and architecture and the effect that situating has upon our thought.
Philosophy, if conceptualized as a desire for introspection rather than a formalized
discipline, in this sense may be analogous to nature, while architecture could be
seen to represent the “civilizing” influence or the framework for the utilitarian
maximization (or in Freud’s terms, exploitation) of the natural. Each is dependent
18

upon the other for its expression and development, perhaps even its existence. It
is this level of engagement with philosophy—the human desire for introspection—
that I will continue to use throughout this document.

Though in the Western tradition we tend to privilege thoughts considerably
more than the forms of their expression (though this claim may not apply within
the creative arts), without structure and without civilization, humans would be
adrift in an existence that is unquantifiable and unremarkable. By unremarkable,
here we might consider the word as a hyphenated un-remark-able, in the sense
that marking of existence through art, literature, philosophy and language is the
means by which humans become engaged in and document and analyze their own
life experiences. Architecture and the conceptual imagery it elicits from us, the
structure, could be the root force that allows the creation of platform for human
existence to discuss itself as remarkable. The natural to humans, though Freud
may have disagreed, is arguably their desire to mark—and to remark upon—their
experiences through meaning-making processes, and this can only be made
possible through a universal human system of structured communicative
channels: a language, a lexicon, and a platform for the expression of thought.

Half a century later, Hayden White would expand upon this structuring in
a discussion of metahistory, a practical (if unsettling at the time) examination of

19

history as subject to the processes of human narrative expression, and dependent
upon the structuring of human thought at least as much as on the “truth” of the
event itself. When one considers a personal encounter with a piece of memorial
architecture, White’s distinction between the competing forces of a “lived present”
and a “mythic past” (Burden, 133) certainly are recognizable as components of our
individual meaning-making processes and interpretive impulses. Though early
on it could be argued that White focused more heavily on interpretation than
inquiry, in any case the development of historicism over the past forty years has
certainly included a recognition of the necessity of challenging those
interpretations as well, bringing with it a point of view not dissimilar to Freud’s
on civilization4. Thought cannot be expressed without structure, just as history
cannot be discussed without its own historical framework. In a 2005 article, A. Dirk
Moses describes White’s contention that “… the problem with humanistic realism
is its dependence on hierarchy and domination” (318), a problem that is not for my
purposes linked to White’s Marxism, but rather is indicative of the improbability
of achieving any definitive meaning outside of a multiplicity of historical, cultural
and individual contexts. In some sense, it is a problem more political than
philosophical, since hierarchy and domination are implicit in any structuring of

Somehow this idea ends up as eternally generative—even the website metahistory.org discusses the four
stages of metahistory since its inception. We are always looking for meaning.

4
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thought or development of ideas—elements must be selected or rejected,
arguments tightened and conclusions achieved—but meaning is possible in
infinite scope and is driven by the multiplicity of contexts. In another sense, it is
no problem at all.

It has been noted that Hayden White feels that the work of the historical
profession lies within the realm of meaning rather than knowledge because it is
written for a particular group or purpose (Moses, 319), clearly supporting the idea
that thought—about history or any event or, I might argue, any thought—is
always a platform for inquiry rather than a firm location of fact and event. As
early as 1966 he would state in “The Burden of History” that the intellectual value
of the discipline increases in the Twentieth Century because it focuses on the
similarities of art and science rather than their differences (113). Similarly, my
discussion will only strive to point out but a very small number of the countless
ways that meaning can be made across and within disciplines, cultures and
individuals, all with a similar architectonic structuring of thought, and each with
an individual point of view and outcome, all of which arrive at a version of truth

21

and none of which are to be considered less significant forms of meaning-making.
5

This suggestion of betweenness, a literary foundation, and the multiple
perspectives of the historical process will be vital to my discussion of metaphor
and metonymy in engaging with memorial architecture. For now, however, my
project may be summarized as an attempt at a reinterpretation of Hayden White’s
interpretation of a metaphor for the historical account: “a heuristic rule which selfconsciously eliminates certain kinds of data from consideration as evidence”
(Burden, 130). Not unlike the processes of assimilation and accommodation
described by Jean Piaget, a heuristic, a metaphor, even an equivocation that is my
thesis allows for a continual reworking of thought and inquiry into our alreadypresent Western structuring of thought while at the same time encouraging—no,
urging—an openness to the consideration of new perspectives to allow the
architecture of the mind, the schema, to be dismantled, shaken up, altered and
rebuilt. This last facet, rebuilding, will be shown to lie at the essence of the
consideration of our current cultural and intellectual position.

This

accommodation is no different than the metaphor posed by Hayden White,

In this same essay, White discusses the “historical imagination” and our resistance to it. I think this
comment is still spot-on 45 years later, despite our alleged progress, and in fact I think it might be extended
to “intellectual imagination” in general. We are still so afraid.

5
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Freud’s analogy of the psyche and the city of Rome, and the instances of rupture
suggested by Baudrillard.

If we begin from this point—the point from which a new examination
consists of, is bound by and simultaneously is freed by the previous examinations
of modern scholars—the evidence suggested by psychologists, historians,
philosophers, and theorists points in a similar direction. Across disciplines the
idea is continually presented, whether through analogy, metaphor, cultural
history or postmodern theory, but in none of these cases is the most simple,
foundational idea of thought bound by structure developed and interrogated, or
even presented as subject to questioning at all. The foundation and structuring of
thought is accepted as given, and it is my only intention to begin an examination
of this cultural given in its own right, ultimately analyzing to what degree Modern
and Postmodern theory are able to allow for the situating of our current
intellectual position in a larger framework using architecture as a concrete means
of employing the theory.

As Wigley describes, philosophy and architecture may historically be said
to have a “fatal attraction” for each other (19). One is not possible without the
other, yet each seems to endeavor to undermine the foundations of the other at the
same time as using the other to define itself. The interconnectivity of the two
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disciplines, including philosophy’s reluctant acceptance of the role of architecture
as contributor to its own existence, becomes crucial to the study of either. This
factor is central to the development of my thesis since in architecture, arguably
more so than in other disciplines, the role of philosophy is more a matter of
necessity than optional influence. The intersection of the two disciplines (or I
should say intersections in the plural, since the overlap is a complex intermixture
of crossing points hardly distinguishable as singular nodes, though they all are
hinged upon one commonality) provides a solid ground for exploration of the
processes of our own ways of being and thinking. One result of this process,
however, is that the result is not transformative and does not generate thought, or
even much notice, for most people who view it. This absence of meaning-making
must also be considered as one point of view (if a troubling one) in a consideration
of memorial architecture and incorporated into our self-analysis. This “paradox
of ignorance,” as Jose Medina discusses in The Epistemology of Resistance (146), is
exemplified by the following example from the University of Louisville campus:
how, in the presence of so much available information, can observers remain
ignorant of their own cultural and historical background (even, in this case, when
it is such localized history)?

On a traffic island between Second and Third Streets adjacent to the campus
of the University of Louisville stands a Confederate Monument dedicated to the
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fallen Confederate soldiers of Kentucky. The subject of occasional controversy,
first as an impediment to the free flow of traffic in the 1920s and 1940s then as a
potentially politically incorrect if not overtly offensive symbol of intolerance, the
monument, long-term property of the city of Louisville, has nonetheless remained
in its original location since 1895. The monument consists of two life-sized bronze
statues elevated on a series of four stairs and a 70-foot pedestal topped with
another slightly larger-than-life statue of an infantryman. Thousands of students
walk by this structure every day, with few ever stopping to observe it, ponder its
purpose or read its inscriptions.6 Only occasionally and in mild form has protest
against the monument been raised over the past century. We all walk past it, it is
barely noticed.

Often students are surprised to learn the purpose of the

monument, they go on to respond to the news with indifference or opposition, but
rarely do they demonstrate evidence of introspective engagement with the
structure itself, its meaning or its history. When discussing the monument as part
of ongoing class discussions about racism, many of my students have commented
that they feel it has no relevance to them or to their viewpoints in current times
and remains purely a historical artifact situated in its era.

The inscriptions read “Our Confederate Dead 1861-1865” and “Tribute to the rank and file armies of the
south by the Kentucky Women’s Confederate Monument Association” with the two opposing sides inscribed
with simply “C.S.A.”

6
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As the University of Louisville continued to become more diversityconscious in the early 2000’s, a commission was formed to fund and develop a
park with the goal of memorializing the loosely-termed “struggle for freedom” in
antebellum Kentucky. This struggle included such elements as retelling the story
of Kentucky during the Civil War, documenting the Civil Rights movement in
Kentucky, and healing Louisville’s divisions along racial and class lines (Master
Plan, 1). This park would include at one corner of the property the Confederate
Memorial remaining in its traditional location and unaltered in form. To reduce
or counteract the negative associations with the Confederacy and to offer a balance
with the symbol of Southern sentimentalism, Freedom Park was completed as
designed in 2008 with the intention of telling the story of slavery and the struggle
for civil rights within the Louisville area. Encompassing the historic Playhouse
and most of a city block, Freedom Park now stands as what might be considered
a counter-monument, one which arguably receives as little direct attention six
years after its completion as its predecessor by a century, despite the lofty goals of
the commission to educate the public and provide a place for thought to be
generated. Though the design is quite striking and the purpose entirely positive,
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rarely is anyone caught in the act of stopping to notice it either. 7 Almost an attempt
to “undo” the memorializing purpose of Confederate Monument, Freedom Park
exists as a rehabilitative effort for past injustices, but at the same time it sets up its
own position of irrelevance as well. Many of my students view Freedom Park’s
objective to be achieved and the historical issue resolved—it offers a counterperspective to the Confederacy, offers multiple avenues of engaging with the
“struggle for freedom,” and is serving the expectations of a diverse city and
university population—but the ongoing purpose of the memorialization process
seems from their perspective to be static and completed.

One difficulty with the discussion of the multiple purposes, manifestations
and meaning-making processes of monumentation and memorialization is at its
essence tied to the question Jacques Derrida posed in an interview with Peter
Eisenman: “What is of this place? What is to think there?” In the case of
Louisville’s Freedom Park and Confederate Monument, according to the
statements of many of my students, the thinking has already been completed for
the observer. This admittedly short-sighted and dismissive viewpoint is one with
which we must struggle in terms of opening up a dialogue for discussion of the

Also in 2008 the row of fraternity and sorority houses across from the Belknap Campus underwent a change
of name from Confederate Place to Unity Place. That name change at least receives some recognition in
Greek organizations.

7
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current cultural moment. Discounting processes of what Medina calls metablindness, an insensitivity to insensitivity (149), or what I might call willful
ignorance, is a significant obstacle in arriving at a serious and well-considered
viewpoint of inclusion.

Perhaps the paradox of ignorance he discusses is

noticeable in starker relief in our current technologically-driven society. Here
again I think of my undergraduate students who Google everything, glance at the
“answer,” and never pause to think about it. From their perspective, they are
anything but meta-blind since they are “aware” of the presence of all sorts of –
Americans, the LGBT community, issues of race and gender, and so on8. They do
not often interrogate their own “awareness” (and here again Medina has a name
for the process: thesis of cognitive minimums) of either themselves or of others.
The title, the name, the grouping is sufficient, but in that way is also restrictive and
harmful. What I intend to do in this project is to expand the search for ways of
introducing the relevance of the discussion of this historical moment culturally,
and as a part of this, necessarily acknowledge the presence of a multiplicity of
viewpoints.

Let me say here that my students are mostly wonderful people who, when pressed on the issue of their own
lack of investigative drive, will so often respond positively and enthusiastically. Here I am with Medina that
the problem lies with our cultural failure to point out the necessity and value of overcoming our metablindness.
88
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Perhaps there is a further point to be presented here regarding what
Medina terms the “ignoramus”: I would agree that in large part the responsibility
for lapses in cultural knowledge of other perspectives does lie beyond the
individual, but we each participate in the ongoing exclusion of other perspectives
by failing to investigate them more thoughtfully, to identify the underlying
assumptions and cultural presuppositions under which we operate, and to
attempt to reformulate our own positions in light of that investigation. Even left
acknowledged at the level of “awareness” (rather than a considered examination)
however, other perspectives at least have begun to enter into our cultural
consciousness on some level.

Perhaps though still partial and largely

uninvestigated in dominant cultural thought, the presence and influence of
perspectives from the margins can no longer be suppressed.

Since this process of already-having-been-thought-through, dangerous as it
is to be left uninterrogated, is arguably true of all things that have been named
anyway (what function a monument or memorial serves that separates it from
other objects will be discussed in a later chapter, as will the process of naming and
renaming), how might a discussion of objects, and certainly ideas, be approached
beyond their concrete and self-contained named forms? What is to be thought in
a specific place is no small part dependent upon the existence of place itself, and
the structure of the thought that develops is dependent upon the restrictions and
29

limitations of the place it occupies, and the future directions of thought always
threatened by looming irrelevance.

Though within a single framework any

number of possibilities for interpretation and thought may arise, the
communication and transmission of those thoughts depends upon the framework
to support them. From thinking and structure to idea and implementation, the
possibility emerges that philosophy and architecture are mutually dependent for
their expression.

In order to investigate the significance of architecture beyond the purely
aesthetic, we must first recognize that the language of philosophy is grounded
(structured, built, constructed, founded) on architectural imagery as is even the
language of discussing the language of philosophy. An architectonic lexicon has
always been necessary for philosophy to describe itself as a discipline: the idea of
‘grounding’ or ‘foundation’ in philosophy has been employed since the ancients
and has transitioned into the Modern era with Descartes, become solidified in
Kant, then redeveloped by Heidegger, and interrogated by Derrida. The historical
basis of thought has necessarily described itself as being built upon a firm
foundation of logic—the metaphor of philosophical inquiry and the construction
of an edifice seem only natural when describing a progression of thought. As
Wigley states in The Architecture of Deconstruction, “Metaphysics is no more than
an attempt to locate the ground. Its history is that of a succession of different
30

names (logos, ratio, arche, and so on) for the ground” (7). The quest for a suitable
means of describing and taking hold of the ground, then, could be a primary
function of philosophy in no small part because of philosophy’s own definition of
itself.

If we, then, examine the ground as contingent by nature, not contingent
upon any one thing or other in specific ways but rather always simply contingent
on something, we are reminded of Badiou’s assertion that every object … “is
inexorably marked by the fact that in appearing in this world it could have also
not appeared and, moreover, it may appear in another world.” (321) From this
position of recognized contingency, though, we can still meaningfully develop a
series of observations and interrogations of the notions of ground, particularly in
the intersections of the architectonic language of philosophy and architecture
itself. From this intersection then will follow a critical examination of the structure
and function of memorial architecture.

To trace the development and use of architectural language and imagery in
philosophical expression, we may begin with the very reduced and simplified
Aristotelian perception of metaphysics as a search for an answer to the question
“what is substance”. From this most bare form and definition can the immediate
presence of possibility and contingency in meaning be recognized. While the
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answer to this question ”what is…” necessarily anticipates the making of a
statement on truths and epistemology, the purpose of this investigation is not to
arrive at a means of accessing absolute truths, or even identifying the presence of
contingent truths, nor is it to critique means of arriving at knowledge. Rather, what
follows is only the most modest attempt to ponder the means by which our very
thinking about thinking is dependent upon architecture, how that thinking is
influenced by metaphor and memory, and how those elements combine into a
process of meaning-making. The outcome(s) of that process is/are less a matter of
focus than the process itself.

To begin thinking about thinking and our ability to structure thought, in
other words, the intersection of philosophy and architecture, we might
acknowledge that, as with all language, the terms we choose both express and
delimit the structure of our thinking, leaving some part of the meaning always at
least partially inaccessible. Episteme is to be found in common English usage in
the word epistemology, of course, the study of acquisition of knowledge or the
distinction between opinion and justified belief. Michel Foucault would in the
Twentieth Century describe episteme as a means of separating statements into
those which it is possible at a given time to identify as true or false (Power, 197), a
description which reflects the instability and relativistic nature of what we
consider to be knowledge based in science or the scientific method. Techne, though
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likened the term to craft or practice instead of theory, nonetheless includes within
it an implicit inclusion under the broader scope of knowledge in general rather
than the solely artistic or creative. In modern English usage, however, we tend to
revert back to the dichotomous distinction between theory and practice in our
thinking about intellectual pursuits9 and, perhaps because we do not have a proper
word for it, fail to question ourselves as to what might be located in that middle
ground. In this current document, I am as guilty as anyone in keeping theory and
practice dichotomously separated, but the entire work is suggesting possible ways
of recognizing and approaching that middle ground.

Though the medieval scholastic period would see the development of
metaphysical thought in terms of logic and semantics (in all its luxurious
laboriousness) paralleled by the construction of magnificent structures in the
Gothic style, scholastic philosophy itself depended heavily upon the influence of
the Church and of a religious underpinning. In short, the view was that humans
were created by and grounded in the perfect being of God, and all human creation
and thought resulted from and was devoted to this Creator. For the purposes of

I might offer up as evidence the distinction within the Humanities PhD program between dissertations that
are more traditional and research-based (Culture, Criticism, and Contemporary Thought) and those which
center on an artistic product (Public Arts and Letters). I would like mine to be able to occupy a place between
the two.

9
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the discussion of the architectonic language of philosophy and the intersection of
the two disciplines, it seems best to exclude the element of religion and the bases
of scholasticism at present, as they do not further the discussion as presented and
would encompass an entirely separate investigation of theory (belief) and practice
(works).

Rejecting the prevailing Scholastic claim that knowledge is primarily achieved
through sensation as well as attempting to dispense with the resulting proofs and
arguments that became only more complicated over the centuries, Descartes
privileged the ability of the mind to access truth through clear, precise geometrical
theorems and through its own ability to doubt. Though he differs from the
Aristotelian-Scholastic idea that substantial forms exist and result in specific kinds
of things, he still contends that there is an extended thing, a body, matter (Principles
II:1) and goes on to delineate the parameters of how we might determine what
makes something able to be classified as itself. When one considers this in an
architectonic sense, the dependence Descartes places upon the three dimensions is
actually little varied from the ancient tradition—the solidity of the object, or the
ground, is not questioned even when subject to his process of radical doubt. The
difference lies in his developing the new, stable, undoubtable ground of the mind,
at least to his thinking.
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In Part II of the Discourse on Method, Descartes provides an example from
architecture as a parallel to the way that one matures in one’s own capacity to
reason, stating that, though the most appealing buildings and towns are those of
a single architect or a single plan, uniformly organized, structured and designed,
one would never destroy already-present buildings in an effort to achieve
uniformity in a city. In a similar way, one cannot help but employ and build
further around one’s own previous knowledge and around the canon of
knowledge altogether rather than destroying the existing foundations of one’s
personal knowledge and start afresh10. However, he does discuss the human
achievement of reason over time as equivalent to a resurfacing or restructuring,
even an occasional destruction and rebuilding, of buildings that already exist
when it comes to the individual and his attainment of knowledge and reason over
time. Ideas, like buildings, can be dismantled and rebuilt, can take different shape
and meaning, but their placement on the ground will remain unchanged.

Though Descartes may be interpreted to have razed ancient philosophy to the
ground and to have rebuilt a new method of structuring thought in its place, in his
writings the presence and stability of the ground, however, remain unquestioned

In this way, I think Descartes anticipates some Heideggerian ideas about existence being a precondition
of thinking about existence, only in terms of knowledge and the thinking about knowledge.
10
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(in a process similar to that mentioned by Wigley above in the Postmodern
period). Throughout the Discourse on the Method, Descartes speaks of “grounds for
doubt” and “grounds for certitude” without ever doubting the presence of ground
itself. Again, he removes all knowledge based in the material world and in
sensation, until he is left with the only undoubtable structure, the thinking self—
but of course now the “I” becomes its own ground. Even in his architectural
metaphor he suggests a rebuilding if a foundation is not solid or an alternate
structure inhabited during the rebuilding process, but he does not question the
existence of ground as either a concept or a word.

If the ancient and Cartesian edifices were the cornerstones of the architectonic
language of philosophy, their connection was firmly solidified by Kant’s erecting
of supporting walls around them. Though Kant found architecture to be the most
inferior of the arts (tellingly, because of its very utility), he certainly availed
himself nonetheless of its imagery and terminology to construct and develop his
own thought. Even the title of his work The Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
reflects this presupposition of a place or space upon which his argument for the
development of reason can be built. Just as in the work’s first chapter he argues
that moral law is more or less the codification of a series of morally “good”
decisions that a person makes intuitively, it could be argued that his, and all of
philosophy’s, use of architectonic metaphor to construct rational arguments is
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similarly a form of the legitimizing of what is an intuitive process of thinking about
thinking arrived at independently within the human experience. After stating his
postulation on the categorical imperative that one should conduct himself as if the
maxim were to be a universal law, Kant writes, “…here it is mere lawfulness in
general (without grounding it on any law determining certain actions) that serves
the will as its principle…” (Grounding, Ak 4:402, 18).

The suggestions of

contingency and possibility are already evident in the form of even the most basic
acknowledgement of specificity of context or action as something that he rules out
in his recognition of the general nature of morality (or of the ground).

Of course, Kant’s abstract stance would later come under criticism, particularly
by Hegel, because it does not account for variation among cultures or societies,
however, this aspect of Kant’s position in Grounding illuminates an important
premise in both his argument and its critique: whether there is a societal difference
in determining the moral good or not, the presence of a moral good—whatever
form it may assume—is not in question, and it serves as the basis upon which the
rational examination of reason and morality is begun.11 In the same way, the

This reminds me of the discovery of a 32-foot section of a ship dating from 1773 in the foundation of the
former World Trade Center in New York City. While excavating for an underground parking structure,
workers found the ship’s hull 22 feet below ground level, used as part of the foundation for previous
buildings. The necessity of a foundation is unchanging, but the acceptable forms it assumes vary across time.
11
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structural dependence of philosophy to ground itself in architectural language for
its very expression is itself unquestioned, though the manifestations and
interpretations vary widely.

In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant stresses the necessity for the creation of a
stable philosophical edifice and firm ground on which inquiry can take place. He
views the state of metaphysics as a discipline at that time to be in ruins and uses
such images as clearing or preparing the ground for the establishment of a new
metaphysical structure altogether. This language, however, contains an inherent
acceptance of not only the durability of the structuring of thought but also, and
most importantly, the tacit presupposition of the existence of a firm ground itself
upon which every thought can be built, every edifice constructed, every structure
made solid. Clearing the ground reaffirms and necessitates the presence of the
ground itself. His discussion of an a priori human knowledge of mathematics, for
example, relates directly to the intersection of architecture and philosophy and to
his discussion of the construct of space within the human experience. That space
(and with it, time) is an intuitive construct in Kant’s reasoning suggests that its
applicability to my assessment is not to determine what the parameters of real
objects are or to try to explain how that type of knowledge might exist outside of
the faculties of our own minds, but rather to turn the focus of philosophical
thought toward an examination of the way humans think about their own thinking
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minds. In other words, the actuality of the ground is immaterial, if you will, but
the conceptualization of that ground in the human mind is the foundation upon
which philosophy rests. Here I would interject that I by no means intend to focus
on or even suggest that there can be the identification of a particular ground or a
unified foundation. Rather I hope to discuss the continual process of seeking and
relying upon foundations (multiple, contingent and always in a state of revision)
to discuss our thought.

Some scholars suggest that the significance of Kantian views on aesthetics,
beauty and utility were pivotal in the progression of the philosophy of architecture
and in fact present a line of demarcation in the way that the “purpose” of
architecture was envisioned.

Paul Guyer suggests that while the Vitruvian

conceptualization of architecture prior to Kant emphasized both beauty and
utility, post-Kantian thinkers used his Critiques to shift the perception of
architecture toward a more cognitive form of art which would express abstract
ideas (7).

This would anticipate high Modernism’s views on the role of

architecture, illustrating the transcendent role of a structure in human experience
and the use of material and design to allow for a full development of social, ethical
and intellectual experience, but this was not to take shape for almost another two
centuries. Certainly Kant’s position was nowhere near the Modernist view in
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terms of abstraction of ideas and theory, but it did introduce a new abstraction and
complexity in the philosophy of architecture nonetheless.
Though he would not remove utility from the equation and make the aesthetic
judgment of it purely abstract, he did discuss architecture as merely 12 exhibiting
the idea of adherent beauty which he describes as, “… the beauty of a building
(such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a summer-house) presupposes a concept
of the end that determines what the thing should be,” and that “. . . . one would be
able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in the intuition of it if only
it were not supposed to be a church.” (Kant, CPJ, §16, 5:230.) In this statement, he
delineates the very presuppositions about architecture that are always holding it
back at the same time they are defining it—in other words, we cannot think about
thinking about architecture without including the thoughts both that it must
function and that it must always exist to some degree outside our intuitive
engagement with it. In a later chapter we will return to this discussion both in
terms of the definition of a memorial, in that one must always allow for some extraintuitive element of presupposition as a factor of the experience that restricts and
predefines one’s realm of engagement with the object, as well as in terms of how
Modern and Postmodern theories allow for expression of this idea.

Kant uses the descriptor “merely” as a qualifier when he uses the term adherent beauty in regards to
architecture in the paragraph from which the direct citations were taken. I find this significant.
12
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John Whiteman, architect and Director of the Chicago Institute of Architecture
and Urbanism, wrote about this difficulty of engagement between people and
objects, stating: ”I believe that we find ourselves at a distance from our objects,
and that it continually occurs to us to try to cure this distance as if it were an illness.
Instead I see the skeptical distance between person and thing as an unavoidable
and difficult, even if not a natural, state of affairs; and I regard the task of
architecture

merely

to

repeat

this

situation

quietly,

weakly,

and

unmelodramatically ...” (Skepticism, 43) Rather than treating (if not curing) the
distance as a disease, he suggests that we recognize and accept this skeptical
relationship between a person and architecture (or the entire world), an almost
Kantian view of the discipline as being restricted by both its purpose and our
expectations of it. Whiteman then discusses the expression “against a wall” as
simultaneously connoting leaning on the wall for support but also having no
means of escape in doing so. This phrase and the metaphorical image it presents
illustrate the rigidity, complexity, and paradox of even a person’s most basic
engagement with a structure and, in turn, with the expression of thought.13

A distinction between the philosophy of architecture and architectural theory most certainly exists, but that
distinction occupies a position outside the scope of this chapter. The hope of this chapter is only to search
for generality through discussing philosophy and architecture as disciplines and their points of intersection.
An outline of architectural theory will occur in the final chapter of this dissertation.
13
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Martin

Heidegger

would

later

rearticulate

connections

between

architecture and philosophy by expanding the intersection and interdependence
of their domains while at the same time opening a new avenue for our thinking
about thinking and about our experience with structures. In his 1954 essay
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” he begins with a discussion of the
interrelatedness of the very words “to build” (bauen) and forms of “to be” (such as
in the German ich bin and Old English beon), suggesting that prior to its modern
definition of “to build,” bauen had been more expressly linked to a sense of
dwelling. In other words, that to dwell (wohnen in German14) in our current use
signifies only one of many daily activities that a human does, in fact, an
unproductive one and one done in a specific location. In earlier connotations of
bauen, however, Heidegger points out that a person does not just dwell in a
location but exist in the human sphere (be) and, very importantly, that bauen in
earlier forms connoted both an element of cultivation (as of the soil, which is
evidenced by the modern German word for a farmer: Bauer) and an element of
edification.

In this same essay, Heidegger continues with his etymological analysis with the word “wohnen” (to
reside, dwell or inhabit) to similar effect, linking the word to a being at peace in a space. I felt that
“bauen,” however, was better suited to my discussion.
14
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Heidegger goes on to explain that we do not dwell because we are builders,
rather we build because we are dwellers (350), a statement which rearranges the
usual relationship between a person and a structure: it could be suggested that
what the structure does for us in terms of aesthetics, utility or theory is almost
immaterial, those are not the essential elements of a human engagement with
architecture at all, but rather that we as humans, as dwellers, are the ultimate
contingent and dependent objects of a discipline we created—we needed to create
architecture because we needed to dwell, but now we are subjected to and defined
by the very thing we needed to create. He asks, “What is a built thing?” and goes
on to articulate an example that, “a bridge gathers the earth as landscape around
the stream” (354). We only create the bridge because we dwell, we exist, and part
of the existing is the physical need of crossing a stream. In order to fulfill that
human need, however, to keep our existence intact, we have at the same time
handed over the power of place to that bridge. The place was not there until a
bridge was needed, Heidegger contends. Once we determined the need and built
the structure, we allow the structure to assume the work of designating “place,”
and in this way, we may be by necessity building our own irrelevance into the
structure. As soon as a structure (or in Heidegger’s famous example of a jug in
discussion of a Thing) achieves its form and becomes independent, selbständig, it
lives up to a direct translation of the German: self-standing. Even without
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entering into a discussion of etymology, applying the lexical item to a structure
reveals that the structure, as soon as it has reached completion, is self-standing, it
has become independent of us as its creators and exists outside of (and perhaps
despite) our relationship with it, circumscribes our sense of place and geography,
and has made us dependent upon it for at least a partial engagement with our own
sense of being.

In terms of my own inquiry into the intersections of philosophy and
architecture, Heidegger’s essay served as a catalyst in my contemplating in the
realm of philosophy what we are willing to accept as given or stable and what we
are willing to surrender to products of the human hand. Though certainly this is
not the first instance of a philosopher arguing that point, it seems clear that
Heidegger’s articulation of the idea can be interpreted to almost devalue the
“head” from the person and while situating the person as a being in a physical
space of his own creation. This multidirectional relationship between the person
and the structure, the comingled interdependence of the two elements of our
thinking and our dwelling, is a constant of all human experience, even if that factor
goes largely unexamined because it is thought to be too obvious or mundane. By
concentrating on the phenomenological experience of being before anything else,
suggesting a more vigorous interpretation of “to be” as a verb of action, Heidegger
nudges at our post-Enlightenment tendency to first absorb meaning and relevance
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through the mind by instead taking pains to situate our bodies on the earth (and
under the sky), in other words, to remind us first that we exist. 15

In short, Heidegger’s works can be said to present a central question in
relationship to Being: on what does it stand? His process of kritischer Abbau
(directly translated as ‘critical unbuilding’ or less expressively, ‘deconstruction’)
incorporates both his recognition of the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics
and his vision of a new direction for the discipline of philosophy. He suggests that
a first crucial step is to cause the foundations of metaphysics to totter through the
process of unbuilding. The difficulties with Heidegger’s aspirations, however, are
that in order to critique one’s susceptibility to one’s own language, one must
employ the language that makes us susceptible to it, and, as mentioned earlier, in
order to think about being, one must first inhabit a state of being. Even the term
Abbau reflects the architectonic structuring of thought as well as the tacit
acknowledgements that in order to deconstruct something, it must have been built
(and already be selbständig) in the first place, and that the place where it stands has

Adam Scharr presents a down-to-earth discussion of this idea in Heidegger for Architects (27) by stating
that one difficulty with philosophy is the conundrum that one must already exist to think about being and
existence. In the same way I have always thought that one must have the luxury of a place to dwell before
one can think about being or existence or even dwelling.

15
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been solidified in the process. Though the foundations have been (and should be)
shaken, the ground underneath remains stable.

Heidegger conducts his examination in reverse chronological order as he
critiques Western philosophy using Abbau, which he describes as “a critical
process in which the traditional concepts, which at first must necessarily be
employed, are de-constructed down to the sources from which they are drawn”
(Basic, 22).

In other words, he is using not only language to critique itself, but

philosophy to perform its own self-examination and self-criticism as well. At its
very essence, then, one might come to view philosophy as a continual history of
its own construction, a history which had long been due for a critical examination,
but a history which finds itself bound to, limited by and dependent upon the very
language and processes that have made its expression and development possible
at all.

Jacques Derrida would expand upon both the difficulties of language and
the problems of the potential structuring of what may reluctantly or
uncomfortably be called a “method” of deconstruction and develop these
difficulties into another version of philosophical inquiry into its own discipline.
Derrida embraces the Heideggerian concept of causing the foundations of a
metaphysical structure to totter and expands upon the metaphor using the Latin
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term sollicitare16 “to shake as a whole, to make tremble entirely” (Wigley, 35) or “to
disturb, shake up” (latindictionary.net). By not only destabilizing but un-resting
(in the sense of beunruhigen), Derrida incorporates the entirety of the structure of
metaphysics, not just its foundations, into a disturbing of the peace.17

Once the peace has been disturbed and the un-resting begun, we might
concede that though a foundation must always exist, it is never stable, and that
only through this instability is the constant re-creation of the edifice of philosophy
permitted and future directions of thought made possible. When critical analysis
exposes cracks in the existing structures, metaphysics must immediately and
continually rebuild and refortify itself, only to have the resulting critical analysis
expose new cracks. Derrida encapsulates this idea when he describes that structure
of metaphysics is, “erected by its very ruin, held up by what never stops eating
away at its foundation” (“Fors,” xxiii).

Much like the space between the self and

the self as other in the mirror, as metaphysics continually investigates itself both
as itself and as itself being studied, the space between the two leads to a constant

The German equivalent of sollicitare is beunruhigen, which directly translated means to un-rest or to disquiet, an antonym for which is beruhigen, to calm or to ease.
16

The phrase “disturbing the peace” has been in my mind because of Heidegger’s discussion of the verb
wohnen (to dwell), which he traces through its Germanic root to a modern word for “peace.” I find it so
engaging that he does the same thing with words that he does with the history of philosophy that at times I
find it difficult to leave these little things unmentioned.
17
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and necessary sense of tension and instability. Similarly, architecture is in a
continual state of standing and being understood, allowing for the same instability
and fluidity. It is arguably through the instability that possibility arises and the
multiplicity of meanings has space to be constructed, but this process is
complicated by the parameters of the physical presence of the structure in a way
that is peculiar to architecture among the arts. This undeniable presence of the
physical uniquely positions architecture as a means to analyze the effectiveness of
these processes of thought and meaning-making.

In an interview entitled “A ‘Madness’ Must Watch Over Thinking,” Derrida
states that: “… as soon as there is language, generality has entered the scene and
the idiom compromises with something that is not idiomatic: with a common
language, concepts, laws, general norms” (Interviews, 339). The commonality
stands as the very precursor to possibility and variability of meaning. Rather than
a restrictive zone of compromise, then, perhaps the middle ground can be
reinterpreted as a freeing space for the cohabitation of any number of conflicting
views, united by one common element, whatever that may be. Only because they
are tethered to the general then can the potential for the flourishing of meaningmaking, interpretation and possibility exist.

From this position one may, as

Lorraine Code says of the epistemologist, begin to “…devise ways of positioning
and repositioning herself within the structures she analyzes…” (What Can She
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Know, 70). Recognizing the structure in its general form—a middle ground of
sorts, always limited though it is—allows for movement from a narrowed
perspective to a more inclusive one and a positioning that allows for constant reevaluation and re-development of that perspective in light of ongoing selfinvestigation and cultural critique.

Once the foundations of our thinking about architecture have been exposed
to the critique of Postmodernism and pluralist perspectives—our assumptions
have been shaken, the forms have been deconstructed and the ground has at least
been acknowledged to be simultaneously destroying and regenerating itself—
where is there left to go? Since structures once built do not depend upon people
to inhabit them, and since they become their own selbständig entities which we then
use to define place for us, the new and possibly interesting questions could
arguably take shape without depending on a structure to ground them in the
physical world.

Science fiction writer Bruce Sterling has been credited with having coined
the term “architecture fiction” in 2006, a strange, futuristic, conceptual marriage
of imagination, design, and eco-consciousness oftentimes reminiscent of the
hopeful transcendent certainty of high Modernist architectural theory. Though
architecture fiction can also take the form a convoluted, neo-sci-fi style of writing
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adopted by a very specific virtual community, more interestingly the term is used
to describe the creation of conceptual models that use structural design to describe
a vision in the way a writer would use words. To be sure, architects have always
designed models with the intent of producing a structure or representing a
potentiality for a structure, but whether or not these models were ultimately
transformed into physical form or discarded on the drawing table, they inhabited
a step along the way towards the production of a structure. The difference with
the models of architecture fiction, however, is that they are intended only to be
conceptual, never to achieve physical form. In that way, and in perhaps a possible
new way “forward” following the critique of Postmodernism, they—the things,
the objects around which so much of philosophy has always centered itself—
remain in the realm of “fiction” while still allowing our theoretical engagement
with architecture to evolve.

Perhaps architecture can only develop after

postmodernism without the physical structure to confine it, without the burden of
the interaction with the person, no longer assigned and assuming the task of
defining place for us. As a thought experiment, the notion is valuable, but
architecture it is not.

The Green Machine, a concept by a French group, Malka architects, arrived
on the virtual landscape in March 2014. The vision of a self-contained industrial
city on a mobile platform, it is conceptualized (in theory only) to regenerate
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vegetation and restore the water balance to an arid region, then to move itself
along the desert to rehabilitate another area of land.

The images are quite

stunning, complete with water-gathering balloons appearing suitable as props for
any steampunk film, legs that appear half-scaffolding, half-Tinkertoy ending in
tank-like caterpillar treads refurbished from NASA rocket transporters. Created
only as “architecture fiction,” the Green Machine is intended to spark conversation
about the increasing problem of global climate change and diminishing resources
rather than to be placed under construction or to take on the task of land
reclamation in actuality. Envisioned in the Sahara desert, the structure would
contain an entire industrial city, complete with schools, housing, production
facilities and recreational areas, all of which would exist so that inhabitants could
further the goals of planting seeds, irrigating the land, and producing what the
architects speculate would be 20 million tons of crops each year. Once an area had
become an arable farming space, the Green Machine would roll on through the
desert only to stop and rehabilitate another arid landscape into workable,
productive land.
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Even if a possible way for thinking about architecture to move forward is
in the realm of the unconstructed—after decades of being deconstructed—the path
nonetheless is reminiscent of the search for a radical change in urban planning in
late 19th-Century Modernism as well, only one which cannot come to physical
fruition. Not unlike the City Beautiful movement at the turn of the 20 th Century,
architectural fiction focuses on not only design and aesthetics but also equally on
functionality and purpose, only updated by a century and with a shift in primary
focus from the individual human experience to the global environmental one.
Imagining the City Beautiful design, one need only consider the Mall in
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Washington DC, the quintessential arrangement of civic structures with public
space, or even the arrangement of Frederick Law Olmstead’s parks in Louisville.
One goal of the City Beautiful movement was to arrange structures with regular
open spaces that allowed the free procession of humans between them, and this
impulse is reflected in architectural fiction as well, only on a much larger scale. In
the case of the Green Machine, the “architecture” itself is designed to move and to
have some agency in affecting change, despite and only because of the fact that the
model is never meant to be brought into being. It is by design speculative and
theoretical, not intended to achieve physical form, always both bound by and free
to move within the realm of imagination. It is from this very recent development
within the disciplines of science fiction and urban planning that the historical role
of architecture in thought might be freshly examined for its future direction. To
be clear, it is by no means the future of architecture as it is not architecture at all,
but it may be used for the theoretical construct of the arrangement of thought in
the imagination.

The model, whether a blueprint or a virtual image, has always occupied a
position between possibility and actuality, between thought and representation.
While architecture fiction intentionally sets itself apart from the discourses of
theory and design, in all other forms of architecture including the most basic
modes of construction, a model necessarily exists in a liminal position between
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vision and implementation, a bridge of a million cables linking idea and
representation. However, the model is not an object firm in its definition or form,
it instead represents possibilities and a multiplicity of eventual outcomes. The
model stands as a bridge between the conceptual and the actual, but it itself
encompasses much more than either of the two. It encompasses possibility. It is
from this point of the architectural model, of the position of neither-nor and bothand, that a critical interrogation of the future directions of the intersections of
philosophy and architecture might be undertaken. Perhaps architecture fiction
serves as a catalyst for a critical reexamination of the middle ground—or we may
begin to consider it as the middle space—that has served as a function of our
metaphysical engagement with thinking and being.18

The Green Machine is architecture that is neither structure nor theory
exactly but rather represents only and entirely possibility. The story it tells, the
fiction in the architecture, is that of the architecture itself, never intended to
assume physical form, it is only a construct of the mind. Unlike actual structures,
architectural fiction can and does tell a story—but that is all it does. Though

I realize this entire segment is pure speculation, but following in the etymological footsteps of Heidegger,
I might point out that the Latin form speculare “to observe,” or “to view” is also a modern Italian term for
the noun “mirror” or “mirror image.” Without speculation we can neither see ourselves nor move forward,
and architecture fiction (as well as my discussion of it) is purely speculative in the most optimistic sense of
the word.
18
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architects have always created models or plans or blueprints as precursors to the
actual structures they would build or design, what should the model be called
when it is never meant to be brought to physical being? The possibility of a design,
of a structure, rather than the structure itself? The architectural plan or model is
the product, in the way that words on paper are the product, and architectural
fiction now places the discipline into the virtual rather than the concrete. It is then
difficult to tie the determinedly ephemeral into anything beyond speculation or
fiction, to speak of theory and structure, but it is here that the role of the model in
architecture fiction reveals itself as intriguing to our continuing processes of
thinking and being.
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“Memory is the architecture of our identity.” -- Kevin Townsend19

In order to discuss the materials of memorial architecture in any meaningful
way, or in fact to enter into any discussion of memorialization at all, the need for
a heuristic definition of memory becomes quickly apparent. Though the definition
of what constitutes memory has been continually questioned and redefined in
most disciplines of social science, common elements, all problematic unto
themselves, include: that it is distinguishable from the present, that it can be

Kevin Townsend is a Boston-based artist and educator whose works are driven by representations of
memory. I emailed him asking for his permission to use this quote from an interview he had given, and he
agreed to allow me to make use of it as I wished. He said I could credit it however I chose, since his thinking
was strongly informed by Deleuze and Bergson on the matter. I thought crediting him was the best solution
since he was the one who said it exactly that way.
19
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expressed or shared with others, that it can be triggered without our conscious
control and that it is a form of knowledge. Scientifically it is often likened to a
filing system or a method of encoding information for later retrieval. All of these
elements, while certainly true to varying degrees, leave vast gaps in the definition.
Some of those gaps I will attempt to bridge by addressing considerations for my
discussion of memorial architecture: image and representation (including time),
psychological factors (including false memories) and the collective versus
individual experience of memory. For the purposes of this discussion and with the
goal of arriving at a heuristic definition of memorialization as well, memory could
be defined as: a sometimes voluntary and always unreliable means for an
individual, bound by his position in and as a product of his social and cultural
situation, to engage mentally with past events which may or may not have
occurred.

This definition is informed by the examination of a historical

engagement with memory in the Western tradition and is by no means definitive,
original or authoritative. It is only intended to serve as a working term for the
duration of this discussion, all the while remaining a point from which continual
questioning may be allowed and even encouraged.

To any definition of memory, a consideration of imagery—or the materials
of memory—is crucial, as is the acknowledgement of temporal positioning.
Arguments attempting to counter the positioning of memory as anything but
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referring to a past time would be spurious for the purposes of this study, but the
possibility of a reinterpretation of time and volition in memory in the current
technologically-driven world is worth some consideration. Since memory and its
representation have always been linked in a fundamental way—Aristotle uses the
term “presentation,” Bergson writes of representation and imagery, Ricoeur of the
tendency toward “overly representing” certain historical events—in an age of
virtual imagery, the problem of memory and the most representative form of its
artifact becomes all the more perplexing. If memory since ancient times has been
thought of as temporally separated from the present and viewed in retrospect,
what then can we say of the modern catchphrase “Making Memories”? The term
can be found from every episode of Here Comes Honey Boo Boo to the caption for a
Friday-night Instagram barcrawl selfie, and, while it is annoying in its smugness,
it is nonetheless captivating in its willful marking of the significance of an (often
otherwise insignificant) moment in the present as elevated to the status of “event”
when viewed as past in a future moment.

This phrase reveals us catching

ourselves in the significance of a present act from a future time and in so doing
reveals and captures the present as the future’s past.

In a technologically-centered world of instant images, simulacra, and firstperson virtual “experiences”, perhaps the term memory is falling into the position
of becoming relevant primarily as a managed attempt to keep pace with the
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breakneck pace of technological development and access to information. Whether
the nature of memory depends on the form of experience, the conscious cognitive
engagement with a moment, or the performative speech taken to elevate that
moment to a memory, what is taken into account and named as a memory
necessarily must now evolve in the context of our dependence on technology as a
mediator for engagement with life. Our traditional views on memory are fading
as we superimpose our technologically-generated products upon experience.

In her essay, “The Place of Memory,” Suzanne Küchler makes a case for
differentiating memory into mneme and memoria.

She asserts that mneme is

remembering a previous experience by chance while memoria is a conscious
process of recalling an experience, stating that “things of the mental world have a
necessary correspondence to things belonging to the moral and temporal world.”
(54) To a degree, Küchler reinforces the cultural notion that somehow unsolicited
memories are more valid or “count” more because they appear to come out of
nowhere, while memories tied to things are much more easily accessed and are
thereby less valuable.

Though both terms are translated into English as

“memory,” the root of memoria appears most often in our cultural discourse, and
though the differentiation between the terms as offered by Küchler may not be
optimal overall, for the purposes of a discussion of memorial architecture the
distinction is at least useful to acknowledge as a possible trajectory for thought.
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When engaging with a memorial, one is subject to the already-ongoing discourse
of history and cultural experience surrounding the event and in so being is called
upon to consciously “recollect” an event that is likely outside their realm of
individual past experience. In other words, a memorial is always designed to
provide at least part of the memory for the observer.

A Google image search of the term “making memories” reveals fauxantique plaques and photographs, as well as well-organized craft bins and
carousels of scissors, ribbons, and various accoutrements of scrapbooking. To
make a memory, to knowingly preserve a moment, to construct a model or graphic
representation of that memory, all of these assumptions underlie what has
somehow, in popular culture, become the slogan of the possible reinterpretation
of memory-making into a hands-on craft project. Popular culture would have one
believe that memories are specific and volitional and can assume the shape of
concrete things, in other words, that memory is under our conscious control and
can be adequately represented by an intentional “product” in an active process of
creation of future experiences of memoria. This intentionality of the present act of
memorialization that always eludes the present reminds one of Badiou’s comment
that, “[T]he event is always what has just happened, what will happen, but never
what is happening. The event is a synthesis of past and future.” (382)
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We set out to make the memories, execute the planned action, document
the result, and identify then resolidify the moment as a memory in the retelling. It
is almost as if the element of the past is being removed from memory and being
supplanted with a temporally-loose structuring of the present, or at least
recognizing the present (or even the future, as in: “Let’s go make some
memories!”) action that will knowingly be interpreted as the past at a later time.
Memories are made (concrete) by cutting and pasting chosen images, artifacts and
words into an aesthetically-pleasing final product. A manufactured memory is
perhaps becoming the newest legitimized form of memory in a post-industrial,
technology-obsessed, documentation-hungry society. It seems that at least in
popular culture we are moving toward a trend of the substitution of memory with
external imagery or, somewhat more generously, a fusion of the two, leaving
unexamined, unanswered and almost irrelevant the question of what actually
constitutes or defines memory outside of the artifact that bears the descriptor.

That question, of course, has been a documented part of the analysis of
human thought since the ancients, and the idea of imagery has been linked to
memory throughout, however what has changed is the nature and scope of those
images. In the Modern era with the rise of photography, film and now virtual
imagery, a shift has occurred from an internal recollection of an image toward an
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external representation of an image as the primary source of memory20. When
considering the question from a philosophical perspective, we still employ traces
of the ideas from the ancients that memory is a work in progress, one under our
control, that is formed by the accumulation of images or ideas synthesized
temporally into something we call our memory. Plato likened the process (and
product) to a wax tablet upon which impressions were made, focusing on the
impression or image more than the functioning of memory itself (Theaetetus, 191).
Socrates is often quoted in popular culture for disparaging writing as a force that
weakens memory, while Aristotle distinguished between retentive (as the lesser)
and recollective (as the superior) forms of memory (On Memory, I), all of which
allude to an individual possession or ownership of one’s memory. In the briefest
summation, then, the ancients might be described as viewing memory as
something that achieves its highest form through the refining of internal dialogue
and critical engagement with a subject.

Through art and logic in the Medieval Period and Renaissance and
quantification and categorization during and since the Enlightenment, the forms

To be sure, elements of external imagery have always been linked to memory and memorializing—one
thinks of cave paintings as testaments to memorializing hunting successes—but my claim here is that in the
post-industrial technological world, we have begun more and more to supplant internal memory with external
image.
20
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or materials of memory appear to have changed little, though the intellectual
positioning of memory in human experience would take new avenues. In the
Medieval Period, engagement with a text was seen as a process of consuming and
digesting (terms we still use today when describing an in-depth reading) with the
memory taking the metaphorical form of the stomach instead of the mind.21
Though this is only in reference to memory in terms of texts, the visceral metaphor
of digestion is quite intriguing to describe the process of consumption and
ownership. During the Enlightenment, scholars would offer multiple forms of
categorization and structuring of memory in ever more complicated schemata,
while in the post-Enlightenment period, we have made no great progress in the
capture of memory as an intellectual or metaphysical construct beyond these.

Certainly during the Twentieth Century, the role of memory underwent
radical interrogation, the impact of which will be discussed later in terms of
memorialization, but the fundamental structuring of the elements of memory
themselves exhibited little variation. To be sure, other more complex versions of
personal memory presented themselves as a result of the inhumanity of the
Twentieth Century, such as the disrupted narratives and lack of hope for

For a captivating read on this, and on the position of memory in the Medieval Period in general, Mary
Carruthers’ The Book of Memory is a winner.
21
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resolution and closure of which Lawrence Langer speaks in Holocaust Testimonies.
In that work, he suggests that Holocaust survivors often exhibit processes of
memory that he describes as anguished, humiliated, and tainted, though I might
add that these facets of personal engagement with memory could be extended to
include survivors of other traumas. Though I do not address trauma narratives
specifically in this work, their impact on our ways of thinking cannot be
discounted, however, I will abbreviate my discussion to the parameters of our
more limited processes of engagement with memory. During the Twentieth
Century, the study of memory, in an arguably neo-Enlightenment drive to classify
and categorize, flowered in the discipline of cognitive psychology, with one
primary area of scholarship in recent years taking the form of studies in false
memories.

Since memory itself is difficult to define, its processes still remain

largely mysterious, and its reliability continually and openly presented as
marginal at best, the phenomenon of false memories complicates the
quantifiability of memory even further, and at the same time lends itself more
comfortably to the purposes of this discussion of meaning-making and
memorialization.

Leading toward a questioning of the purposes of memorial architecture, the
subcategory of false memory is particularly applicable since it necessarily factors
into engagement with the historical process external to us as individuals. If, in the
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expression of our thought, we depend upon structures of generalization, memory
might be thought of as performing a similar function in our engagement with
events and the historical process altogether. It could be argued that generalization
necessarily includes an element of falsification or, less cynically, compromise with
other perspectives in order to arrive at some commonality of experience or thought
that can be retold as a historical narrative. Whether or to what degree this process
is volitional is a matter of debate, but recent studies suggest that the generation
and acceptance of false memories occurs at least in part independently of outside
factors.

Nearly two decades ago, researchers posited a fuzzy trace theory of
memory which argued that the process was composed of two types of traces:
verbatim traces as a memory of the surface form of events and gist traces as
involving associations and relationships in the memory process. In a 2002 article,
Brainerd and Reyna discussed the parallel storage but dissociated retrieval of
verbatim and gist memories based on their finding from 1995 that reasoning
accuracy was largely independent of memory accuracy. Not surprisingly, one
could fail to retrieve the details of an event (verbatim) but could easily access
information when it was able to be related to other structures (gist). Though it
makes sense to even the casual observer that gist memories are more stable than
verbatim ones, in the later study Brainerd and Reyna found that false memories
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were more persistent than true ones when events in the false memories had better
retrieval cues for gist memories if those in the true memories were based on
verbatim traces (167). In other words, when they are easily retrievable as being
associated with other events, false memories will endure longer than true
memories which are based on more specific actual cues. This finding was indeed
surprising, since the truth of an event was shown to be a less important factor than
the manner in which the individual encoded and stored the information.

Another recent study on false memory concluded that even when subjects
actually performed actions (rather than just witnessing them), they nonetheless
made consistent errors by “remembering” their performance of parts of a task
when they had not performed those actions at all. This was the case even when
alternative versions of the event were not presented to them, suggesting that false
memories are created not only through outside influences but also have a tendency
to arise from within the individual. As Foster states of the study: “… doing
something does not confer immunity from false memories; even in the absence of
suggestion, people can falsely remember having done things they simply have not
done” (231).

Cognitive psychology, then, demonstrates the tendency of an individual’s
memory to blur the lines between what is actually remembered, what is suggested,
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and what is fabricated, resulting in a generalized internal account of an event
which is neither specifically individual nor specifically collective. 22 Episodic or
phenomenological memory is difficult to isolate to an individual experience of
memory, since almost all events are in some way influenced by other people or
versions of the event, even, it could be argued, in the retelling or documentation
of the event. Even the anticipated sharing of a memory—and even the memory of
an event that never happened—in some way removes an entirely individual
ownership of it. Here one is reminded of the Oliver Sacks example of recollecting
the intrigue surrounding an unexploded bomb in his backyard only to find out
that his “memory” of the situation came entirely from letters his brother sent to
him while he was away at boarding school. In this way, I might suggest that the
ways in which memory translates into “knowledge” is subject to the same
processes of uncertainty and outside influence. The blurring of lines can extend
beyond memory (of a past event) to the continual re-working of understanding (in
the present), and in that way can become a valuable process in the continual
redefinition of one’s cultural and personal knowledge, including the knowledge
of another person. As Lorraine Code explains, claims of knowing a person are

Jerome Dokic describes this as “Goethe’s problem”—the philosophical difficulty in describing, much less
explaining, the gap between episodic (here, he means phenomenological) and factual memory—stemming
from a comment Goethe makes in his autobiography about confusing what others tell us about childhood
memories with what we genuinely know from personal experience of the event.
22
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“open to negotiation between ‘knower’ and ‘known’” (What Can She Know, 39),
in a way that is suggestive of a continual re-evaluation of a relationship based on
shared experience and some level of intimate understanding.

While this

relationship does not have to be based on a dynamic of power or control, it does
however suggest a fluidity of role in that process of negotiation between two
people or, perhaps less dynamically, between a person and an object. The memory
develops along with the relationship and the mutual knowing.

This is very different from “collective memory,” however. That term,
originally credited to Maurice Halbwachs23, refers to memory shared by more than
one member of a specific group. Studies in psychology have revealed inherent
problems of collective memory, among them what Basden et al term collaborative
inhibition, noting that “the frequency of false recall increased when group
members were perceived to have mentioned events that never happened.” (221).
Certainly the idea of outside influence on individual memory is nothing new, we
commonly use terms like “groupthink” or “social loafing” to describe it, but in
many ways collective memory is difficult to distinguish from what has been
traditionally thought of as history. One must not necessarily have participated in

I cannot let this go unmentioned on the grounds of fun (and likely false) etymology: Though Halbwachs
himself was French, in German “Halb” means “half” and “wachs” could come from either the verb “wachsen”
(to grow) or the adjective “wach” (awake).
23
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an event to be eligible for participation in the collective memory and the ongoing
discourse about that event. Kathleen Lennon discusses the limitations of our
understanding as always partial and our subsequent judgments and justifications
as always based on those limitations. She suggests that the consideration of other
points of view results in an impact on our own point of view in a process of
recognition that “other perspectives can make sense” (255). In this light, the
boundaries of an engagement with a historical event through collective memory
can expand to more easily include the perspective of someone who did not
experience it. However, as I will discuss in a later chapter, this process does not
mean that the engagement of an observer is analogous to or demonstrative of the
same type of engagement of someone who directly experienced an event, only that
it is a different kind of “memory” that is accessible through the distance of a
collective cultural history. Understanding that another perspective “makes sense”
does not, of course, translate to a complete understanding of that perspective, it
only means that the other perspective is worth consideration in an effort to expand
the parameters of one’s own positioning and participation in the structures of
collective memory. In many ways, this is the best we can hope to do.

When collective memory enters into a discussion of memorial architecture,
then, its limitations as described by psychologists may supplant parts of the
individual memory of a person who actually experienced the event and
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circumscribe a pre-packaged “memory” for someone who did not, though we
have seen that these are also processes that “make sense” in the development of
our perspective of an event. The concept of collective memory must necessarily
be incorporated into the process of memorializing, oftentimes as a legitimizing
structure from which the oppressed might make their voices heard, and while this
is certainly a necessary function, the interrogation of it may become almost
proscribed because of an appearance of insensitivity. Though we acknowledge
the inherent unreliability of individual memory, we culturally stand much more
firmly behind the ostensibly verifiable collective memory of an event rather than
discuss its own susceptibilities to falsification, unreliability, and interpersonal
factors or the processes of group dynamics.

Culturally speaking, collective

memory is not only used to justify history, it is itself doing the telling of history.

This calls to mind a quote by Herodotus about the job of the historian: “Very
few things happen at the right time, and the rest do not happen at all: the
conscientious historian will correct these defects.”24

If an individual is

conceptualized as having a repository of experiences from which memory is
drawn, the storage, coding and retrieval of these experiences, as is borne out by

I use this quote in my Cultures of America and 20 th Century History classes, and it does not sit well at
first with undergrads who think that history is “real” and factual.

24
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the psychological studies in false memory, is susceptible to the subjective
responses of the individual himself. The extension of this individual subjectivity
to all members of a group participating in the discourse of collective memory
immediately reveals the spiraling processes of “correction of defects,” “social
loafing” and the errors in acceptance or rejection of false memories blur any
accuracy in describing the event.25 I think the phrasing of collective memory, as
with individual memory, is best served by the acknowledgement and inclusion of
an aspect of negotiation—both within the individual himself, to account for
variances in coding and retrieval and for external influences, and within the realm
of the collective social group, to account for individual influences and the
processes discussed in the discipline of psychology.

Gadamer’s position as

summarized by Kathleen Lennon is worth nothing here: in terms of the functions
of our own prejudices, we might consider them as openings for further
understanding to enter our ways of thinking rather than closed-off boxes keeping
new perspectives out (255). Knowing the limitations of our individual perspective
can urge us to be open to incorporating other perspectives into our own.

Please do not think I am asserting that absolute truth exists in anything. I just cannot find a more suitable
way to phrase it.
25
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In History, Memory, Forgetting, Paul Ricoeur describes collective memory as
an ongoing construct that involves the telling and retelling of an event. An
individual is inserted into this ongoing narrative at the time of his birth, and the
narrative serves as a lens through which individual memory is experienced
throughout his life. Ricoeur does acknowledge the problematic nature of the
retelling of an event based on the unreliability of the individual and the
shortcomings of collective memory, but asserts that historiography nonetheless
can be said to be truthful or accurate as a version of an event as it is told and as it
applies to a group, while it always remains open to revision. For the purposes of
my discussion, Ricoeur’s thoughts, as briefly as I have condensed them, reflect a
solid point of departure for a questioning of the meanings in memorial
architecture. While memory may not be completely reliable, in order to make any
statement, one must recognize its shortcomings but at the same time rely upon the
process of historiography to illuminate a particular version of truth. At least this
negotiation provides some level of acknowledgement of the accuracy of the details
an event while still providing room for the ongoing act of necessary and continual
revision of that event.

I recognize that the difficulty with defining memory—either or both
individual and collective—is immense and fraught with limitations, pitfalls and
inconsistencies and that my discussion, like all the others, has not been able to
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bring clarity to the overall very human situation. For the further purposes of this
discussion, however, the limited heuristic definition of memory at the beginning
of this chapter will have to suffice, informed by philosophy and psychology both
but nonetheless profoundly incomplete as it is.

Even beginning from such a problematic definition of memory and
discussion of its history in the West, one recognizes the ongoing human endeavor
to transform memory, whatever its definition may be, into some concrete form.
Though the process is familiar, the use of the word “concrete” raises new questions
in terms of the object, image and representation of memory. Since a memory is
itself contained in and confined by a mental space, it arguably cannot achieve the
status of an object in the material world as such. To have a memory connotes the
claiming of possession of an intangible mental structure, to share a memory
involves communicating it through some form of language, but to transform a
memory into a material object (or to transfer it onto one) takes the process into
even more uncertain territory.

It is at this intersection between a memory and memorialization that we
might look back to the ancients as a descriptive starting point. Aristotle posited
the idea of production and the four causes, which might give some insight into the
bridge between idea and material form and our conceptualization of the meanings
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of memorial architecture. The four causes, then, might serve as a possible frame
for the introduction of what we consider to be memorial architecture, using the
most basic individual grave marker for a more straightforward example of the
scope and limitations of any discussion of this transition between memory and its
concrete form. One should keep in mind that Aristotle felt that not everything
achieves final representation as an excellent example of its form, and it is from that
standpoint of considering what constitutes excellent memorial architecture that
allows for an interrogation of the two structures in my final chapter.

A significant facet of the intended work of memorial architecture is
indicated through the materials chosen for the structure itself. Though in other
cultures memorials are often constructed using perishable items found in the
natural world, in the West, the material of choice has traditionally been stone, a
substance associated with endurance, strength and permanence. Some recent
public monuments, however, are constructed of concrete, a temporally vulnerable
man-made material hinting at uniformity, or a combination of materials ostensibly
chosen to evoke a range of responses. In a later chapter will follow detailed
descriptions and analysis of materials and structural design of The World War II
Memorial and The Holocaust Museum, both located in Washington DC, and the
intended (and perhaps unintentional) effects of these choices and designs upon
the memorialization process for the observer as well.
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To be sure, the choice of stone as the material for monumentation and
endurance begins well before ancient Greece and Rome, but it is from Greece and
Rome that we in the West likely achieve our primary associations with the
material. From the Grecian Herm’s roots as participatory monumentation of sorts
to the employment of travertine in roads and structures of ancient Rome we can
trace the development of an association between material and purpose that alludes
to permanence in more than simply a religious sphere. Much stone statuary and
representative sculpture was created in a memorializing capacity, but it is worth
acknowledging the uses of stone outside of a decorative or religious function to
bring the civil, public facet of monumentation into the discussion as well. The use
of stone to memorialize is surely linked to the material’s durability, certainly not
its convenience or cost, as a nod to the eternal. This association can be discussed
outside the human desire to connect with the divine through the memorialization
process, and the scope of this discussion is limited to only the ways the human
drive to remember and commemorate manifest themselves in material form.

To return then to Aristotle’s four causes in this process, we might first
consider the material cause, the stuff from which a thing is made. Though this
could traditionally be interpreted as the most easily identifiable and
understandable of all of the causes, the definitive and decisive nature of the
selection of materials for the purposes of my discussion, particularly in terms of
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what we can consider a “material” that comprises a memorial, suggests a need for
further analysis. For now, it is enough consider that, as stated above, most
individual grave markers in the West are made of stone—granite, preferably, or
some other hard stone that resists weathering and maintains its physical integrity
over time—to allude to the enduring nature of the memory of the deceased. The
assumption is surely that the material choice of stone will evoke a feeling of the
presence of the eternal, perhaps even a sense of the afterlife, in the observer. One
considerable difficulty in allying stone too closely with an idea of the enduring
nature of memory, however, is that as we see from psychology, memory is
anything but stable and permanent and always remains susceptible to processes
of falsification, loss and outside influence. Perhaps the solidity of stone grave
markers could be said to provide some counter-mechanism to the shortcomings of
memory, but the attempts to undertake this process may be doomed to failure by
the very shortcomings they are trying to counterbalance. The choice of materials
represents the truest, most basic human conundrum of ascribing concrete form to
amorphous memory, and the process reminds us bluntly and immediately of the
impossibility of seeing the essence or the truth of a thing—or even the thing itself—
beyond our interpretation of it.

Aside from a discussion of the arrival at a shape and its applicability to
memory which will be undertaken later in this chapter, when one considers the
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standard grave marker, at its most basic and familiar, the relative dimensions of it
are not easily or directly translatable to the human form. How then did we arrive
at the common Western gravestone’s shape and size?

The casket itself is little

changed over centuries—it must always accommodate a human body of whatever
dimension, and its form is dictated to a large degree by the physical nature of its
task. Here one is reminded of Kant’s view of architecture as the most inferior of
the arts because of its inherent utility, and we see how relatively little casket
structure is incorporated into academic writing compared with monuments or
memorials. So though the grave marker is freer in its physical dimensions,
nonetheless it takes shape as one of the familiar forms of a (sometimes rounded)
rectangle, a mausoleum, or an obelisk and still maintains its role as the conductor
or narrower of the memory of an individual. Worth consideration, of course, is
the assumption that the grave marker triggers memory in the observer altogether.
Ultimately it may be more accurate to say that it triggers meaning(s), but that those
meanings are not always to be described as memories.

Regarding the

representation of a memory, then, one must question whether the idea of the shape
it will take in materials or the account which describes its taking shape can ever
possibly be sufficient to encapsulate a memory. In other words, what is it in the
grave marker that reflects the human capacity for memorializing.
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It is here that we might consider Aristotle’s efficient cause in application to
memorial architecture. While Aristotle references examples such as the person
who makes a decision or the person who gives advice, there is also included an
element of this cause which is not human and which references more than the
direct acts of a human. More than an identification of the person who did
something, the efficient cause indicates the necessity of looking at memorial
architecture (or any event or object) as more than simply a plan put into execution
by an agent; it urges us to consider something much larger about the art of
memorializing through architecture.

For the purposes of my discussion of

memorial architecture, we ought to consider the efficient cause—our knowledge
of and experience with it, the ways that it is made manifest and the methods used
to make it manifest that reflect the ways in which it functions—in order to
interrogate what it is about the art of (creating) memorial architecture that can end
with its being qualified as excellent. The space allowed for indeterminacy and
fluidity in the transition from memory to memorial architecture and will be
explored in more detail to follow. Keeping with the example of the simple Western
grave marker, however, we might view the efficient cause as the intersection
among the human agent who carves the stone—or in modern times, the human
agent who operates the machine that carves the stone—the artistic basis for the
craftsmanship of a grave marker, the tradition and patterning of the idea of grave78

marking, and the history of the process of memorializing a deceased individual.
Is that part ok??

Aristotle’s four causes suggest that some things may not achieve the
definitive or most excellent manifestation of their kind, and as a result, for the
purposes of this discussion of memorial architecture, ample space is created for
the questioning of what the form of memorial architecture might be, expanding on
the Aristotelian idea of form. The common individual grave marker alludes to this
process of open questioning at a most basic level—when observing it, one may
recall memories of the deceased person if they were acquainted with them, ponder
the life circumstances of the deceased if they did not know them, perhaps situate
the timeline of the deceased person’s life in history, or thousands of other
unpredictable individual responses based on the similarities of individual human
experience. The form (or substance) of memorial architecture, may turn out to be
the ever-changing interpretations of the structure, the multiplicity of available
meanings, and the continual questioning and reinvestigation of its evolving and
indeterminate presence outside of the teleological examination of its form.

When we consider these ideas in relation to memorial architecture, of
course, the first step is to ask what is the substance of memorial architecture? In
order to begin to even consider what the point is, we have to examine the elements
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with the eventual goal of arriving at a heuristic (again, admittedly incomplete and
imperfect) definition of what a memorial is, what distinguishes it from a
monument (and whether or under what circumstances that distinction is even
significant), and from that standpoint, what then might be considered memorial
architecture—and what might be an excellent example of it—before beginning to
examine what its meanings may be and how we might arrive at them.

In The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, James E. Young
describes monuments as celebratory markers of triumphs and heroes while
defining memorials as commemorating past deaths or tragic events by providing
places to mourn (3). Within his definition seems to flow an undercurrent of a
binary of representation, either a triumph or a tragedy, and a neat categorization
of events into the dichotomous structure. Though his essay deals specifically with
issues of Holocaust memorials, the distinction is worth noting because of the
difficulty in the defining the terms, even by an expert in the field. In my final
chapter will be discussed the potential meanings and especially the meaningmaking process of the World War II memorial, which by Young’s definition could
be both a monument and a memorial, and the Holocaust Memorial Museum,
which may not even entirely fit into his definition of a memorial at all, though its
very title includes the word. The process of defining a memorial and then
contrasting it with a monument is clearly complex, but the reduction of the
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description into only two choices limits the manner in which we might engage
with, understand and study memorial architecture. If anything, the definition
should be expanded, not contracted.

To this end, Michael Rowlands offers a stepwise process between
monument and memorial in his essay “Remembering to Forget: Sublimation as
Sacrifice in War,” but in so doing tacitly assumes that the monument necessarily
precedes the memorial and that a memorial must, conversely, have begun (though
perhaps merely conceptually) as a monument. “Monuments become memorials
when they: 1) acknowledge the importance of the death and destruction that
constituted the sacrificial act, 2) transformation of a sense of collective loss into an
object of devotion and passion, 3) deification of the dead through this process of
devotion.” (144) Many of his terms—such as “sacrificial act” and “collective loss,”
even “object”—are troublesome in application to my discussion, as they assume
that the art/history26 of the memorial is an outgrowth of a process of
monumentation first.

The process of growing a memorial from a former

monument is not particularly useful to my analysis, as the distinction between the
two seems to hinge upon the nature of the event (or memory) rather than the

Although the effective cause makes a lot of sense to me, I am hesitant to only use the word “art” or “craft”
in describing the process Aristotle references. To me, inclusion of the co-descriptor “history” makes the
image and idea fit more comfortably into my discussion.
26
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nature of its expression. Additionally those same terms do not fit comfortably in
my discussion because of the presuppositions of trauma, heroism, sacrifice and
noble cause, all of which are questionable in their unexamined sub-context of
rightness of action and nobility of purpose.

That a memorial (or even, I might suggest, a monument) is commonly
considered to perform actions—to acknowledge, transform and deify, as
Rowlands sees them—however, is of vital importance and suggests, though
perhaps he might disagree, another indicator of the need for an expansion of the
definition of a memorial (or memorial architecture) rather than a narrowing of it.
To what extent a memorial can ultimately have a version of agency is certainly
debatable, and this issue will be addressed in the following chapter, but for the
moment it is enough to recognize that any “agency” a memorial has can be traced
back to the choices of human agents. It is an agency transferred by a person onto
an object. Nonetheless, the idea of the transformative experience does seem to
inform much of our cultural thought about encounters with memorial
architecture. When a visitor describes an experience as powerful, life-changing or
eye-opening27, he has surrendered some of his agency to the memorial in the mere

These words are ones my Honors students in Humanities offered in describing their visits to the
Holocaust Museum.
27
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description of his psychological reaction to it. Of course, as discussed, the element
of the psychological and collective memory is notoriously tricky, but it does
illuminate the underlying cultural assumption that successful memorials are
designed with the expectation that they will somehow act upon us. As Adrian
Parr writes in his work Deleuze and Memorial Culture, “Maybe, then, memorial
culture is utopian thinking: one where culture inhabits this disruptive dimension
of traumatic memories, which also entails a little bit of forgetting, while
simultaneously bringing forth a sense of agency.” (3) Again here is the tacit
assumption that a memorial refers back to a past trauma, and, though I do not find
that I am necessarily comfortable making that statement overall, for the purposes
of this discussion with its limited examination of only two artifacts of memorial
architecture, some element of trauma prior to the memorialization process will be
assumed as part of a working definition. The crucial element of the assumption of
a memorial’s agency (and its intersection of the agency of the observer) must more
clearly be described and will be examined in the following chapter on the role of
metaphor and inscription in memorialization.

Before that, however, we must return to the initial question of what exactly
can be considered a memorial. My heuristic definition of a memorial for the
purposes of the current work, informed by history, philosophy and architecture
is: a tangible or intangible placeholder for an event; a location or artifact
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purposefully identified to facilitate the gathering of thought and memory, which
is always at least both a result of and generative of cultural expectations and
experiences. This limited description contains no overt reference to trauma since
it is acknowledged in the choice of my artifacts, but it does spotlight the shared
intersections of possibilities for meaning-making among the memorial, the
individual and culture itself, as this is the most significant avenue for inquiry and
examination. Though a memorial cannot have agency exactly (or agency that was
not transferred from its human designer), the focusing of the multiplicity of
meanings and interpretations within and around it does indeed grant it some form
of influence over the possibility and scope of observers’ meanings and the fluidity
and flexibility of those meanings over time.

The first element of my heuristic definition—that of memorials as
placeholders for past events—is strongly informed by the point James E. Young
raises about them in terms of his work with the Holocaust memorial: the inherent
impossibility of engaging directly with the event by means of engaging with the
memorial. He writes, ““They [visitors] have come to Dachau, after all, to ‘see what
it was like.’ Being told that this is not what Dachau was like, but only what its
memorial is like, may leave some visitors bewildered as to why they have come at
all.” (70) Further interrogating the idea of visitors coming to “see what it was like”
is the pivotal element in his comment when it comes to informing my thinking
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about the topic. Even the making of an analogy, the choice of the phrase “what it
was like” belies the feeling of the visitors he describes. If visitors arrive with a
hope to see what Dachau was like, a sense of bewilderment and even
disappointment should be expected (even by the visitors themselves), since a
memorial cannot ever be the event or even the replication of an event. A memorial
to Dachau will always be a comparison to Dachau, a type of simulacrum. Even if
a survivor of Dachau returned to visit, the memorial would never be “what it was
like.” If one visits a memorial, one knowingly places oneself in the current
placeholder for a past event and, I would argue, does not arrive at any real sense
of the past event beyond the (admittedly large) range of possibilities for the
meaning of the memorial, but one does arrive at a changed individual perspective
because of those possibilities. Here, in a process akin to what Jose Medina terms a
“knowledge of social contextuality” that encompasses both self-knowledge and
knowledge of others (134), one can recognize the limitations of one’s experiences
and knowledge and create new meaning despite those limitations and actually in
full recognition of them. It is another means of incorporating perspectives of others
into an ever-changing individual point of view. Recognizing limitations and
boundaries, as I will discuss in the next chapter, allows for freedom of movement
and exploration within them, so the limitation of a simulated Dachau can
nonetheless generate openings for creation of new meanings within individual
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perspectives, though clearly they would be quite different from those generated
by Dachau at the time of the Second World War.

When it comes to the war memorial, the visitor certainly realizes that he
will not be able to experience “what the war was like,” but arrives with the
expectation of the memorial standing as a majestic statement about the war itself.
As Rowlands observes, “… war memorials have to be to some extent a special
category where resolution is achieved by the extent to which visual forms
unproblematically affirm ‘that they did not die in vain’.” (142) Though the World
War II Memorial undeniably provides this affirmation, just a few blocks away
Maya Lin’s Vietnam Memorial stands in stark contrast to it. Her design was and
is still considered to be controversial because of its lack of resolution and absence
of the conveyance of a sense of “rightness” regarding our participation in the
Vietnam War. Though the distinction between a war memorial and other types
of memorials is certainly important—like distinctions between memorials and
monuments, as well as memorials and museums—the distinction is not as relevant
to my current discussion of memorial architecture in general. Again, rather than
an increasingly-specific examination of the structures and their roles in meaningmaking, I intend to examine the ways in which generalizations can be made across
all forms of memorialization, memories can be expanded to have multiple
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meanings, and commonalities can be recognized rather than differences precisely
examined.

Perhaps the war memorial as a structure can or should never escape the
cultural demand for an element closure and healing, but the ways in which that
cultural desire, and in fact all cultural desire for memorialization, is changing over
time and generations is worth consideration. Further complicating the idea of
expanding the definition of memorial particularly with regard to changes in
meaning-making processes over time is again the ever-developing place of
technology in society. With photos of any artifact immediately available on the
internet, the roles of imagery and representation, simulacrum and reproduction,
and especially determining “what it was like” and any expectation on the
memorial regarding the healing of trauma, become necessary to acknowledge and
interrogate in their involvement in the memorialization process. This will also be
discussed in the following chapter on inscription, as it seems that a discussion of
the virtual fits more closely to metaphor than material.

A final consideration in the process of attempting to define a memorial for
the purposes of this discussion in light of the chosen structures is to address the
question of how one might differentiate between a memorial and a museum, or
perhaps better stated, how any museum could be considered a type of memorial.
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The word museum, of course, originates from the Greek as a home for the Muses,
inspirations for creativity and artistic expression. In contemporary use, we tend
to think of museum as a physical repository of collected items rather than as a
location (“location” used as a verbal form, for which we more commonly use
“locating”) of thought and ideas. The prevailing Western assumption that a visitor
to a museum only observes the art and creativity of others, rather than engages in
his own active process of creativity, suggests our cultural positioning of observer
as the acted-upon, a positioning which is not dissimilar to the viewpoint of visitors
to memorials undergoing a multiplicity of transformative experiences.

Both

museum and memorial inhabit the realm of presentation and definition for the
observer, but they both provide opportunities for creative thought and meaningmaking on an individual level as well. It is with this line of thought that I chose to
use a memorial and a museum as my artifacts without further differentiation, as I
consider both structures as designed to occupy a similar place in providing
locations for meaning-making. The differences between the two (and in fact
between the monument and memorial that some have so carefully delineated) are
immaterial for my discussion, as the process of meaning-making is similar, though
the structures, titles, and presentations may be different.

It is not my intention to discuss the exhibits in the Holocaust Museum, to
analyze their “effectiveness”, or to provide a narrative of the events of the
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Holocaust. Those important elements have been and continue to be done by
scholars of the Holocaust, and I feel that my statements on the exhibits would
contribute nothing new to that discussion. This is not to say, however, that the
presence of the exhibits and the outlay of the museum itself are unimportant, only
that the meaning of and human experience regarding the exhibits themselves is
much beyond the scope of my analysis.

The final element vital to my working definition is that the placeholder may
be tangible or intangible.

Though architecture, clearly a concrete form of

memorialization, is the scope of my discussion, it should be acknowledged from
the start that the nature of a memorial is fluid and that a memorial could easily be
something without physical shape at all. One need only consider a memoir, a book
written as memorialization of a time or person, to justify an expansion of the
thought of memorial. The bound volume itself is not the memorial, but rather the
words and stories contained within it facilitate the gathering of thought. From
there, it is not difficult to extrapolate that a conversation might be a form of
memorializing—in a formalized sense, one thinks immediately of a eulogy, but in
a freer consideration, a conversation between two people could serve as a
memorial as well. A conversation, a spoken reminiscence, provides a different
form of “location,” again not in the nominal sense of a physical place but as the
verb for discovering a place. The locating of a memory need not be physical at
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all—perhaps it could be seen as always at least partially metaphysical. It is at this
juncture that the lines between the definitions of memory and memorial become
blurred and begin to overlap, since perhaps it is not the physical structure that
locates our memories, but that memory has discovered and identified the location
for the memorial. My idea here is certainly informed by Heidegger’s comment in
“Building, Dwelling, Thinking” about a bridge over a stream: “The banks only
emerge as the bridge crosses the stream. The bridge expressly causes them to lie
across from each other.” (356) The memorial only emerges as the memory allows
and is situated only within the parameters of the memory, which is in itself
intangible, malleable and constantly evolving.
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The ArtScience Museum in Singapore, designed by architect Moshie
Safdie28 and completed in 2011, draws visitors with the hope that the “combination

Moshie Safdie also designed the 2005 Yad Vashem Holocaust History Museum in Jerusalem. I purposely
chose not to discuss that structure and opted for the Lotus Blossom instead so as not to cross-pollenate my
discussion of metaphor with the specificity of memorial architecture. For this discussion, I felt a commercial
28
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of beautiful design, intriguing content and intellectual discussion, [will] inspire
the creativity in us all”. Designed to resemble a lotus flower, the eco-friendly
structure is made of high-tech materials and collects rainwater at its base for
recycling and use within the building. Nicknamed the “Welcoming Hand of
Singapore” by the Sands Hotel chair Sheldon Adelson, each of the fingers (I
thought they should have been called petals) leads to a different gallery space
which is infused with natural light from above, and the museum is itself a part of
a recent development called, rather blandly, the Marina Bay Sands.

This

integrated resort, aside from the museum and the luxurious Sands hotel, contains
theaters, a convention center, two event centers, a promenade, and an upscale
shopping center. The space is designed to be visitor-friendly, almost all-inclusive,
and offers numerous activities for the traveler. Despite the intriguing design of
the hotel (and its rooftop infinity pool) and the entire complex, it is clear that the
visual focus and the symbolic center is the Lotus Flower Museum.

Early reviews of the museum agree that the architecture overshadows the
exhibits (CNN, archdaily.com) and a review of 2014 holiday season exhibits would
tend to support their claims. At the end of 2014, the museum offered exhibits

museum would allow for an introduction of metaphor without the added complication of the memorialization
process.
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about Harry Potter, ocean photography, ArtScience: A Journey Through
Creativity, and a selection of Da Vinci drawings, hardly exceptional in content, but
ideal for the purposes of examining the structure for its own sake rather than
reducing it to blank white space secondary to the exhibits it houses29.

The structure is designed to present two immediate visual metaphors—the
“welcoming hand” and the lotus flower—that distinguish it from other structures
in the region but simultaneously place it as unique to Singapore. The metaphor of
the welcoming hand presents itself as an undisguised attempt to attract visitors to
the Marina Bay Sands complex by advertising itself as itself and signifies that the
city is open to visitors on a global scale. Yet arguably the lotus flower metaphor
achieves exactly the same result, only through the avenue of natural instead of the
commercial. The open hand/flower base and the uptilted orientation signify one
basic and crucial element of metaphor, described by Elisabeth Camp as “cognitive
efficiency” (3). This cognitive efficiency, though it lies at the heart of the process
of metaphor, linguistic or visual, is also its most problematic and restrictive
element.

Efficiency can be viewed as an updated version of Kantian

This is an important element in my choosing this structure, as my discussion of the Holocaust Museum in
Chapter 4 will not include much more than a necessary nod to the exhibits and will focus almost entirely on
the structure itself. Museums are often as structures subordinated to the exhibits they display and viewed as
secondary, or in this case almost intrusive.
29
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categorization, a means of structuring thought and thus necessarily limiting
possibility, or, to paraphrase Camp’s further statement, metaphors exploit
characterizations. In other words, they reduce thoughts to known associations.
Not dissimilar to images such as Rubin’s vase (also known as a figure-ground
image) which can also be viewed as two faces, the Welcoming Hand / Lotus Flower
imagery necessarily reduces the viewer’s choices to one of the two (or perhaps
both) through the simple process of naming the structure. The structure could also
resemble a Blooming Onion appetizer from the Outback Steakhouse restaurant, a
reclining floor chair for playing video games, a beaky bird or a Beyblades toy—all
things with which I am personally familiar, but all of which are allowed room for
metaphorical expression only within my own interpretive and visual personal
response to the building. The cognitive efficiency of metaphor and the naming of
the metaphor(s) have already informed much of my thinking for me. Only if I am
willing to step outside the presentation of the named metaphors can I expand my
thoughts to other possibilities, yet without metaphor I am arguably not able to
express my thoughts at all (since of course likening the structure to items in my
own experience is doing exactly the same thing, for better and worse). This is the
catch-22 in our expression and engagement with objects, and literary theorists,
philosophers or artists, no matter how in depth their analysis, are unable to escape
this bind. We are both restricted by and entirely dependent upon language in our
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thinking, and metaphor is only one process that demonstrates this dependence—
in other words, metaphor is a perfect metaphor for language.

This “being stuck,” however, once acknowledged, allows for the more
secure locating of a common ground for the expression of thought and in fact may
be the cornerstone of discussion of superficially unlike objects and thoughts. This
trap of metaphor allows for a process which Sobolev calls a “comparison of
incomparable things” with emphasis that they can be either true or false (913). If
individual metaphors overlap, understanding may be achieved, and, more
importantly, when they differ, a new perspective can be introduced with the goal
of neither rejection nor acceptance, but only and entirely introduction of that new
perspective. In short, conversation and the intellectual endeavor depend upon the
metaphor’s efficiency of characterization but do not depend on any particular
version of truth or universality of its application. Metaphor, then, for the purposes
of this discussion can be viewed as a means through which a gap can be bridged,
the Heideggerian abyss upon which all is constructed can be recognized, the
intended meaning which can be both expanded and made irrelevant
simultaneously. The “exploitation of conceptual similarity,” as Kaja Silverman
describes (111), allows for a continual movement between the elements, to use her
word, a “transversality” of meaning (110). Metaphor does not change the objects,
rather it allows for change in perception and understanding of them and the
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expansion of meaning across and among elements of thought. While this process
is true of language in general, both in terms of lexical items and structure, the
process is distilled and made more easily discernible in the realm of metaphor.

In his 2007 work Critical Modernism: Where is Postmodernism Going?, Charles
Jencks discusses the definition and role of postmodern architecture using what
almost becomes a language of metaphor. He describes late postmodern (and
probably what other scholars would consider “contemporary”) architecture as
having an “enigmatic signifier,” what in his definition is “an implicit allusion”
made to look like “everything and nothing in particular” (62). He describes this
development in architecture as a response to the reductionist connotation of icon 30
and its obviousness—architecture needed a means of countering the reduction by
expressing an expansion in the form. This would include the ideas of “folding in
differences,” for example Frank Gehry’s curvilinear designs, and a comparison to
the continually-evolving and ever–rebuilding structure of DNA in terms of
architectural critique, response and restructuring. The allusion is implicit, not
overt, and the referent is not always clear (or singular). The intent of creating a
structure to look like “everything and nothing in particular,” though, while a most

And I completely agree with his assessment on this technologically-driven shift in the meaning of the
word.
30
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captivating construct, seems to exemplify that old conundrum of historical
postmodernism (which will be discussed at length in the following chapter): the
gulf between the theory and its implementation. This seems like a reiteration of
the old saying “the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,” with the spirit as the
expansive theory that seeks to nudge at if not outright destroy the status quo, and
the flesh as the restrictive limitations of the physical world. It may be that there
ultimately is nothing new in the construct of the enigmatic signifier, as, through
the use of metaphor, any object can arguably look like everything and nothing in
particular, but certainly the use of the construct of “everything and nothing in
particular” in Postmodern architectural expression is visible.

When its expression is not limited to a physical form, however, the
enigmatic signifier becomes a parallel structure to metaphor.

Though

undoubtedly all signifiers are unstable or at least open to varying interpretations,
this does not necessarily connote an overtly obfuscating tendency—in fact, I argue
that metaphor overall enhances understanding between or among individuals by
providing a negotiated and systematic finding of common ground between the
individual interpretations—in the same way that viewing signifiers as enigmatic
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does. Enigmatic connotes a deliberate mystery, inscrutability or opacity 31 and
stands as a contrast to the expansiveness of metaphor. Metaphor, then, is more
than an “implicit allusion” in that it relies upon explicit expression in order to be
recognized and understood. Rather than relying on an implicit decision made by
a theorist (or architect)—because by making the implication clear, the implication
is that the allusion has only one result—metaphor allows for a range of possibility
in the engagement with an object or idea, with a much broader space for the
individual to assert limeted agency in creating a singular interpretation pursuant
to his unique historical position, intellectual disposition and aesthetic point of
view.

This brings to mind the process of nicknaming, a human creative endeavor
that is not often enough mentioned as a metaphorical element within the
communicative process, but one which I would argue is fundamental to the
progression of our thought and the descriptive means by which we choose to
engage others and to take advantage of “conceptual similarity” while at the same
time expressing some personal engagement with it.

Recent academic articles

focus on nicknaming sports teams or places of historical relevance, but the process

Here I go with the etymology again: the root verb of enigma means “to speak in riddles.” This most
definitely connotes a deliberate, conscious action of making something difficult to understand.
31
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itself as a form of metaphor (or metonymy) is worth mention as a precursor of the
facet of engagement we demonstrate with architecture and our own structuring of
thought.

Though I do not intend to enter into a lengthy discussion of forms of
metaphor and metonymy, as categorizing and analyzing their differences and uses
are much more safely left to literary theorists, I do feel that a quick nod to the
playful practice of nicknaming is of intellectual relevance here32.

Without

becoming trapped by terminology and tropes of expression, the discussion for my
purposes is one of common function rather than literary style and how this usage
impacts our thinking. Much like in the way Charles Jencks describes the naming
and classification of periods as a “necessary fiction” (18) and Hayden White
describes history as the extension of a narrative account, the nicknaming of
buildings can be used as a means of describing a not-exclusive but still-relevant
mechanism by which we appropriate some form of ownership of the structure.
Certainly the process of nicknaming can have a pejorative element, but that
negative trajectory is counterbalanced by the endearing use of the form as well. 33

Again, I feel that nicknaming, like architectonic language to describe thought, is so wholly pedestrian a
phenomenon that we tend to overlook its impact because of its very familiarity. It speaks volumes, however,
in my mind in terms of description, metaphor and individual meaning-making. My own loved ones have
always had nicknames, and only in official capacities do I refer to them by their “proper” names.
32

While I recognize the power dynamic involved in nicknaming and the type of objectification it can
encompass, I stand by the conviction that it is no less or no more detrimental or restrictive a process that
33
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On that note, there are two types of metaphorical or metonymic expression that I
feel relate directly to our engagement with thought and architecture, hypocorism
and antonomasia.

Hypocorism, the use of pet names, is so commonplace that we tend to
relegate it to a low position in terms of intellectual expression if we consider it at
all, but in fact it deserves recognition in terms of an individual’s meaning-making
process. What is more restrictive and defining, yet individual and expressive at
the same time, than a name? A nickname refits an already-defined person or object
into a new frame, and, though the person or object is still the “same” one, the
meaning we have attributed to it has undergone a most personal revision. It is
almost a remodeling or resurfacing, but one which requires at least some level of
familiarity with the object or person. The more familiar the object or person, the
more singular the nickname, and the more personal the association made, even up
to the nicknaming of oneself or the group with which one identifies. Maria
Lugones describes the practice as one example of the “festive resistance” of
curdling-separation that can serve as a means of overcoming or at least managing

selecting an actual name. Even a politically correct nickname—and here I think of ‘curvy’—that can be
viewed as empowering, can be used in a pejorative manner. In my discussion I only address the process of
nicknaming of buildings as a means through which individuals can demonstrate a sense of “ownership” in a
positive way.
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oppression and social commentary (“Purity”, 486) rather than a form of
oppression or control itself. In so far as any type of knowledge can be considered
a form of ownership, and in the Western tradition we at least acknowledge that is
to some degree a given parameter, the reclamation or reestablishment of identity
through a deliberate alternate name choice may speak to processes of inclusion
and further grounds for achieving understanding or knowledge.

The word hypocorism has as one of its roots the suggestion of the Greek
verb “to caress,” and the intellectual caress of redefinition and renaming is a very
intimate and personal gesture indeed. This is the element of metaphor, not the
concrete comparison, not the conceptual alignment, nor the cognitive efficiency
that is most relevant to my project and to the opening of a platform for the
discussion of our approaches to our own thinking.

Comparing two objects,

creating an allusion or streamlining the mental categorization process are all
certainly valuable means of structuring thought, but one goal of my project is to
investigate other perhaps less traditional means of arriving at metaphors and ideas
through inclusion, expansion and openness. This is not to say that it will be
successful, of course, but only that it will have been an avenue explored.

Nicknaming is both reductive and expansionary, of course, but it allows for
an introduction of the personal and affective into the meaning-making process and
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the engagement of a person with an idea or an object. Renaming an object—
whether it is a piece of architecture, a person or an idea in our minds—illuminates
the underlying individual structural framework which privileges certain
personally meaningful characteristics.

This is not unlike Robert Kirkbride’s

description of all of the architectonics of memory (and I would certainly add
metaphor here as well) as “tactics of containment” (31).

Containment

simultaneously circumscribes and liberates a memory, an idea, a name, and in so
doing defines the metaphorical process. Akin to the policy of containment during
the Cold War, in which the goal of “gradual mellowing” of Soviet influence
expressed in George Kennan’s 1947 “X Article” would quickly become the policy
of “rollback” outlined by John Foster Dulles a few years later, containment as a
process of metaphor (or memory) demonstrates our desire to exert conscious
control over meaning-making by defining the boundaries of the metaphor or
memory in order to restrict its power (or applicability). Containing an object,
nation or idea involves delineating boundaries separating one from another, and
recognizing the unique and threatening nature of the object, nation or idea if it
were not tamed or restricted by an outside force.

Naming is a tactic of

containment, nicknaming allows for a personal interpretation (though not always
positive) connotation and re-naming of the contained.
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Antonomasia, though arguably less creative overall, is also important to my
discussion in terms of the redescription process and provides a relevant point from
which a discussion of the private versus the public memorial can be undertaken.
Antonomasia, I would suggest, stands as the more public of the two terms, as it
relies upon some unambiguous and easily recognizable characteristic leading to
the renaming of an object, some universally acknowledged concrete facet. Current
architecture often is subject to antonomasia, and perhaps this is because of its
inescapably public nature34. It seems that recent buildings are given nicknames,
perhaps because the proper names are too laborious or unimaginative or because
of a local desire to express a feeling of propriety, and more frequently these
nicknames become replacements for the actual names of structures. For instance,
there is a Marilyn Monroe tower in Ontario, a Cheese Grater in London, and the
Bird’s Nest stadium in Beijing, all nicknames which are much more imaginatively
appealing and memorable than their proper names of the Absolute World Towers,
the Leadenhall Building, or the Beijing National Stadium.

Strangely, though (or perhaps not so strangely after all), this process seems
to have begun occurring on a large scale towards the end of the Twentieth

Think of how many buildings have nicknames, even here in Louisville. The Cash Register of Humana,
the unmentionable name for the Aegon Center (now 400 West Market) and the “lace building” Kaden Tower.
34
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Century. Prior to this, most famous Modernist structures were and are known by
their proper names—think only of the numerous houses designed by Frank Lloyd
Wright identified by the surnames of the original residents, the many office
buildings by Mies van der Rohe named for their geographic location, their
corporate client or their function—and I would suggest that this antonomasia has
become a much more widespread phenomenon in recent decades because of the
proliferation of images and publicity for architectural structures that have arisen
as a result of technology. One need only Google the Pregnant Oyster building
(yes, there is one), and images of it are instantly available, from all angles, its
interior and exterior, at twilight and in bright sunshine. Even though one may
never travel to Berlin, the image is easily accessed in seconds. We desire some sort
of, perhaps not ownership of, but surely personal engagement with (or
containment of) a structure, even if we have only seen its image. In contrast to the
more personal and private nature of the hypocorism, this public version of a
nickname is the role of antonomasia—the redescription of an object to arrive at
some culturally relevant level of engagement with it.

It is here I would have to both agree and disagree with Richard Rorty in his
statement that “Ironism … results from awareness of the power of redescription.
But most people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on their
own terms...” (89). Though he references people here, I would apply it to our
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processes of approaching architecture and structures of our own thought as well.
While I would agree that there is much power in the process of redescription, it
need not be a power that is confrontational, necessarily, or adversarial, but could
instead represent a power that includes the capacity to unite or to make aware. It
is also not a power specifically appropriated by the ironist, but rather one that can
be embraced on a societal level, not to provide a definitive redescription that is
more privileged than the rest, but rather to provide a space for multiple
redescriptions, all of which are meaningful at the local level, some of which
transcend those limited boundaries into recognition on a public one.

At this point, having acknowledged the processes of metaphor via
nicknaming and in regard to architecture in general, the next step is to apply this
line of examination specifically to memorial architecture. Again, as stated in an
earlier chapter, it is not my intent to parse out distinctions between monuments
and memorial architecture. For the purposes of this study, any structure which is
designed to commemorate an event or person is considered memorial architecture,
no matter whether it is public or private, and no matter its shape or name
(including a museum). My intent is to examine whether our patterns of
engagement with a structure—and the structuring of thought that runs parallel to
that engagement—reflect anything specific to memorial architecture that is not
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present for architecture in general. In other words, (how) does knowing that a
structure is a memorial affect thinking?

Before examining the specificity of inscription and returning to the
delineation of public versus private, the overall process of memorializing itself
might be mentioned here as potentially one that can be described as a process of
metaphor.

Metaphors, as Christopher Tilley writes in Materiality of Stone:

Explorations in Landscape Phenomenology, are “creative and infinitely generative
in their allusions and the manner in which they permit the creation of meanings.
They are not an embellishment or an elaboration of an originary and primary
literal language but constitute its very essence as a mode of communication.” (23)
Monumentation can be described as a metaphorical process made tangible in its
range of possibility (though I hesitate to say “infinite,” as Tilley does, since I
contend that containment and exclusion are always parameters of thought, no
matter how creative), but at the same time must be recognized to be
simultaneously limited by the means chosen to represent its “purpose,” or what
set of things we are intended to understand from the monument. Kaja Silverman
describes the function of metaphor, framing it in terms of absence, writing, “Each
[element] recalls, but does not replace the other; the distance which separates them
is as important as their initial juxtaposition.” (112) So a literal association between
a named memorial structure, a tombstone or a war memorial for example, and our
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psychical associations with it could be both as closely linked as intended but also
as far removed from each other in the same way that architecture and philosophy
are linked in interdependence yet remain forever separate and distanced from
(and by) each other.

Architect John Whiteman writes, “Nothing is actually happening in
architecture, at least not all at once; there is no single story for it to tell. Indeed,
architecture is the limit of narrative, at least when it is successful as architecture.
If a story can be told of a building, there is, I think, a certain kind of architectural
failure there”. (51) Though this statement might initially seem deflationary, it can
also be viewed as further evidence that (“successful,” whatever that is)
architecture is not the ultimate thing that is discussed when one discusses
architecture. When we talk about a building, the discussion is of our thought, and
our ways of thinking about architecture and about ourselves. We construct a
Cathedral in our own Raymond Carver story so that we may share our
understanding and meaning with others. In one view, architecture is not a story,
rather it allows a space for the telling of stories; it is a limitation on narrative
because it is not a narrative—it is the place in which narrative and thought are
grounded. Architecture is bound by its physicality, and there reaches the extent of
its story (which reflects Whiteman’s position). Any narrative architecture “tells”
is one that has had a human agent at its root and any architectural metaphor
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employed is the result of a conscious human effort to structure and rationalize our
engagement with existence. The metaphor of architecture and the architectonic
linguistic structures are apt descriptors for philosophy and the structuring of
human thought because they are always removed from them just as they are
always being relied upon. Architecture itself is not doing anything to us35, rather
we are making and interpreting it and always have been, but it is a useful construct
for allowing us to understand the parameters and limitations of our own thought.

From another perspective, however, architecture can indeed be seen as a
story, one that runs parallel to many others. Though admittedly I tend to agree
with Whiteman above, I recognize that writ large, architecture, like any other
construct, is one of any number of nodes from which meaning can be derived. The
concept of an overarching teleological narrative has been subject to Postmodernist
and pluralist critique and was exposed as lacking. In the contemporary moment,
coexisting narratives certainly have room for expression in a way they did not
decades ago. One of these narratives, of course, is that of the traditional Modernist
view, but now alongside and intersecting it exist a multiplicity of other

…phenomenology aside, and I leave that can of worms for someone else to open. And there is some
contention that in recent decades architecture has forgotten all about people. How architecture could possess
the ability to forget is beyond me, but I would agree that theory and design appear to focus more on form and
presentation.
35
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perspectives. It is through these marginalized perspectives that we can begin to
understand and incorporate new narratives. Whether architecture is a narrative
itself is debatable, and it is my assertion that architecture can be used to facilitate
the development of narratives more easily than being one itself, however the
presence of compelling competing views on this subject suggests that this would
be an area for future personal research and contemplation in order to develop my
thesis further.

Metaphor and naming, public and private, representation and restriction,
within these parameters we can begin to discuss memorial architecture and the
possibilities it provides. There does seem to be an inherent difference, of course,
between memorial architecture and architecture in general, if for no other reason
than inclusion of the descriptive adjective, but questions remain regarding what
that difference could be and he ways in which it might affect the structuring of
thought. Perhaps it is simplest to begin with the concrete example of the most
obvious difference—that of the inclusion of the name “memorial.”

Because

metaphor and language are the means by which we make our thoughts—and
make our thoughts known—the inherent having-been-named quality of a
memorial must surely serve a function in the way we first conceptualize the
artifact and the structuring of our thought around it, without immediately and
consciously addressing the form of the memorial itself. Scholar James E. Young
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quotes Austrian writer Robert Musil: “There is nothing in this world as invisible
as a monument. They are no doubt erected to be seen—indeed, to attract attention.
But at the same time they are impregnated with something that repels attention.”
(13)

The attraction certainly is that of the monumentation process—the

Augustinian gathering up of and making room for thought in a delineated space—
while the repellent (or I prefer to restate it as the element of disappointment, since
“repellent” sounds unduly harsh) facet of the actual form of the monument is that
its very concreteness, as with every image, makes it an always-inadequate
representation of memory. In order to counteract this inadequacy, inscription had
traditionally played a part in the framing of memorial architecture, but I suggest
that it only serves to extend the jointly operating forces of limitation and liberation.

Clearly, inscription and ornamentation are traditional, almost ubiquitous,
Western features of grave marking, indicating corporeal location and, perhaps
more importantly, serving as a tangible trigger for memory of the deceased.
Because the memorial structure is designed to reference the eternal (or at least
stand in temporal longevity), as discussed in a previous chapter, the most common
material of formalized memorialization is stone36. From a historic standpoint, the

The roadside memorials and temporary “shrines” to victims of tragic or violent deaths serve as a fascinating
parallel to this and blur the distinctions between public and private memorialization even further, but those
36
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etymology of the adjective “lapidary” in English can be traced back to the Latin
root for “stone,” not only in terms of a precious stone or jewel but also in a manner
connoting considerable brevity and precision in language.

Because stone was

(and is) expensive, as was the actual engraving of the stone, since ancient times the
language of the memorial has been necessarily concise, and thus restrictive. Even
in present-day usage, the adjective “lapidary” is used to define language as
“suitable for engraving … elegant and concise” (OED.com). What had surely
begun as economic prudence has developed into a Western cultural tradition of
transmission of factual data about the individual deceased: name, date of birth,
date of death. These are the salient features of a recognized and commemorated
life, perhaps serving as a reminder of the equalizing force of death as well.

One means of acknowledging individual existence and serving as a counter
to the presentation of merely factual data, almost a nickname of sorts, is the
epitaph, an attempt to summarize the life experiences or Weltanschauung of the
deceased into a short string of words. An epitaph can problematic, of course, since
in an attempt to summarize the life of the individual, it necessarily directs and
limits our thoughts about him. Occasionally, however, its brevity can allow for

practices are intentionally not included in my discussion because they deserve much more attention than I
could give them here.
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and encapsulate a fundamental nuance of a person to all who might have known
him.37

When one has not personally known the deceased, however, the

possibilities for interpretation are circumscribed in a construct more or less akin to
a historical inquiry—assimilating secondhand information (or perhaps anecdotes
or artifacts) into an “image” of the deceased upon which then the epitaph is
superimposed. The message is only interpretable through the once-removed filter
of history, and is thus questionable in terms of the possibilities for a “true” or
“individual” interpretation by the observer. To counter this linguistic restriction,
epitaphs have often been carefully crafted to reflect just the right sentiment about
the deceased for posterity. Though last words can serve the same purpose, the
effect is rather different with the epitaph because of its lasting, written nature—an
immortal nod to their existence or a catchy slogan to remember them by. One
epitaph which can be described as meta (before there ever was such a thing) might
be that of 18th Century architect Sir Christopher Wren, buried in London’s Saint
Paul’s Cathedral, which he designed. It reads: “If you seek his monument, look
around you.” If one did not already know that Wren was an architect, or that he

37

I would be utterly remiss if I did not mention here the impact one person’s chosen future epitaph

has had upon my thinking, both in terms of this dissertation and, more importantly, of my own
life. And that is: “Here lies Mark Blum: He tried.” It is a most delightful summation for a most
delightful human being.
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had designed the cathedral, one might interpret this statement to say that the
cathedral stands as a monument to God. However if one is aware of Wren’s
occupation, one understands this epitaph as the architect’s arguably vainglorious
pat on his own back.

In either case, the epitaph is a usually self-chosen

representation of the person after his death, and our thoughts are very much
directed toward a specific interpretation if it, particularly if we have no personal
connection with the deceased.

In a private monument, the deceased is directly represented by name, but
in a public (or, more precisely here, a collective) one, the process of naming the
memorialized may only serve to intensify the otherness of the deceased. The
language chosen for an epitaph, an inscription or a name interprets for us, of
course, and we exhibit our tacit complicity in this process each time we view a
monument and immediately question for whom or what purpose the monument
has been erected. This reveals our dependence on the process of naming (and here
I would include metaphor as a kind of analogy-based naming process) or labeling
to garner a basic type of meaning, if only to narrow the parameters of the topic of
engagement. We need someone to have given us the words by which we can
identify the beginnings of our thought. Certainly, to be considered a memorial, a
structure implicitly contains a differentiation between a cultural past and present
in a way much different than the private memorial in that there is no necessary
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undercurrent of inclusion in the private monument. In a 2008 article, Anita
Kasabova writes that, rather than means of establishing continuity with the
present, memorials are in essence semantic means of dealing with the past. She
justifies her position by analysis of grammatical tense, asserting that “a past event
is the antecedent grounding a present situation” (1), and presents an interesting
linguistically-driven presentation of the role of history and memory in memorials.
The difficulty with this, as intellectually fruitful and engaging as it is, lies in the
fact that the development of a tense-based analysis leaves (or opens up) room for
other semantic problems—what constitutes a “past event” or a “present situation,”
and in which ways these term might be applicable to and complicate our
understanding of a memorial. Distinguishing past from present is in my mind not
a problem for which there is a strictly grammatical means of distinction, however
for the purposes of my discussion here, Kasabova’s assertion that the past grounds
the present combined with the traditional view that they are distinct temporal
constructs will suffice, though the problems associated with doing so are readily
acknowledged.

Culturally, we as subjective viewers are quite comfortable with the process
of memorialization when its intended object is represented clearly for us
beforehand and when we have an expectation of our engagement with the
structure, in other words, to paraphrase Kasabova, when we know how to
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interpret the influence of the past event on our present situation. Intuitively
memorial and monument are familiar territory, the already-known, comforting in
the nod to the eternal, solidly defined in meaning, and tangibly representative of
our memory. It is this complacency with the traditional form that should be subject
to the same processes as the disciplines of architecture and philosophy themselves:
sollicitare, a shaking of foundation, a gnawing through of edifice. The sacred place
which the collective monument inhabits is by its nature restrictive and oppressive
to our memory--we are, after all, nothing short of instructed how and what to
think, though I contend this may not be such a bad thing after all.

Georges Bataille interrogated the overarching problem of public
architecture in his 1929 essay “Against Architecture,” observing that “the form of
the cathedral or palace is the way the state or church speaks to the masses and
imposes silence upon them.” Of course, Bataille uses strong language to make his
case, but considering this statement with a milder eye and only in regard to
memorial architecture can reveal that the imposed silence is both mutual and
volitional, that the “silenced” benefit from the limitation. The version of silence
that culture (or language) uses memorial architecture to place upon the individual
(and I do believe this is the case, as difficult as the wording is) prohibits the
construct of “infinite possibility” to which I objected earlier, but nonetheless
allows for the making of some, but not just any or all, versions of meaning. Here
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is what I might call the ultimate influence—purpose is certainly too strong a
word—of memorial architecture on culture, and architectonic language on
thought. The parameters of each allow the freedom to work within them, and the
established boundaries afford room for the framing or creation of meaning,
something I might describe as purposefully directed thought which nonetheless
retains room for individual variability and experience. In her article “Thinking
About Ecological Thinking,” Lorraine Code expresses a similar description of
boundary drawing as a necessary delimiting force in expressing thought because
including and understanding everything is admittedly impossible. She goes on
to add that at the same time boundaries may be thought and lived piecemeal, this
does not mean that the result is necessarily one of “fragmentation, contradiction,
or isolation” (192).

Thought can only be approached with the hopes of being

partially understood or recognized when viewed within boundaries and
parameters we knowingly place upon it. Though Bataille surely has it correct in
terms of government and organized religion exerting control over and silencing
the individual, memorial architecture has little to gain, in fact it couldn’t gain
anything if it wanted to, from our engagement with it or its parameters. Rather
than an agent, it is a symbol, a metaphor, or a ground

The linguistic turn and human agency are certainly still issues of contention
among theorists, postmodern, poststructuralist or otherwise, and while I
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acknowledge those scholars who suggest that humans are no longer agents of
history but rather “patients” or objects, that is not a discussion to which I can
contribute anything new, nor does it serve my purposes in providing a platform
for the discussion of architectonic language on our ways of thinking. It is worth
noting, however, that throughout this document, in every circumstance, it is my
working assumption that a human agent is creating the image, choosing the
language, and employing the metaphor. My discussion of “the architectonic
language of philosophy” always presupposes human agents using the language,
creating the philosophy and describing the thoughts, while statements regarding
architecture “providing a space” naturally also presuppose a human agent
creating the structure. The architecture and language only exist because of the
human creation of and use of them and in no way do I intend to suggest that either
has any agency. When either word is used with an action verb, the presupposition
is that the noun—language or architecture—is in its final state, already created or
chosen by humans. In this way, architecture and language are even more strongly
tied to each other in the expression of human thought, in that they become the
means by which humans solidify and transmit their ideas to each other. Just as
there is an architect behind every structure, there is a speaker (or chooser) behind
every utterance. As I will argue in my final chapter, humankind is not finished
with our former ways of being human quite yet.
117

To be clear, my intent with this discussion is not to propose a new means
of approaching agency or a revision of any former approaches, but only to mention
possible means we can employ to analyze our own responses to memorial
architecture, only one of which is that of the human as an object. Fitzhugh and
Leckie describe “… the theorist’s privilege of standing outside history… [as] quite
literally an out-of-body experience” (63)38. Theory, as will be addressed in the
following chapter, is undoubtedly useful as a means of structuring thought but is
not the definitive means through which thought can be structured. For my
purposes, too heavy a reliance on theory could over-complicate the discussion of
memorial architecture, or at the very least can be seen to discourage or minimize
otherwise valid perspectives, including those of individuals informed by the
already-known but not completely restricted by it and those of individuals who
have been traditionally excluded from it.

Whether individual memory exists in a capacity that leads to meaningmaking in the present is certainly debatable, but again exploring a definitive
answer to this question is outside the scope of this study. For my heuristic

This article deals with the present/future position of the historian in the wake of postmodernist theory,
relying on, of all things, cognitive science for a new direction. I found this idea fascinating, and I would have
liked to incorporate more of my thoughts on it, but they would stray far from the focus of this document. I
disagree with their claims about Foucault, the closed-system of language and the possibilities for change-they make it sound as though being trapped in a paradox is a bad thing!—but it nonetheless got me thinking.
38
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purposes, here I consider individual memory to be a variable, always-biased,
incomplete but nonetheless valid construct based on the experiences and
predispositions of a single human operating within the cultural, linguistic and
phenomenological environment of his time. From that standpoint, I would have
to disagree in part with James E. Young’s statement that, “A monument turns
pliant memory to stone.” (Texture, 13) As discussed in the previous chapter,
memory can always be considered pliable, open to revision and falsification, and
singularly unreliable. To suggest, then, that a monument asserts restrictive agency
over a constantly-shifting human process is far from the position I would be
willing to take here. Individual memory and meaning-making are not crystallized
and frozen in a memorial, but they are instead given a set of parameters, without
the concrete form of which they could not be examined at all.

The memorial,

perhaps most moderately but appropriately stated, might be best described as
providing what Maarten Delbeke calls “an analogous space.” (99) Here the
metaphor, with its parameters that allow some—but not too much—room for
meaning-making, affords the human memory a place to interact with the concrete
as a process of metaphor. Rather than provide the definitive version of the
conceptualization of a memory of an event, a memorial influences the human
ability to reconceptualize, revise and restructure one’s own meaning-making
processes and one’s own ways of thinking about thinking. In other words, akin to
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the role of architectonic language in philosophical inquiry, a memorial might be
considered a starting point for further thought, a descriptor for the mode and
language of discussion, and a means of filling in the gaps in individual or cultural
knowledge so that numerous versions of understanding and perspective can be
reached about an event.

Memorial architecture is, of course, very often collective in nature, and by
use of this term of course one is drawn into yet another semantic conundrum. Is
a collective memorial the same as a public one? Where do the boundaries of the
term collective begin and end? Who is included within the collective—only those
who are commemorated or are the observers included as well? Here a nod to
Habermas’ public sphere is in order, not in terms of politics or economy, but rather
in terms of whether the public and private should or even could be separated in
terms of memorial architecture.

His contention that publicity by design is

manipulative is both true and untrue when applied to an engagement with
architecture. Certainly any object, idea, design or thought can be viewed as
manipulative, and for political and economic systems this holds its own set of
problematic outcomes, but when one expands a consideration of the process into
an intellectual or philosophical realm, manipulation need not be so negative a
term. What if manipulation of thought were akin to manipulation of, say, a limb
during a medical exam—a method of determining range of motion, possibility,
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strength—or physical therapy, when manipulation is conducted for a therapeutic
purpose? Manipulation of material in clothing design reveals the way it best falls,
fits, or can be combined with other materials into a garment. If we are indeed
manipulated by a making-public, in the case of architecture, this may be a
desirable phenomenon after all.

By employing architectonic language in

philosophy and by regarding memorial architecture as a path of meaning-making
of past events, we can actively participate in manipulation of our own thoughts—
not with the negative connotation of trickery, but with the medical connotation of
investigating the range of motion and strength of the ways in which we think, and
with the textile-based connotation of continual readjustment and interrelation to
both itself and unlike “textures”. In this way, manipulation loses its negative
connotation and becomes another manifestation of the platform for inquiry and
discussion that I have posited throughout this document.

Considering

manipulation in its diagnostic and therapeutic capacity can open our notions of
thought, collectivity and the historical process (and that’s just for starters).

Considering the way metaphorical processes influence our thinking, one
can trace this pattern of simultaneous restriction and expansion even further when
regarding inscription upon a piece of memorial architecture. Clearly, inscription
amplifies the always-suspect role of language, and my intention here is again not
to revise any theories or present any new ideas, only to suggest possible avenues
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for ways in which this could serve to frame our thoughts. In order to arrive at a
very small-scale discussion of inscription for current purposes, however, I will
limit my comments to inclusionary and temporal elements, acknowledging that
the selection of any elements will always be reductive and incomplete.

First it seems that the question of enumeration, a version of inscription,
should be quickly addressed. As a popular example of memorial architecture for
the past three decades, Maya Lin’s Vietnam Memorial lists names of 58,000
servicemen who died in that war, an extensive, personal acknowledgement to be
sure, but one which opens the question as to whether this memorial is somehow
more meaningful or how its meaning might be different because of what is
considered to be its more personal nature. In terms of metaphor, one could liken
the Vietnam Memorial to an extended gravestone which recognizes the
individuality of each fallen soldier. General Westmoreland, in fact, proclaimed
the structure a “masterpiece” because of its simplicity of form and enumeration of
each death in chronological order. This would seem to point to an efficacy in the
simple act of inscribing names (a lapidary conceit) that allows for very personal
engagement with the memorial, but one wonders if this could also serve a barrier
to achieving understanding of the significance of the entirety of the war as an
event. Almost in opposition to this drive for observers to find the name of their
loved one and achieve some personal meaning from the memorial, Maya Lin
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explains that she specifically did not talk to veterans about their experiences in the
war because she would consider that “prying into other people’s business”.
Though she considers viewing the memorial to be “an act of participation”
(Lectures), the distance between the “business” of other people, herself, the
observer and the structure itself is apparent in her approach to the design and
stands as recognition of the simultaneous presence and absence (or perhaps
nearness and distance might describe it better) of the observer when viewing the
memorial.

Popularly the perception of the Vietnam Memorial is that the inscription of
individual names makes it unique in meaning-making possibilities among the
monuments in Washington DC, but with the overabundance of singular nodes of
information39 the ability of the observer to focus on the general, rather than the
specific, could easily be diminished. So the very element of inscription that makes
Lin’s memorial personally poignant on one hand could also be seen to shift
perspective from the entirety of the event to the loss of a particular individual on
the other, and in that way stand as a large-scale version of a gravestone rather than
a collective memorial. When one steps back from the inscription, however, and is

39

Here I use a sanitized replacement for the word “names” to remove any suggestion of

disrespect for the deceased
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able to focus on the structure itself, its material, shape, and size incorporate
physical (but not overtly linguistic) elements of metaphor into the meaningmaking process.

In his book on Deleuze and the culture of memorialization, Adrian Parr
writes, “…the [Vietnam] memorial is opposed to memorialization in that it doesn’t
attempt to look back and pass judgment or lay blame….it presents a nonhuman
wound: a landscape that has been sliced open…” (71) Though here Parr is
granting agency to the structure in a way I am not willing to support completely—
as stated earlier, I believe the memorial is a metaphor or symbol available to us for
use but that does not exert complete agency over the observer (much less be
capable of passing judgment or laying blame)—his conceptualization of the
structure as a “nonhuman wound” is apt for shifting the observer’s perspective to
the large-scale event (or perhaps atrocity) rather than the small-scale individual
tragedy. Pan out to the entire structure, the whole of the sliced-open landscape
instead and the Vietnam War as an event becomes the focus parallel to the fallen
soldiers40. The metaphor of a wound still allows for a connotation of what
Rowlands calls an implication of injustice and a desire for revenge in a “bad

The Vietnam Memorial does not delineate whether the war or the individual lives are being commemorated,
unlike other memorials which are more specifically named. Here I think of Eisenman’s “Memorial to the
Murdered Jews of Europe.”
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death.” (131) This is a concept easily adopted for a Holocaust Memorial, but one
that becomes much more ambiguous for the Vietnam War. If the individual names
are the focus, the representative nature of a “bad death” becomes much more
problematic and potentially offensive whereas the metaphor of a generalized
societal wound allows for a less troublesome recognition of the possibility of
injustice and a suggestion of revenge, as Rowlands suggests. The event itself can
culturally be viewed as contributing to a process involving “bad death,” but
making that statement with regard to an individual opens up possibilities for
judgment of their actions or prejudicial in terms of their worth. Nonetheless,
memorial architecture inherently contains an element of the healing after—if not
revenge for—an event despite its taking shape as a gaping wound, a dissembled
and fractured Star of David, or any other signifier of discord and trauma.

The second element in specifically memorial architecture that can open
further room for discussion is that of temporal relevance. As noted, one basic
element of a memorial is that it refers to or symbolizes a past event, and this means
that metaphorically it serves as a bridge between that past event and the present
observer. Defining an observer in the present, of course, is a complicated issue,
but in order to discuss the memorial works in the following chapter, I would
subcategorize the observer here in three ways: one who experienced the event (a
veteran or Holocaust survivor), one who has a personal but not firsthand
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relationship to the event (a family member of a veteran or Holocaust survivor),
and one who has only a culturally- and historically-based knowledge of the event
with no direct personal connection. Undoubtedly this oversimplifies the role of
the observer, but here this threefold distinction can contribute to the platform for
discussion without overwhelming it too many variations and too many
definitions41.

Clearly a firsthand participant in an event, a veteran or survivor of an
atrocity will have a much different qualitative response to a memorial in terms of
memory and subsequently meaning-making than the other two types of observers.
This position I would suggest could be the one from which a phenomenological
engagement with a structure could be most easily communicated, since the
actual—or it is perhaps better to say personal—memory of an event could certainly
have connection to the physical form of the memorial that is beyond the symbolic.
The middle position, that of a family member of a soldier or survivor, is similar in
that the memorial is personally relevant, connected, if not to the firsthand
knowledge of the event, then to a direct participant in that event. What impact

I think here of one of my students in a 20th Century History class who said she considered herself a
Holocaust survivor, since her grandparents had survived the concentration camps. The entire class hour that
day we discussed the nature of being a survivor. I would consider her self-identification outside probably
what is the norm, and I couldn’t begin to address all of the possibilities here.

41

126

that circumstance has upon the meaning-making process surely depends upon the
level of identification the observer has with the role of their friend or family
member, and here an opportunity for continuing study of this indefinite, liminal
position would be productive for developing my ideas beyond the current project.

The third position, however, the one most observers arguably find
themselves occupying, is that of the “detached” outsider for whom the event is
only familiar through a historical or cultural lens. This is the observer whom I
have referenced throughout this document, and, though incomplete and
superficial as it is, my discussion will continue to assume this as the default
position of the observer in this work. As earlier stated, I am not delineating a
phenomenological experience of the structures in the following chapter or of
memorial architecture in general, only recognizing some possibilities for using the
works as grounds for discussion and analysis of the ways we structure our
thinking, not what we think of them or how we experience them.

Here the Freudian notion of a visual form being able to liberate a person
from a compulsion to relive the trauma is worth consideration regarding those
who have suffered no trauma from the event. Does a collective trauma exist for
those with whom a connection to the event is non-existent? Imagine a group of
eighth-grade students on a school trip touring monuments in Washington DC.
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They may know of the Holocaust, they may have a vague sense of World War II,
but their ability to connect to the memorials and to make meaning from them is
very uncertain and probably undeveloped.

While there may be a sense of

historical significance, there is also the looming question of what is it “supposed”
to mean to a kid born over five decades after the war ended. Adrian Parr describes
the role of memorials in overcoming our present circumstances by “the legitimate
synthesis of utopian memory thinking: … a practical experiment with the
empirical material of memory and the real conditions of history.” (5) When a child
has no “empirical material” outside of perhaps a textbook unit on America in the
twentieth century (presuming any middle or high school class makes it past the
colonial period), the meaning-making process becomes quickly overwritten by a
prepackaged version of an explanation of why this structure is important. Even
in terms of the way many adults view memorials, the already-known element of
the event is the focus, and the meaning-making process may be left
uninvestigated42.

This question of generational appeal and relevance of a memorial becomes
more significant when one considers the virtual imagery available which

A museum at least affords some relief from this superficiality through more personal exhibits, but exhibits
are excluded from my discussion for that very reason. They do not constitute memorial architecture in my
view.
42

128

precludes the necessity of having to visit a structure in person. Here a nod to
technological advances is certainly in order, since to some degree a visit to a
memorial (or gravesite) could traditionally be described as a manner of
pilgrimage43. When a visit is planned, contained expectation guides the thoughts
we have along the way. Those middle school students walking down the Mall in
Washington DC at least must shift their focus from, say, Abraham Lincoln and the
vague knowledge they might have gained about him, toward the World War II
Memorial, during which time the more distant past and nearer past overlap. This
travel time, as it could be seen, allows space for some mental engagement with the
journey—even if that engagement is at the most basic level of asking “What are
we seeing next?” A pilgrimage or journey toward the physical structure at least
provides time for a spatial organizational mechanism for our engagement with a
piece of memorial architecture, an opportunity for the building of anticipation, a
wondering of how the structure will look or what form it will take, perhaps some
reflection upon the event and whether the memorial will contribute to our
understanding of it.

In this way thinking about thinking about the

An interesting psychiatric study on a pilgrimage to the Vietnam Memorial by veterans suffering from
PTSD done in 1995 (Watson et al) showed marked improvement in symptoms short term, but an almost equal
chance of a long term result of improvement or an exacerbation of symptoms.
43
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memorialization process occurs almost naturally when we anticipate viewing a
structure44.

In this age of technological simulation and virtual imagery, instant access
to pictures are supplanting our engagement with memorials, and, arguably, the
processes of thinking that enter into that engagement. Though a discussion on the
virtual and advances in technology is far beyond my ken and my discussion here,
but because of the instantaneous nature of their availability, I do feel a few
comments are warranted. One important result of this virtual engagement is that
it may limit our ways of thinking but not allow for an opening of them in quite the
same way as viewing them in person (or even learning about them in scholarly
sources). Online “visits” are often accompanied by comments and reviews from
any number of people who need no qualification or expertise to share their
thoughts, and though there is certainly room for this type of discussion in
examining the effects on our own processes of thought and meaning-making, it
can derail or interfere with our processes of thinking. Oftentimes these comments
will include “don’t miss” elements or will provide factual information (though, to
be sure, many others are often drivel), and, while this may be helpful, it at the same

In popular culture, and here I think about National Lampoon’s Vacation movies, people are often impatient
when viewing architecture and reluctant to “take it all in,” but somehow this impatience and reluctance are
subsumed under our human desire to recognize and commemorate historical events.
44
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time reduces the desire to imagine, predict or speculate as to how one might arrive
at meaning from the memorial. As Barrie Fez-Barrington explains, “The more the
internet bombards us with images and solutions the less we have the time to
‘picture’. Design may be a lost art” (6). This reluctance to “picture” things or to
anticipate experiences in our minds is a worrisome societal trend as people become
more impatient with speculation, introspection and a playful sense of uncertainty
in favor of Googling factual data (usually promptly forgotten anyway), looking up
what one is “supposed to get” from a structure, or giving in to a growing
enamoration with what is the often perfected form of the virtual over the actual.

With memorial architecture, the distance is already present between the
structure and the observer—the very distance that allows for but simultaneously
restricts

the

meaning-making

process—but

achieving

and

maintaining

intergenerational relevance is of some concern when we think about how this
process informs our own structuring of thought. The “middle man” here, the
middle ground, of physical presence and temporal absence, is usurped by the
always-insurmountable distance of the virtual. My intention here is not to say that
the virtual is not itself another valid form of reality of course. Here I only hope to
point out that the restrictions on the meaning-making process with memorials and
the impact of the distance on the architectural language of our thought are brought
into sharper relief as technologies advance. In ten or twenty years, when our
131

vocabularies

have

incorporated

countless

numbers

of

yet-unimagined

technological advances, the question will be to what end will this process work
alongside—or to what degree even replace—the architectonic language of thought
dating back to before the ancients and to what extent to future generations will
consider memorials even to be relevant in their physical forms.

The one reliable bridge for communication between the virtual image and
the concrete form, however, is metaphor. The image is a representation already,
and if this representation can be likened to a representation of the physical
structure, the metaphor can serve almost to “triangulate” the space between
them—in other words, to provide a structuring for the comparison of thoughts
and object/image. Anne Friedberg’s 2006 book The Virtual Window provides a
coherent and historically far-reaching look at the shifting perspectives from
framing thought in single, traditional forms (what she calls windows) toward
multiple simultaneous windows of the virtual. She illuminates the shift in a
successful Western format of the singly-framed concept while at the same time
describing the expansion of our historical conceptualizations to include the virtual
as well. The metaphor of a window is appropriate for the development in our
processes of thinking about thinking and the language we employ to do so in terms
of my current search for the parameters for a discussion platform for these ideas.
Though I would not say that virtual imagery completely restructures our
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concretely based architectonic thought processes, I would indeed agree that recent
technological advances have nudged at the boundaries of the ways in which we
frame our discussions about them, and in response we must continually
investigate new ways to open widows to incorporate them.

So to bring the discussion back to where it began—the metaphor—we
ought consider the possibility of a literal metaphor such as the Welcoming Hand
of Singapore combining with a memorial metaphor of an event in the historical
trajectory, expanded by a window into the generationally-relevant world of the
virtual and technologically advanced as a metaphor for the metaphorical process
itself. Sobolev lists conditions of metaphor as logical contradiction, conceptual
incongruity, and nonexistence of a given entity in a given world or textual context,
empirical falsity, banality or a true but pointless statement. (906) All of these
conditions are met—and welcomed—when we begin to discuss how metaphorical
processes might inform our engagement with memorials and with architectonic
language and thought.

Examining architecture, memorial or otherwise, using metaphor allows us
a glimpse into that which lies beyond both architecture and memory but at the
same time encompasses them both. To this end, Tilley writes of materiality and
meaning, describing the means by which this transverse process can best be
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undertaken, that is, through the use of “carnal phenomenological ‘thick’
description” rather than a “thin, analytic account” (28). This view, however,
privileges the sensory experience and risks reducing the process of architectural
metaphor to that secondary and inferior position in which philosophy has often
endeavored to place it. This is an unstable position unto itself, though, since there
is certainly the element of physicality in architecture that is present in the same
way in no other art or method of thinking. The structure must stand, after all, and
at that most basic point, all critique becomes an esoteric (though worthwhile)
matter. This attempt at thick description will follow in my next chapter, with an
eye toward the limits of language and metaphor, thought and expression, but with
the goal of attempting to arrive at a platform for working around/within/beyond
them.
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Part One: In Theory

The difficulty with metaphor, or indeed any inscription or description, is
that by its very nature it includes presuppositions, cultural allusions, preconceived
connections even in the simplest and most direct application of the form. If the
representation is indirect, however, it could carry the risk of misinterpretation,
repression or misuse by the observer.

Between these two exists space for

investigation of the underlying cultural structures and individual interpretations
and the ways in which we analyze our own thoughts. Superficially this may
appear to be no different from language use in general, but the complexities of
language and meaning are taken a step further by applying or carving those words
(or images) onto or into structures.
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As a work of clearly but minimally inscribed architecture, the World War II
Memorial in Washington DC illuminates and allows for analysis of the processes
of construction of meaning and representation through overt but streamlined
inscription and ornamentation, while in contrast the Holocaust Memorial
Museum in the same city presents as an almost overdetermined example of
ornamentation and inscription which may serve to hinder the meaning-making
process. Though the processes of meaning-making and psychical representation
among observers are certainly similar, in this chapter I contend that simplicity of
inscription and imagery allows for a more complex characterization of the role of
memorial architecture than does an overabundance of information, imagery and
architectural representation. Direct representation in a more simplified form
ultimately may provide a more solid framework, both philosophically and
aesthetically, for the memorializing process and the making of individual meaning
than a form that is overdetermined, overwhelming, and intentional in its
structured disorientation.

This being said, however, the effect of disorientation and dismantling by
Postmodern theory and the expansion and contestation of pluralist theories were
a necessary development in the progression of our structuring thought leading us
to this difficult-to-define contemporary cultural and historical moment. Yet again
a version of the traditional dialectic is in process—the rigid structure and
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formalizations of historical Modernism and the counterbalancing de-structuring
of historical Postmodernism45 allow for a synthesizing effect, not with the goal of
providing a definitive answer or eliciting a revolutionary approach, but in terms
of the creation of a new space for communication of ideas, allowing for a possible
means of address for what Richard Rorty calls the problem of “overcoming
authority without claiming authority” (105). I argue that we are experiencing a
moment in which the patent structures of authority in Modernism has been
overcome, thanks to the destabilizing interrogative processes of Postmodernism
and pluralism, but at this moment no new cultural form of authority has taken
shape. What an exciting time to be involved in the processes of thinking about our
ways of thinking—we are not bound by the rigidity of Modernism, but we are not
completely destabilized by the dismantling of Postmodernism. We are able to
return to the stability of Modernism but it now appears in a newer, wiser and more
relevant way, all because of the critique it bore. Though the current moment has
been characterized as “contemporary” by some scholars (Smith, 683), the term

When I use the terms Modern and Postmodern in this document and particularly this section, I am speaking
from a historicist perspective rather than one of architectural styles. I recognize the awkwardness and
difficulties of this choice, but I use the terms throughout as centered around ways of structuring thought
rather than ways of describing formal styles.
45
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“neo-Modern” is probably more apt since it retains the connotation of a new
version of an old theory, period or style46.

This is the claim that I intend to make, first by discussing the theoretical
tenets of Postmodernism and examining to what degree the theory holds up in
terms of architectural representation and processes of communication and
derivation of cultural meaning, then by describing what appears to be a return to
Modernism via a neo-Modernist perspective. The difficulty, of course, lies in being
able to meaningfully distinguish neo-Modernism from its ancestor, but my
contention is in keeping with Terry Smith’s assessment of neo-Modernism being
“old modernism in new clothes” (685). At this moment, a heuristic definition is all
that is available since culturally and intellectually we are still in the process of
developing the parameters of both the theoretical and stylistic elements of neoModernism. For my purposes in this text, however, I will define the term as the
return to the theoretical goals and ideals of Modernism, re-imagined and reworked after experiencing and surviving the dismantling of Postmodern theory
and the inclusive drive of pluralism. Once we made the step of removing the
ground from under ourselves (what Derrida described as a continual process of

Of course, as soon as I say that, I realize the shortcomings of the term neo-Modern, a significant one of
which is the idea that in other “neo-“ periods, the original one had come to a definite end. I do not think
this (having ended) is the case with Modernism at all, but this term is the best one we have at this point.
46
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gnawing away its own foundation), we had nowhere to go. The only direction
was back to the foundation of Modernism, though it is certainly now less certain
and we are less idealistic.

To be sure, Postmodern architectural theory does shake the foundations of
Modern architecture’s assumptions about structures and space as well as
interrogate the process of memorializing through architecture and inscription.
The very solidity and clarity of the Modernist memorial are held under necessary
scrutiny, dismantled, and laid bare. The process was necessary to illuminate the
ongoing reliance upon Modernist structures (altered though they may be), but
here I would agree with Josh Toth, author of The Passing of Postmodernism, that if
Postmodern theory had been carried out as an aesthetic endeavor, “…it would
have ceased to move. It would have become absolutely silent.” (179) The role of
Postmodernism on our thought, then, might be analogous to a gesture, which is
defined by Merriam-Webster as “a movement [usually of the hand or head] to
express an idea or meaning”—and, importantly, not an idea or a meaning itself.
The gestural quality of Postmodernist theory was valuable in its role as metaphor,
but the practical application of the metaphor does not allow for resolution or
forward progress into Postmodern architecture.

In Part Two of this chapter, I

will discuss the ways in which a neo-Modernist memorial allows for a different
type of meaning-making than a Postmodernist one.
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This illustrates the

shortcomings of Postmodernist theory, not in intellectual importance but rather in
practical application for a new trajectory of thought distinct from or beyond
Modernism.

I would suggest that the process of Postmodern theoretical disassembly and
critical unbuilding has revealed the strength of the (neo-)Modernist architectural
memorial and, pertaining only to the role of the memorial in my discussion, does
not hold up well when subject to its own interrogative processes. To what degree
this holds true in other disciplines or arts is certainly debatable, but here I limit my
discussion to only memorial architecture and our meaning-making processes
associated with it. Though I am captivated by the inscriptionless Postmodern
memorials such as the 2008 Pentagon Memorial for victims of the 9/11 acts, my
aesthetic fondness for structures such as these are distinct from my discussion of
the function of a memorial. On the other end of the spectrum of Postmodern
memorial structures are those with an element of pastiche, a multiplicity of
references and an amalgam of styles, such as the World Trade Center 9/11
Memorial (which recently experienced some considerable controversy over a
commemorative cheese plate) or the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington
DC. I will suggest that the overrepresentation of the Postmodern memorial does
not fare as well as the less ornamented neo-Modern one in terms of opportunity
for meaning-making and the discussion and structuring of thought when held
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under its own processes of scrutiny. It is not my intent to deliver a new critique of
Postmodernism, to redefine or extend the definitions of neo-Modernism, or to
posit some alternative means of memorializing, I only intend to raise questions
about how neo-Modern and Postmodern forms and critiques apply to memorial
architecture, both structurally and in terms of inscription, and offer my thoughts
on those questions.47 It seems that at this moment, a new path forward has not yet
emerged, and, after grappling for purchase during Postmodernism and trying to
gain a footing with the expansive scope of pluralism, we have had found ourselves
returning to our Modernist roots to find a foundation. Though altered, it still exists
as stable.

To this end, we might recall the problematic nature of metaphor and
representation in memorial architecture, specifically that the processes lend
themselves very easily to overdetermination. The old Mies Van der Rohe stock
phrase “Less is more” deserves a fresh consideration—not from a singularly
Postmodern standpoint, but rather from a temporal distance from what could be
considered the period of “high Postmodernism” from the 1970’s through the
1990’s.

Neo-Modernist memorial structures, based on Modern architectural

One of my recent student evaluations read: “I wish she would stop questioning everything and just give
us definitions already.”
47
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theory itself, have emerged more solid in the shadow of the dismantling of the
very base structures of Modernism, something that arguably Postmodern theory
was not able to demonstrate using its own processes. “Less is more” now has a
patina which could only have developed after we have seen that too much can
indeed be too much.

To delimit the bounds of Postmodern theory, it may be useful to consider
as a basis Robert A. Stern’s three stylistic hallmarks of what he calls the
“postmodern position”:

contextualism, allusionism and ornamentalism (47).

First, contextualism might be very simply defined in my own words and for this
purpose as the relative belief (not to say truth) held based on circumstance which
may or may not lead to closure or finality, allusionism can be viewed as the
reference to an already-acknowledged artifact, and ornamentalism defined as the
decorative (not necessary for function) embellishment of a structure (or thought).48
Acknowledging that a thorough critique of these terms is beyond my scope here,
the problematic nature of the “Postmodern position” exemplified in these three
defining characteristics necessitates a brief discussion.

Though it is far from any relevance to my current discussion, I particularly like that “Ornamentalism” is
the title of a 2002 book by historian David Cannadine suggesting the manner in which Britain viewed and
justified its Empire.
48
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First, contextualism, though certainly allowing for a multiplicity of
meaning-makings because of the lack of certainty (or closure), presents the
problem that if one adheres to a pattern of contextualizing and re-contextualizing,
one may simultaneously be prohibited from the arrival at a conclusive individual
meaning. Philosopher Keith DeRose posits a tiered approach to the dilemma of
arriving at acceptable levels of knowledge or closure—such as the old question as
to how we decide whether we have hands or not—depending on whether the
context or knower is “skeptical” or “ordinary.” I feel, however, for my purposes
that this distinction will not suffice because my objective is to present a platform
of discussion wherein “ordinary” and “skeptical” may coexist and co-operate. To
make a distinction between the two is recontextualizing the definition of
contextualizing.

Here I think of the word “focus,” which in its scientific definition denotes a
place from which rays converge or diverge to reflect an image or the point from
which rays appear to proceed and which in its common usage suggests the main
purpose or the center of an activity (OED.com). Both of these definitions of the
word reveal the difficulty of maintaining an overabundant position and truly
acknowledging a pluralistic viewpoint while effectively maintaining a clear
platform for discussion—to incorporate a multiplicity of perspectives, to pan out
to the larger image, means to sacrifice some precision and detail within the image
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reflected, in other words, to lose focus. The attention to empirical fact that can be
the focus of an investigation, if not entirely lost, could become diluted in what
could be considered a parallel to a less clearly delineated drive for inclusion, but
it can also open up possibilities for expansion, or as Code discusses, the choosing
of “points of contestation” of the dominant cultural perspective through which
parameters could be expanded and challenged.

In order to counterbalance the shortcomings of the traditional Western
canon, we must respectfully acknowledge a pluralistic view on thought and
existence, while at the same time recognizing that doing so will involve some
measure of exclusion. Perhaps it is a necessary (or even unavoidable) evil, but one
which is employed by pluralist scholars as well. Black Feminist Thought necessarily
excludes a focus on the religious view of Asian males, not to its detriment, but to
further its drive for specificity and clarification of one of many positions within an
acknowledged global, multicultural and multiperspectival context. Because the
canonical discussion has traditionally centered on Western white males is not
justification for the assumption that it continues to signify oppression, repression
or cultural hegemony now that culturally we openly recognize the value and
existence of a multiplicity of alternate perspectives. What contemporary (that is,
post-Postmoder and -pluralist) questions about defining our current position may
now allow room for is a partial rehabilitation of the canonical Western
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viewpoint—no longer as the dominant perspective, but as only one perspective in
a diverse field, no better or worse than any other, no more or less exclusionary
than any other in a manner not dissimilar to what I am suggesting has occurred
with our partial, informed return to structures of Modernism to describe our
current situation—wiser, shaken, more inclusive, with its limitations exposed, and
the better for it.

This is not to say, however, that space does not exist for other perspectives
or that they are in any way to be minimized. In fact, as I suggested throughout
this document, the creation of space or of a platform from which multiple
perspectives can be addressed is a necessity of the very position in which we find
ourselves as scholars attempting to categorize the current historical moment.
While I would agree with Lugones that the conception of the vantage point
assumes unity, I would disagree that this unity necessarily derives from a
mechanism of control by a dominant traditionally-male perspective (Purity, 465),
at least at the contemporary cultural moment. Instead, I would argue that a true,
over-arching vantage point is as impossible a construct as an all-inclusive
perspective, and that the unities—plural—are temporary, variable and multiple.
There are only contingent vantage points, agreed-upon by those who identify with
a particular group, or negotiated among different positions. To say that a single
vantage point exists (and that it can still be attributed to the Western white male
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perspective) is simplifying the issue in a way that I feel it can no longer be
simplified.

An acknowledged difficulty of including multiple perspectives, however,
is the risk of placing them uninvestigated in what become dominant perspectives
of their own parallel to the traditional one of the Western white male. Medina
addresses this issue throughout The Epistemology of Resistance and suggests what
he terms a “polyphonic contextualism” that encourages the development of the
conditions under which “contestatory practices of social commentary” can occur
and flourish (265). The self-reflective extension of critique and contestation of
inclusion during the process of inclusion demonstrates what I feel to be a marker
of transition in the contemporary period, informed by pluralist thought, away
from the limitations of Postmodernism toward whatever this period may be
named, neo-Modern or otherwise. Mindful inclusion that is self-reflective and
open to the same processes of contestation applied to traditional dominant
perspectives offers a practical guideline for ways in which perspectives from the
margins can both be included but simultaneously interrogated for instances of
their own underlying structures of dominance.

The other two qualities of the Postmodern position, allusionism and
ornamentation, deserve brief mention as well, though they do not differ
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significantly from similar processes in Modernism. Allusionism, I might suggest,
is a catchy new word for the age-old literary and historical processes of making
analogies and references to the past. This term, now especially popular in film
studies, for the purposes of architecture does not signify a meaningful departure
from the common process of referring to the past through reintroduction of iconic
elements of former styles or eras. From a literary and linguistic standpoint,
however, it is important to again note the role allusion plays in metaphor and our
representation of memory. Ornamentation, on the other hand, has been discussed
from its absence—or better said, restriction—in Modern architecture, but when we
consider the role of ornamentation for its own sake, represented by pastiche,
intermingling of design elements from various past eras, and combination of new,
unrelated elements, the process reveals itself as one more complication that may
result in hindering rather than expanding the parameters for our thought and our
engagement with memory and meaning-making.

The presence of an

overabundance of options, positions or ornaments is just as surely a process of
erasure, only the form of erasure is through an ever-expanding desire for
inclusion, impossible as it is to achieve completely, which may result in a less clear
path toward knowledge.
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The role of the Holocaust memorial in our cultural awareness, which James
E. Young calls Wiedergutmachung49, stands almost as a cultural expectation.
Arguably, we observe Holocaust memorials to derive a sense of comfort or healing
from them, even more so than in the case of a traditional memorial. There is a
degree to which Badiou’s statement that, “Death alone is proof of life. Finitude
alone is proof of the transcendental constitution of experience” (268), without
introducing, as he does, the role of God in this observation, is particularly
applicable in the case of a Holocaust memorial. Certainly part of its function is to
instruct and to warn, but undeniably an undercurrent of resilience and survival
exists in every exhibit, traumatized and unheroic though it may be depending on
the individual survivor. But this undercurrent applies not only in terms of those
who actually survived, but I would suggest also and particularly in terms of the
observer—who did not experience the event—in that the structure affirms the
observer’s own existence by reminding us of the survival of others.

Though James Ingo Freed, the designer of the Holocaust Memorial
Museum, does not specifically claim to be a Postmodernist, his perspective on the
purpose of his structure would seem to be in line with Lyotard’s assessment of

Again, one has to love the German expression. In English we have no word that simply says “makinggood-again.”
49
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Postmodernism in that it “…doesn’t seem committed to the same issue of
founding in general [as Modernism does]. The job of establishing a foundation—
that of philosophy—is first of all considered to be useless and secondly hopeless,
that is, neither competitive nor performative.” (190) Though Lyotard here is
discussing theory in general, not specifically architecture, the message here is
certainly analogous. I hope to illustrate throughout this chapter the ways in which
Postmodern theory remains true to its ideals but the manner in which the theory
ultimately fails to allow itself adequate room to be translated into architecture. In
other words, the critiques suggested by Postmodernist and pluralist theory reveal
that architecture itself independent of theory cannot exist without a foundation,
and that in answer to those critiques, philosophy is now situated at a point of
redefinition from which the question becomes how thought might or could further
develop in the absence of an established foundation.

A movement towards

inclusion still creates exclusions if its own, however, in much the same way that
Postmodern theory excludes its application by critically undoing the
circumstances under which it could be subject to its own critique. As Medina
notes, the critical factors in our current pluralist position are self-knowledge and
awareness of others’ positions in an intersection of what he terms a “knowledge
of social contextuality” (134).

Despite the inclusion of others’ perspectives, the

social contextuality of which he speaks is still a version (although fluid,
149

conditional and much more informed) of a foundation, and it still requires the
exclusion of some perspectives in the definition of its parameters.

The

contextuality and the knowledge stemming from it are only possible given a
certain set of social and cultural boundaries from which to analyze thought. In fact,
Medina points out the necessity that “subjects are unimpeded in their processes of
knowledge acquisition” (169) in order to fully employ his thesis of cognitive
minimums—in other words, to achieve self-knowledge and incorporate the
knowledge of others’ perspectives requires freedom from oppression or
domination by a cultural force not one’s own. Though certainly he is speaking of
the traditional, White-male dominant culture, and the idea of achieving
knowledge through an unimpeded process is appealing, the difficulty of that
situation is that in a world after post-pluralist critique, the nature of an
“unimpeded process” itself is likely as unachievable as a structure that is held up
by its own ruin, to paraphrase Derrida. Opposition and resistance are only
possible when there is a force to be opposed or resisted, and, while I agree with
Medina that resistance is a means for the marginalized to achieve greater
knowledge, the epistemology of resistance is also an impediment to the
knowledge acquisition of those who are marginalized in other ways and especially
those who either choose not to resist or are not aware of or able to articulate the
extent of their own oppression.
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Part Two:

Neo-Modernist (or neo-Fascist?): The World War II Memorial

The World War II Memorial in Washington DC, though not completed until
2004, stands as a neo-Modernist monument to those who fought in and
contributed to the effort of the quintessential conflict of the Modern era. The
Greatest Generation, the defining event of the Twentieth Century, the pinnacle of
inhumanity, all of these descriptors contain within them, but arguably do not
overstate, the position of WWII in our cultural memory as the culmination of the
unholy alliance of mechanization, dehumanization and modernity. Clear heroes
are outlined against unapologetic demons, and the easily defined nature of the
conflict into good and evil allow our perspective as Americans to become one of
benevolent dominance and moral correctness. Though admittedly this position is
easily questioned regarding its simplistic assessment of truth, and while it
certainly directs attention away from many well-documented negative issues
about American involvement in WWII, this Memorial concretely and
unequivocally represents the dominance and superiority of the prevailing
American version (or cultural experience) of the event through its military, and to
a lesser degree civilian, achievement. The simplicity of the outer structure as well
as the rather minimal use of traditional ornamentation underscore and bring into
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sharp focus the single purpose of the memorial: to celebrate victory. In fact, on
the floor of each of the northern and southern pavilions is inscribed “Victory on
land. Victory at sea. Victory in the air.” There is no room for misinterpretation;
American dominance in the event is undeniable.

This unwavering positioning of unity and commonality, heavy-handed as
it may appear, could in essence serve as the defining strength of the memorial by
almost paradoxically allowing more possibilities for the motivated observer to
arrive at his own meaning. With a firm foundation of clear representation and the
ideal, the observer might more freely construct his own thoughts and process of
memorialization relying on, and in so doing allowing room for contrast to, or as
Medina says “contestation of,” the strong framing of the message. I am suggesting
here and throughout that the questioning and analytic process has more room for
growth in a situation with an external restriction of choices rather than an
abundance of them. A 2004 book (and now a TED talk) by Barry Schwartz, The
Paradox of Choice, outlines this process.

Though Schwartz discusses the

phenomenon from a business/economic or consumerist standpoint, his basic thesis
could easily be applied to the way in which we engage with and make meaning
from memorial architecture, and in turn how those processes both reflect and
restrict our approaches to and expressions of thought. When one is faced with too
many possibilities, Schwartz contends, one encounters what he calls “choice
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paralysis,” a loss of the ability to identify what is desirable. (Here we can look
back to Freud’s assertion that the object desired is not the focus so much as the
experiencing of the desire itself.) Often the result, again here with consumer
purchases, is inaction, but the same could be said of too many choices—or too little
restriction—when we engage with architecture and the means of structuring our
own thought accordingly. The mechanisms at work are psychologically relevant
in an engagement of neo-Modern and Postmodern aesthetic styles of
memorialization—when faced with too much possibility, the individual must
streamline or reduce, whereas when presented with a restriction of choice (or in
this case, what I might call instead an abundance of certainty), the individual is
able to expand or develop, both of which allow for more creative meaning-making
and thought.50 Rather than infinite possibility, well-defined restriction has been
shown to be the more effective structure for the exploration and development of
our thought. We have returned to some familiar forms of Modernism, though they
may present themselves with new layers of clothing.

One could also argue here, as many former Catholics I know often say, that this is similar to being exposed
to formalized religion as a child. Cadge and Davidman also write of this occurrence in an article on
assimilation and acceptance in those raised as Buddhists and Jews. It can be a worthwhile experience because
it gives one a set dogma against which to push back by exploring one’s own perspectives and allows for a
firm foundation with which one can disagree.
50
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The World War II Memorial presents a clear message of triumph and
exhibits a familiar, comforting structure for the viewer—symmetrical pillars,
perfectly aligned ornaments, and short, clear inscriptions, all in capital letters—
organized in a high Modernist arrangement of a traditional memorial (which
TIME magazine even criticized for appearing “too fascist”). The use of stone and
symmetry do certainly reference the neo-classical style of Mussolini’s Italy and
Hitler’s Germany, but the structure, perhaps because of its very “fascistic” style,
allows for a direct and immediate corralling and containment of memory into the
era and a glorifying commemoration of a defining event in American history. As
the National Park Service website summarizes, “Above all, the memorial stands
as an important symbol of American national unity, a timeless reminder of the
moral strength and awesome power that can flow when a free people are at once
united

and

bonded

(www.wwiimemorial.com)

together

in

a

common

and

just

cause.”

Nuance and ambiguity have little place in this

memorial. Rowlands observes that “… one of the features of nationalist war
memorials has been their capacity to turn traumatic individual deaths into acts of
national celebration and heroic assertions of collective value. Freud, writing on
the death instinct, was this transition from negativity to positivity as a
fundamental feature of mourning” (130), and the World War II Memorial certainly
fulfills this function. The individual death is subsumed under the national effort
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and the collective victory, and the focus of the memorial is the achievement of the
nation rather than the individual effort. This stands in stark contrast to the
Vietnam Memorial with its inscribed individual names, of course, but perhaps in
its generality becomes more conducive to meaning-making processes because of
the focus on victory and sacrifice on a national scale rather than personal loss.

These functions were the focus of the World War II Memorial’s architect
and designer, Friedrich St Florian. A native Austrian who was 12 years old at the
end of World War II51, St Florian had personal memories of the war, but since the
majority of his life has been lived in the United States, he identifies with being an
American. He has been at the Rhode Island School of Design for decades—in fact,
he states that he considers his career to be a marriage of both designing and
teaching architecture (Builders)—as well as maintaining his own architectural
design group. Both the neo-classical “fascistic” architecture of his youth and his
identification with American victory and dominance on the world stage are clearly
visible in his design and translate well to observers and the Battle Monuments
Commission as well. The placement of a new monument along the Mall was a
contentious issue, with some opposition feeling that any new construction would

He tells of his parents being strongly opposed to the Nazi regime, but when Americans rolled through
Austria, St Florian recalls being scolded by his mother for admiring the Army’s Jeeps.
51
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minimize the impact of the existing presidential monuments, but, as St. Florian
pointed out in an interview, the McMillan Plan of 1902 sought to retain the spirit
of L’Enfant and Washington’s original design from the 18th century, combining
“simplicity with dignity,” but at the same time endeavoring to allow for the
development of future monuments within the Mall area (Cornell).

When

designing the World War II Memorial, St Florian chose to lower rather than raise
the memorial plaza so that the view between the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials
would not be obstructed and reduce some of the grounds for opposition while
allowing the monument to maintain both its own and the Mall’s planned
structural integrity.

The goals of this memorial, according to St. Florian, were to evoke the
memory of WWII and simultaneously to act as a framing device for the two
presidential monuments (American Builders Quarterly). His expectation was that
visitors would not only think about World War II, but also about the two great
presidents whose monuments flank the WWII Memorial in order to incorporate a
sense of America’s history before the Twentieth Century as well. To be sure,
because his client was the American Battle Monument Commission (with many
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other government agencies putting their two cents in too)52, St. Florian’s original
design underwent some modification before it was built.

Namely, an

underground museum (here I think of the one at the Memorial to the Murdered
Jews of Europe in Berlin) and the plan of having “decapitated” columns to
represent lives cut short in war were jettisoned from the original design. Added
to the structure as enhancement in the view of the Commission were the 4000 gold
stars onto what was intended to be an unadorned commemorative wall. The
architect did not ultimately object to the modifications, stating ''In the end, I do not
feel it has been compromised; in many ways it is a better memorial,'' he said.
''Although it's different, and I liked the original design, it fulfills what I perceived
in the beginning. It fulfills the objective. I am very happy.'' (Times, “Academic
Touches the Masses)

Located along the National Mall in Washington DC, a short walk from the
Jefferson Memorial at one end of the reflecting pool and opposing the Lincoln
Memorial at the other, the National World War II Memorial stands in an open oval
arrangement with a shallow pool and fountain at its center. As one approaches
from the Mall, the Memorial’s pillars denote its boundaries with the tallest (43-foot

A case even rose to the level of the Supreme Court in protest of the design, but the Court decided not to
hear it, and a Congressional measure was passed which prohibited further legal actions against the
memorial.
52
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high) pillars representing the Atlantic and Pacific theaters at the north and south
ends of the structure. The 56 smaller (17-foot high) pillars, one for each state,
territory, and the District of Columbia, form an oval outward from the anchors of
the main pillars, and are arranged such that when one approaches from the east
or west, the space between them provides for an open gate, a clear path.
Approaching from the east, directly from the Jefferson Memorial, one sees that the
WWII Memorial perfectly frames the Lincoln Memorial down the length of the
reflecting pool. A short series of three staircases leads the visitor up to the
structure itself through a vast open entryway53. Ringed by the 56 stone pillars with
the taller pavilions at each end, the interior space is flat to the ground and
curvilinear in layout, and the water of the fountain in the Reflecting Pool sprays
in short but symmetrical arcs at perfectly spaced intervals with two higher
fountains appearing parallel to the northern and southern pavilions. At the west
stands a curved memorial wall, Freedom Wall, adorned with 4048 simple gold
stars to commemorate those who lost their lives in the war.

The pavilions on either end stand in symmetry to one another, and under
the granite shell each has four bronze columns that support four bronze eagles

Of course, wheelchair access is available via gradually elevated sidewalks. These side gates are also
alternate entry points for anyone, though the overall effect is diminished somewhat.
53
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holding a single victory laurel which wraps around the high interior. Each of the
four facades of both pavilions simply has the word “Atlantic” or “Pacific”
inscribed upon it in widely-spaced capital letters. On the floor of each pavilion
(along with the victory inscription noted earlier) is engraved an image of the
victory medal and simply the years 1941-1945. These pavilions are flanked on the
interior of the memorial by shorter walls upon which the major battle sites of each
theater are listed. The shorter walls curve to encompass a walkway along which
visitors may slowly ascend from the entry level of the fountain to the elevated
pavilions on each end, passing state pillars along each side.

The 56 pillars themselves are also made of granite, with the name of a state
or territory simply inscribed in capital letters, and they are arranged by order of
entry into the Union, alternating from north to south54. The pillars have bronze
forms of oak or wheat wreaths symbolizing victory and are united by a bronze
rope connecting them. Since one naturally gravitates to the state with which he
has some connection, each visitor is able to achieve a personal relevance with that
single geographical reference. The foundation is solid, the memory is fluid. Like
the pavilions, each pillar has open space, a narrow vertical opening through which

This north-south alternation is still somewhat baffling to me. Though date of entry into the union is a
reasonable method for arrangement, the alternation seems to complicate the matter with little to gain in terms
of overall meaning.
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light passes when one views the pillar straight-on. From an angle, however, the
pillars appear to be solid granite, almost enlongated and narrowed versions of
gravestones. The slits in each, however, contribute to the feeling of expanse and
grandeur rather than making the visitor feel encircled or trapped, and it is at the
bottom of each slit, ranging from a few feet below to a few feet above eye level,
that the name of the state is engraved. As the visitor walks down the slight incline
from each pavilion (where the pillars’ inscriptions are lowest) he must continually
raise his eyes toward the inscriptions on each successive pillar, each of which is
elevated by a slightly higher base as the walkway angles down toward the plaza
and fountains. At the highest, the inscriptions are still easily readable, however,
at just a few feet above eye level, and the slow elevation of the head to continue
along the walkway results in a subtle, almost unconscious gesture of reverence.

The west end of the memorial is Freedom Wall, a 9-foot high by 84-foot long
concave structure upon which are uniformly arranged 4000 gold stars
commemorating the over 400,000 Americans who lost their lives during the war.
The gold stars, of course, reference the common wartime practice of hanging a
small star in the window of a household which was home to a soldier. Blue stars
indicated an active duty serviceman while a gold star indicated that the soldier
from that household had lost his life in the war. Each of these 4000 stars along
Freedom Wall represents approximately 1000 dead servicemen in an overtly
160

anonymous yet numerically powerful representation. A low granite runner stands
before the half-circle created by the concave wall, and upon this running wall is
inscribed, again in all capital letters, “Here we mark the price of freedom.” The
price is marked as a collective rather than a personal one.

Other areas of the memorial offer various inscriptions—quotes by Generals
Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall as well as Presidents Roosevelt and
Truman, among others—that are succinct (one is tempted to say lapidary),
straightforward, and unequivocal. One or two of the quotes reference the role of
women in the war effort while another mentions contributions of those on the
home front,55 but primarily the focus remains on struggle, sacrifice and victory.
Those from President Truman are most clearly of a commemorative nature, since
they were made after the war and focus on heroism and sacrifice, while some of
those by the Generals reflect statements made while the war was still in progress
as well56. The quotes from the Generals are perhaps the most moving, as they
reference the active element of participation in the event, and evoke the most

Personally, and here I reveal my often-hidden traditional side, I am troubled by the drive toward
“inclusivity” in a war memorial. While I would not deny the impact of those back home who lent their
support to the war effort, I feel that the heft of the memorial is somewhat diluted by their inclusion. As
someone who would never serve in the military, I do not think I deserve the same recognition as those who
do.
55

A complete listing of these (and all) inscriptions on this memorial is available at
www.wwiimemorial.com.
56
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emotional response in terms of the focus on American achievement and victory.
My favorite is that of General George C. Marshall which reads: “We are
determined that before the sun sets on this terrible struggle our flag will be
recognized throughout the world as a symbol of freedom on the one hand and of
overwhelming force on the other.” The appeal of this statement is its calmly
ominous, utterly determined approach toward unequivocal victory.

It is

simultaneously terrifying and reassuring. In 1942 when the statement was made,
US involvement was at only one quarter to one third of the duration of its overall
wartime participation, yet the fixity of purpose and the foreboding tone are
particularly effective in encapsulating the intent of the memorial and in clearly
delineating the position our involvement in World War II would come to play in
our cultural heritage. In the same way, all of the inscriptions are concise, clear,
and unwavering in tone and content while they suggest nothing short of total
military and moral victory. In that way they both completely support and extend
beyond the materials, arrangement and form of the memorial structure itself.

There were of course controversies surrounding the inscriptions, since
historical accuracy and relevance are so closely associated with the process of
choosing words for memorialization, and strangely the two most well-known
surrounding this memorial are religious in nature. One example of this is the
alleged omission of the phrase “so help us God” in a quote from a speech given by
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Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 8, 1941 in response to the attack on Pearl
Harbor. The American Battle Monuments Commission and the World War II
Memorial Commission have taken great pains to address this allegation, actually
publishing the entirety of President Roosevelt’s speech on the National Parks
website. The speech reveals that the original speech actually did not contain the
phrase at all, so it could hardly have been omitted from the memorial. More
recently, controversy arose from an allegation that President Obama refused to
allow a prayer to be read at the Memorial in 2011, again not borne out by factual
evidence. In a secular controversy, access to the Memorial was temporarily
blocked in October 2013 as part of negotiations in the government shutdown,
angering some veterans and giving conservatives some fodder for dissent. Again,
these controversies are questions of a current-day political nature rather than one
which questions the direct applicability of the memorial to processes of
commemoration of those who died in World War II.

As mentioned above, other controversies arose around the Memorial, but
they were primarily those of placement along the Mall57 rather than the intent of
the memorial. Certainly there were complaints about the Albert Speer-like style

There was a movement in the late 1990’s through around 2000 called “Save the Mall” which took issue
with the memorial allegedly defacing the pristine neo-Colonial promenade of the Mall.
57
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of the memorial (which St. Florian felt could perhaps have been a trumped-up
personal slight against him as an Austrian) but otherwise, the cultural
controversies were less related overall to its intended purpose or message than to
opposition to its location and form. The design was challenged by critics as being
too bland or traditional, exemplified by a New York Times review of the structure
which read: “… the design of the National World War II Memorial diminishes
the substance of its architectural context. The design does not dare to know. It is,
instead, a shrine to the idea of not knowing or, more precisely, of forgetting. It
erases the historical relationship of World War II to ourselves. It puts sentiment in
the place where knowledge ought to be.” (“Appraisal”) While I would agree that
there is little architecturally revolutionary in this design, I would not agree that its
form translates into a “shrine to not knowing” for the reasons I have incorporated
into this entire project—the knowing (which I would suggest is more
appropriately called “thinking”) arises as a result of the definitive message of what
is to be thought about (World War II) and the clear presentation of the parameters
within which it can be discussed (the architectural form). In my view, it is indeed
a clear shrine to knowing (thinking) in that it unequivocally, if predictably,
illustrates the subject and the message, making the process of forgetting utterly
impossible for the reasons outlined in previous chapters. Memorializing as a
process is antithetical to the process of forgetting an event, and a clear message
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allows for the proliferation of engagement with individual memory and meaningmaking58. The critic’s comment that the memorial “…represents our yearning for
the timeless and eternal to distract us from the relative and the complex”
(“Appraisal”) is as reductive, simplistic and unimaginative as it alleges the
Memorial to be. The relative and complex are best afforded room for discovery
and discussion when there is a firm sense of the timeless and eternal (or what I
have been calling a firm foundation) from which to extend thought.

To offer an example, the ascending orientation of the pillars and the rigid
symmetry of the pavilions for the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters remind one of
almost literal translation of architecture in modernity, one which could be
described, as Hornstein does, as an ‘architecture of the heart’: “[an] architecture
of memory and imagination that is not a physical and functional object in space,
fixed in a geographic location. Instead…there is an architectural construction
recorded daily by each of us as we imagine the world not before our eyes” (15).
The structure, then, is allowing for an imaginative or creative effort of the mind at
least as much as the physical experience of the body, and, though Hornstein

This reminds me of the film “Forgiving Dr Mengele,” wherein local Holocaust survivor Eva Moses Kor is
challenged by other survivors because of her policy of forgiveness toward the Nazis and all Germans. They
contend that by forgiving, she is allowing forgetting to happen. She most strenuously objects, and I am with
her on that.
58
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suggests that it is variable according to the time and the viewer, the underlying
assumption is that the goal is not only recognizable but also attainable by an
observer. The ideas behind this World War II memorial are not only to convey the
American moral and military victory at the time and places of the event but also
to extend the relevance of that message into the present. In The Postmodern
Continuum, Robert A Stern comments that, “for the Anglo-American, [modern]
architecture had to be much more than the Bauen believed by Mies: architecture
had to transcend materiality to become a symbolic-cultural act.” (54) The effect of
the World War II Memorial is certainly one which transcends materiality and
reaches for a noble and symbolic effect.59 It is this mindset that justifies my use of
the WWII Memorial as an example of modern architecture—stylistically, and more
importantly in its intent, the piece reflects our desire for purpose and clarity
through an aesthetic process of simplification and restriction.

At this point, a brief mention of overarching themes of Modern architecture
might be introduced and applied to the World War II Memorial in order to suggest
a few ways in which meaning making might actually flourish in the presence of

Here I specifically choose the word “noble” because of an inscription on Frank Lloyd Wright’s Blue Sky
Mausoleum: “… the whole could not fail of noble effect.” The concept of “noble” in design is ever-present
in Modern architecture and is an aspiration which I am sad to see Postmodernism dismantle. Surely something
must retain its noble status even in the face of relentless critique.
59
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symmetry of form and fixedness of principle rather than an abundance of
possibility. Here I would agree with Lyotard that: “Modernity is a state of mind,
rather than a period or an epoch. The modern turn is ancient. … Modernity started
with an extension of the Christian vision in which there was a general
purposiveness or finality polarizing the course of the world.

A horizon was

proposed…” (188, italics mine). This “horizon” of modernity is yet another way to
characterize the ground, or the foundation, that I have throughout suggested is
always necessary in order for thought to occur. This horizon certainly has been
interrogated and critiqued by postmodern and pluralist theory, yet I would
contend that this horizon, once proposed, cannot be erased or dismantled entirely.
In other words, using a construct of postmodernist and pluralist thought to reveal
its own limitation, a trace of horizons-having-existed will continue to be present
even if we were to contend that the horizon no longer exists. That it was proposed
disallows the expression of a situation of “post-horizon” thought without
simultaneously

acknowledging

the

onetime

presence

of

the

horizon.

Philosophically the horizon can be limited to discussions of truth, knowledge,
reality and humanity, but the existence (or having-existed) of the horizon of
Modernity does shape and circumscribe subsequent thought in what could be
considered a historical process intrinsic to its development and progression. In
other words, once we have experienced a culture in which a horizon was
167

proposed, we are unable to discard that imagery or framework for our thoughts.
Whether we try to outrun or out-theorize the need for horizons, our thinking has
been structured around their presence in what may be a similar process to the
manner in which thought is structured around architectural language as well. We
can recognize them as limitations and challenge ourselves to work around them
in a process akin to the incorporation of pluralist perspectives.

To summarize modern architectural theory in a few (or a few thousand)
pages is clearly an impossible task, so rather than attempting to do this, and
acknowledging the shortcomings of this decision from the start, I have chosen a
pair of statements by modern architects that will allow my discussion to reflect the
spirit and motivation of the theory without becoming a laborious literature review
on the subject. Again, this will serve my purposes of providing a platform for
discussion much better in that representative statements reflecting theoretical
assumptions are more approachable and accessible to the non-specialist, even and
especially to the non-academic, in order to facilitate a conversation about the
possibilities for meaning-making through architectonic structures and language.

At its simplest, the Modernist architectural drive is well summarized by Le
Corbusier’s famous statement, “To create architecture is to put in order. Put what
in order? Function and objects.” If we return to the World War II Memorial in
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light of this comment, it becomes immediately apparent that the structure fills this
most basic criterion of the purpose of Modern architecture from a Modernist
perspective—function and objects are indeed put in order. The primary function
is, of course, the memorializing of a large-scale American sacrifice and clear
victory during the war, and this function is made unequivocally manifest in
numerous structural elements throughout. The perfectly symmetrical pavilions
and pillars of granite reference the unwavering solidity of the American endeavor
and the stability of our democracy, the shallow pool with fountains represents the
life-giving sustenance and eternal renewal of the American victory and moral
superiority (as it is presented—and here I am not debating the truth of that, only
acknowledging the going cultural story), and the open oval arrangement with
pavilions and pillars suggest a position of America as a protector, but one with
open elements suggesting that this protection does not come through force or
coercion, but rather through a benevolent desire to bring others into the fold.60

A secondary function would, of course, be the historical relevance of
American participation in World War II. Indeed, even schoolchildren have a basic
familiarity with the conflict, the American victory (cultural knowledge that the

Not that I would personally agree with any of this, of course, but one must admit that the intended
message is on-point, no matter one’s moral or political feelings about American involvement in WWII or
feelings about patriotism, the military or politics in general.
60
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victory was achieved by the Allies together might be too much to assume here),
and the Greatest Generation, if not in name than at least in international status.
We only need consider our ongoing reluctance to admit our much-challenged and
ever-decreasing influence on a global scale to realize that it many ways our
cultural self-identification is still tied to the period of and immediately after World
War II. We as Americans want to identify with the moral and military victory, the
undeniable rightness of the war against fascism, and the resolute mindset of the
generals and presidents quoted along the walls of the memorial. The Modernist
ideals of transcendence and purpose are again brought into concrete form in the
solid, symmetrical, focused and unambiguous memorial. The function of this
memorial is just as clear as its form. In fact, St. Florian states that in his view
architecture is “…expected to reach beyond utilitarian considerations and stand as
an artistic statement of timeless value.” (stflorian.com)

The second element that should be put in order according to Le Corbusier’s
statement is “objects.” Without going too deeply beyond reiterating that for the
purposes of my discussion architecture does not assert agency outside of the
individual human engagement with it, I would suggest that the objects in this
structure are nonetheless both the visitors and the ornamentation. The visitor is
an object in my view only in the sense that the design of the memorial—which is
far different from saying the memorial itself, since the design ultimately is
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attributable to a human agent—necessarily limits and directs the visitor within the
structure’s framework. I openly acknowledge that we are at present struggling to
define our after-Postmodern, after-pluralism selves and that a part of that is the
suggestion of the post-human. However, unless we somehow manage to escape
the parameters of our own humanity, it is my assessment that these same binding
parameters of humanness (and those of architectural language and architecture
itself) can be considered the stable basis for the fruitful grounding of thought. I
would certainly disagree with Baudrillard in his dramatically-posited view that
humanity is a “spongy referent…[ready] to collapse under its own weight”
(Shadow, 47), and would instead suggest that humans, though shaken, dismantled
and deconstructed, have re-emerged intact as structures and remained in essence
bound by their own humanity in a way that Modernism (perhaps too strongly)
championed and Postmodernism (perhaps too strongly) challenged.

So the human as a qualified object—an objectivity that comes at the hands
of the architect, not the structure—certainly falls within Corbusier’s orderly
parameters for architecture. The design of the World War II Memorial effectively
corrals the visitor, though he has choices of entry points and directions to walk
within its confines, in its protective metaphorical embrace and in so doing affords
room for him to have a clear understanding of the event and the participants
memorialized. Modern architecture has what I might describe as an undeniable
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“well, there it is” quality61, in that the structures are straightforward in form, clear
in intent, unambiguous in purpose. One need not agree with the message, of
course, but the message is undeniably present and thus its presence presents
possibilities for understanding and contestation. The effect of walking within the
oval memorial is that of protection without confinement 62, for example spaces
between and within the pillars allow for an openness to nature but the pillars
themselves along with the pavilions and commemorative wall serve to provide a
sense of enclosure in a historical and cultural moment of greatness. At the same
time, the visitor experiences a sense of freedom in that there is no specific order or
guided path to take, one is free to examine the memorial from any angle and begin
at any area, and the memorial is of such a large scale that even on a busy summer
weekend (like during my visit) the visitor is afforded plenty of room to move
about and regard the structure in relative solitude.

My favorite example of

ordering of human “objects” is the explicit prohibition from entering the pool,
even with one’s feet, even on the hottest summer day. Though this is objectionable
in terms of personal comfort, the underlying orderliness for the sake of aesthetics

In contrast to what I might describe as often postmodern architecture’s eliciting of a “What is that?”
response.
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St. Florian said his only regret after the project was completed was not having an open passage or
walkway from the Western side of the Memorial.
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(in contrast to, say, a museum which forbids interaction with art that could be
damaged in the process) is a manifestation of the goals Modern architecture as
well. It is not, however, an action of the work of architecture at all upon the visitor
(the structure would allow for anyone to just jump right in) but rather a
manifestation of human rules upon each other.

The other form of Corbusier’s object-put-in-order would be what I consider
the “adornments” of the Memorial—and with the caveat that Modern architecture
did look to reduce ornamentation overall, but in this memorial, the adornments
are symbolic, streamlined and on-message63. Though these would also include the
oak and wheat bronze wreaths, the bronze eagles and victory laurel, and the forms
of the fountain and the green space along the staircases, I will only include the
gold stars and the style of inscriptions as examples here. The inscriptions, all
entirely related to the victory of the United States during the war, are carved into
the granite in regular intervals, in all capital letters, in strict keeping with the intent
of the memorial. Their message as metaphor has been discussed, but stylistically
and aesthetically, their presence serves to “ornament” the memorial in a functional

Even Frank Lloyd Wright’s Blue Sky Mausoleum, an undeniably sparse Modern memorial, nonetheless
has an inscription and a slight decorative carving of the granite in the pillar. I am not echoing Adolf Loos
that ornamentation is criminal, nor would I say it is prohibited in Modern architecture, only that it—not
surprisingly—serves a function. Even the two faux-graffiti “Kilroy was here” images on the WWII Memorial
are with clear intentionality.
63
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and precise manner. Their spacing, their brevity, their arrangement all speak to
the strict orderliness of functional representation in Modern architecture
regarding the memorializing process. Similarly, the 4048 gold stars are perfectly
plotted on the commemorative wall, signifying a unity of purpose and an equality
among individuals, but also through the regularity of their placement allowing for
a purposeful image that acknowledges the magnitude of American losses during
the war (though, to be sure, they were a fraction of those in Europe) without
becoming overburdened by specificity or detail.

The process of “putting into order” is effective in memorialization in that
the design of the memorial clearly identifies the purpose, the event, those who are
to be remembered, and the manner in which they are to be remembered. It
stratifies the event in terms of American history and national image and provides
the observer the intended and unmistakable cultural message. This is certainly
not to say, however, that there is no room afforded for critical thinking about the
memorial, rather, the opposite is likely the case—that having a clear message
provides a space more conducive to exploratory thought and meaning-making
processes than an ambiguous, less-defined message.

The design of this memorial reflects the spirit of the second quote which I
feel exemplifies the drive of Modern architecture, Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s
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statement that, “Architecture is the will of an epoch translated into space.” This
observation is at is at its surface easily applicable to the intended message of the
World War II Memorial by even the most casual observer—the position of
America mid-century, victorious, morally upright, militarily powerful and
benevolent, achieved through will and strength. One need have no familiarity
with architectural theory to conceptualize the message, nor is one necessarily
required to have much knowledge about the event itself to ascertain the intended
meaning of the structure. Part of the success of this memorial (and I would argue
Modern architecture in general, for the purposes of my discussion regarding the
architectonic foundations of language and thought) is the undercurrent of clarity
and forthrightness of the message that is to be conveyed. Modern architecture
effectively adheres to a set of its own regular rules and objectives—it is practically
a given that, beginning with the manifestos at the beginning of the Twentieth
Century, the primary goals of Modern architecture are the achievement of
transcendence, function, and simplicity. Friedrich St. Florian understood these
goals and incorporated them into his structure: “The most important obligation
for the memorial is to remind future generations of what the world war generation
did: namely, to go to war and save the world. So that future generations feel
compelled to do likewise.” (NY Times, “Greatest Veneration”) The Memorial has
met its obligation.
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Adolf Loos would extend these ideals to culture as well, stating that “The
evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian
objects” (20), which is admirable in its revolutionary zeal but which falls short of
applicability to the meaning-making process.

Arguably, any structure (or

“utilitarian object”) has some ornamental aspect. Even the most streamlined
Bauhaus baby cradle still employs geometric forms and primary colors as
“ornamentation,” and even an unadorned beton-brut structure (such as
Corbusier’s

1952

Unite

d’Habitation)

has

some

element

of

aesthetic

ornamentation, even if merely the arrangement of the necessary windows and
balconies. The World War II Memorial is not without ornament, of course, beyond
its basic layout and structure, but the application of ornament is limited, and the
focus, according to St. Florian, remains on conveying the vision and purpose of
the era.

However, if one does have even a basic familiarity with the historical
situation of the first half of the Twentieth Century, both internationally and
domestically, Mies’ statement is revealed to have further layers of meaning. The
“will of an epoch” here belies the criticisms of the World War II Memorial’s
“fascistic” style since the will of that epoch—the 1930’s and 1940’s—was arguably
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one of strong, authoritarian governmental structures64, very often made concrete
in the forms of neo-Classical architecture. Even the oak and wheat wreaths on the
pillars—to say nothing of the bronze eagles—reflect this overall spirit of the era in
the West by representing agriculture and industry, images and symbols that were
ubiquitously reflected in Soviet and German art and culture of the time as well.
The will of the epoch, then, becomes much more than a recognition of American
dominance when it is viewed as a particular moment across the West. Of course,
in terms of defining the reality of what constitutes the will of an epoch, I would
agree with Hayden White that “we may very well be able to come to a specifically
historical understanding of reality only by way of the various fictions we impute
to it” (Reflections, 877). Nonetheless, the reality of the epoch—and here I would
suggest the reality is the place at which multiple fictions overlap—is one of a drive
toward nationalism (regardless of the nation) and authority, exemplified by a neoClassical architectural form representative of the epoch it memorializes.

Mies’ concept of the will of an epoch is also worth examination because of
the World War II Memorial’s reinforcement of the idea of the Pax Americana that
would follow the end of the war and last for decades. As stated, the World War II

Of course FDR was often criticized for being dictatorial in his ways (and one must admit his strong
personality and methods did get the job done), so we as Americans were certainly not immune to the
Zeitgeist.
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Memorial was built in 2004, some sixty years after the end of the war and at a time
in which the United States found itself in a less dominant economic and military
world position, yet the message of the structure is proudly unambiguous. Rather
than a simplistic denial of the declining influence of the United States in the past
several decades, the Memorial may be seen to transcend the past by extending the
will of that epoch into the present (and future). The intergenerational appeal of
this structure lies in the clear transmission of the (perhaps bygone) ideal but the
simultaneous making that ideal available for scrutiny and investigation under the
circumstances of the present. Robert Stern notes, “Architecture is at its best, it
seems to me, when it digs deep into culture in order to affirm, and sometimes even
to reestablish, values and ideals. … But at its most basic, architecture must be the
reification of public values.” (61)65 To shake the values and ideals of our nation
regarding our participation in World War II using architecture is actually
counterproductive, I would agree with Stern, since because of its inherently more
permanent nature the making concrete of ideas is an inescapable product of
architecture. The World War II Memorial reifies our cultural ideas of the event

The word “reify” always feels unsatisfying. The German “Verdinglichung” or “Versachlichung” make
for a much more made-concrete thing, even in the word to describe itself. Reify seems like a limp word for
such a process.
65
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and of the role of the United States in it in the most clear, unambiguous, and I
would say successful means possible.
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Part Three:

The Postmodern Conundrum: The Holocaust Memorial Museum

No such impulse toward resolution or certainty is present in Postmodern
architectural theory, in fact, the ambiguity, the dismantling and the unsettling are
inherent processes within it. The Modernist desire to transcend the past is no
longer relevant here; it has been replaced by a desire to interrogate, disturb and
make uncertain.

The Holocaust Memorial Museum stands as a concrete

representation of this theory, and, as will be discussed, remains true to the spirit
of openness and irresolution of the theory but in so doing remains restricted and
confined by it at the same time.

The Holocaust Memorial Museum, also in Washington DC, presents a
much more laden, layered and deliberately disorienting architectural view of one
part of the same period in history. Though American involvement in liberating
the concentration camps does come into play, the focus of the museum itself is on
the actual inhuman acts committed during the Holocaust, told through exhibits of
photographs, artifacts, videographic and written documentation, and personal
narratives. I realize that comparing a memorial with a museum is fraught with all
manner of problems, as I addressed in an earlier chapter, however, I propose to
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look solely at the structure itself and arrangement—but not specific or particular
content—of the exhibits and base this approach on the very name of the museum
itself: The Holocaust Memorial Museum. Its structural design and architectural
arrangement are certainly versions of “inscription” on the museum, but that is the
extent of my discussion here. The individual exhibits themselves and their
contributions to the meaning-making process are far beyond the scope of my
project and are certainly better served by scholars of the Holocaust.

As for referencing the Holocaust itself, Oren Stier writes, “The assumption
that the Holocaust is the ultimate reference point for any contemporary discussion
of ethics, violence, totalitarianism, and the like…is becoming increasingly
commonplace” (208). The Twentieth Century practice of elevating the Holocaust
to the standard by which all other human actions—whether they are atrocities or
philanthropies—are measured actually binds the present to the past and may
paralyze us in an inability to move beyond the atrocity. Certainly any study of
history faces this dilemma, however, the Holocaust finds itself presented as a
catch-all event for human cruelty, reducible to a slogan (Never Forget), and firmly
(and rightly so) defined as the absolute lowest example of modern human
behavior.

181

Customarily, Holocaust memorials have been intended to acknowledge the
suffering of the victims or the deeds of the perpetrators (Rosenfeld, 124) in a clearly
referential manner, often relying upon objects (I remember piles of shoes at
Mauthausen as my first experience) or photographs of concentration camps.
Other well-known and poignant memorials to the atrocity include the iron gates
at Buchenwald, a representation of an overturned chair at the Holocaust Museum
in Berlin, and the monument to the victims of Nazism at the Platz der Opfer des
Nationalsozialismus in Munich (the eternal flame of which, in a strange moment
of irony in the 1980’s, was under municipal review for being lit only during
specific hours on certain days in order to conserve energy)—all of these
representations are solid, clear in their message and traditional in scope. As James
E. Young observes, ““People do not come to Holocaust memorials because they
are new, cutting-edge or fashionable…(they) are produced specifically to be
historically referential…(they) generally avoid referring hermetically to the
processes that brought them into being.” (12)

The memorial function of exhibits is outside the scope of my current project,
but an acknowledgement of the parallel and distinct process of meaning-making
using exhibits or objects apart from their architectural housing should be briefly
noted. The hall of photographs, the pile of eyeglasses, and camp uniforms of the
Holocaust Memorial Museum elicit strong emotional responses from the observer,
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but are not entirely (or perhaps are not at all) dependent upon their housing or the
form of display for that result. Were those exhibits to be displayed in the storefront
strip-mall museum of Holocaust survivor Eva Moses Kor in Terre Haute, Indiana,
they would be no less powerful to the observer, as the artifacts themselves are the
intended focus, not the surroundings into which they are placed. Here one thinks
of the continuing appeal of a famous painting, say, when it is part of a traveling
exhibit. The ephemeral nature of the exhibit is what draws the visitor—knowing
the Rembrandt will only be available for a short time urges the visitor to make the
trip—not the architectural housing which remains constant around it, which could
be viewed at any time independently of the exhibit it holds. Curatorial concerns
about layout, display and spotlighting are certainly to be acknowledged, however,
the structural presence of a traditional museum is not the object visitors primarily
come to see; it remains the backdrop for the exploration of a continual
investigation of unusual objects on display. Though a piece of architecture may
of course be designed as an exhibit (for example, a memorial), museums normally
provide a space for the exhibition instead of becoming ones themselves. In this
document, I do not feel it is necessary to elaborate in depth on the differences
between a memorial and a museum because of the removal of the exhibits from
my discussion.

For my purposes, the structure of the Holocaust Memorial

Museum—as a memorial rather than a museum—is considered distinct from the
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exhibits it houses. The structure was designed to have an effect on the visitor
alongside but not dependent upon the exhibits, and I rely upon that planned
distinction to discuss only the structure, not the artifacts housed within it.

In The Invention of the Historic Monument, Francoise Choay discusses two
causes of the ”… progressive erasure of the memorial function of the monument”:
the first, a substitution of the ideal of beauty for the ideal of memory and the
second, the development, perfection and diffusion of artificial memories (8). In a
way that I find greatly problematic, the Holocaust Memorial Museum contains
hundreds of applications of Choay’s second point. The difficulty here does not lie
in the artificiality of the memories, but rather that memory that is to be created
here is the product of an intentional multiplicity of “diffuse” (which I read as
watered-down and unspecific) memories which attempt to facilitate individual
meaning-making

processes

through

a

deliberate

and

overwhelming

disorientation. I would very much disagree that an erasure of a memorial function
is even possible, regardless of ideals or artificiality of memories (specifically this
last one, since as discussed in a previous chapter, memories are arguably always
reimagined and recalled in some “artificial” form anyway), based solely on the
most basic already-knowing that the memorial stands as a memorial. To suggest
that a memorial could cultivate forgetting is an overstatement which is in danger
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of being more repressive to the meaning-making processes of the observer than
any overt message or purpose might be.

Since the Holocaust Memorial Museum is a more complicated structure
than the World War II because of its numerous areas of display, my discussion
will be limited primarily to the exterior, the Hall of Witness and the Hall of
Remembrance in an attempt to discuss this drive toward a Wiedergutmachung.
Again, as with Modernism, it is impossible within the scope of this document to
summarize the entirety of Postmodern theory, architectural or otherwise, and thus
I have chosen representative moments within the theory to illustrate the
mechanisms by which the theory is effective but its application is ultimately
unsuccessful.

In 1939 at the age of 9, James Ingo Freed, the architect who designed the
Holocaust Memorial Museum, escaped Nazi Germany with his sister and settled
in Chicago. In early adulthood he studied under Mies van der Rohe for a time,
eventually joining “The Chicago Seven,” a group of architects who challenged
Mies’ dominance in the city’s architecture in the 1970’s. By this time, he had been
working with I. M. Pei’s architectural firm for almost two decades and would
continue his career as a part (and partner) of this architectural group until his
death in 2005. Freed certainly was no strict Modernist in Mies’ style, stating that

185

“…Once it is established that a minimalized building is okay, then as that building
moves through the changes that inevitably occur to it over the years, it becomes
minimalized in another way; it becomes marginalized” (Interview, 87). By Pei’s
account, Freed did not have “a brand” (Chicago-Tribune) and designed and
treated each structure separately rather than remaining true to a specific theory or
style. His eclecticism and range dating back to the days of the Chicago Seven
would inform his aesthetic throughout the decades, often resulting in a mix of
styles from Modernist to neo-classical in the structures he designed66. It is difficult
to determine to what extent, if at all, Freed would have considered more eclectic
architecture reducible to the same process of marginalization as the minimalist
designs of Mies in Chicago, but it is clear that his Holocaust Memorial Museum
design, if only due to the nature of the event it memorializes, will likely suffer no
such fate. This stylistic stance (or lack of one) may prove to be akin to the situation
of the overall lack or dismantling of an established foundation in Postmodernist
theory. Rather than being able to progress beyond Modernism entirely, he is
caught in the Postmodern process of what Terry Smith calls “threats of suicide”
(685) with the decisive action never being taken. If the action were taken, the

My favorite of Freed’s designs is the US Air Force Memorial in Arlington, VA. Aesthetically it is a
gorgeous piece, and the symbolism (it mimics a maneuver performed by the Air Force Thunderbirds) is
spot-on.
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structure could no longer exist. Even pastiche and incorporation of varying styles
nonetheless relies upon certain timeless elements of architectural form and
construction without which it would not stand. Postmodern architecture cannot
destroy itself in the way the theory demands.

When it came to the actual design, materials and outlay of the Holocaust
Memorial Museum, multiple outside factors altered Freed’s original design and
influenced its final form. Whether trying to incorporate the healing or forgetting
functions for survivors (which he discussed in an interview as difficult extremes
within the range of Holocaust survivors’ experiences to represent architecturally),
to satisfy the board and city’s requirements for the structure or to contextualize
the event and the structure without becoming too reliant upon simulation or too
close to a sanitized kitsch, Freed stated that he viewed his design as “… an
evocation of the incomplete. Irresolution, imbalances are built in.” (64) The lack
of a stable foundation is indeed Freed’s intent with this memorial and in many
ways he accomplishes that goal, but I suggest that this deliberate and coerced
instability creates difficulty in meaning-making and serves as an impediment to
the expansion of meaningful dialogue and discussion as well. The specific, stable
and known grounds for discussion are purposefully removed or separated, thus
fracturing the experience between individuals by disallowing the consideration of
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multiple perspectives from an acknowledged, though contingent, common and
stable ground.

Here I acknowledge Freed’s point that the individual may have more
freedom in achieving his own meaning through this incompleteness, however, at
the same time I assert that the imbalance and instability work at cross-purposes
with establishing a platform for dialog between multiple individual meanings.
The irresolution achieves multiple individual meanings (though, I would contend,
so do certainty and resolution, only through different processes) but becomes its
own albatross when meaning and thought struggle to achieve expression to others
with a goal of arriving at a common ground. But this, in fact, this was exactly
Freed’s intent, as he expressed in his article “The Holocaust Memorial Museum,”
published in 1989 before the museum was built: “It is essential that people are left
with what separates them more than with what joins them together.” (64)

Freed’s focus on the primacy of the individual memory at the cost of a
communal understanding may be a good means of allowing Holocaust survivors
to work through their own emotions regarding their experiences, but it does serve
as a barrier to the rest of us, so many more in number, who have a desire to
understand from the outside. The drive toward isolation of the individual via a
deliberate and forced sense of confusion, unsettling and uncertainty could easily
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be off-putting for someone who is trying to learn more about the event and what
it says about us as humans, but perhaps that is the only thing that can happen
regarding such an event.

Freed writes, “I believe that architecture can do a lot,

particularly if you are not absolutely overwhelmed by the need to come to
closure…” and that “this building is decisively meant to put you in a deceptive
frame of mind…” (65), hardly intentions that are inclusionary or in any way
indicative of achieving peace or understanding.

This, of course, then raises the question of whether the Holocaust is an event
that is understandable at all. Perhaps the Holocaust remains an event which
simply cannot—or should not—be understood, and, if that is the case, a
Postmodern stylistic form becomes a fitting representation of a specific and
irresolvable moment in history. The continual lack of closure suggests that the
wound of the Holocaust (as exemplified in the great crack in the Hall of
Remembrance) can never be healed. As a memorial, it perhaps indicates to a
degree that culturally we may never be able to relate or understand or learn from
the event. This is not to say that healing and closure are universally achievable, of
course, only that their deliberate preclusion from the memorial serves only to
allow only for engagement and understanding at the individual’s own emotional
level of interpretation. This structure breaks down rather than builds thought and
shakes the foundation so that nothing is left to build upon. As Freed states, the
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structure is meant to be a “resonator of emotions” (73), but here it is worth mention
that emotional response is surely subject to the same limitations as, say, memory
and other psychological processes. If structure and architectonic language are the
cornerstones of our vocabulary of thought, as I have suggested, then the
structurelessness and instability of the Holocaust Memorial Museum as it is cannot
allow room for the development of thought, only for the experience of emotion67.

Before Freed was awarded commission for the project, Holocaust survivor
and author Elie Weisel said that he envisioned the memorial as a building that
should disturb, but that it should not become a reconstruction, lest in so doing it
devalue the Holocaust (61). Keeping in mind those two criteria and recognizing
the practical limitations within which Freed had to work to satisfy all those
involved (even the more practical, form-based ones such as the Commission’s
insistence that the memorial itself be a hexagon), we might begin to look at the
structure to evaluate the effectiveness of its design at the level of a
phenomenological or emotional response, but also attempt to do so at the level of

I am not suggesting here that emotional responses are inferior or that they have no place in architecture,
but I am pointing out that emotional response is quite different from philosophical discussion. Even Freed
said “All my life I've done rational stuff…but reason doesn't work here.” (73) I disagree with that viewpoint
entirely and have discovered in writing this dissertation that I am “guilty” of harboring a desire for closure,
certainty and purpose, but I feel that I am representative of neo-Modernism in that way. I loved Postmodern
theory for a time, until I came to a point at which I could not find a way to progress using it. In other words,
I realized it lacked the foundation I needed to think about the contemporary moment. It’s strange to think
Postmodernism now feels dated.
67
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a catalyst for philosophical discussion with others. This second attempt certainly
defies Freed’s insistence that it is not be interpreted on an intellectual level, but
that exemption from intellectualization of the experience restricts attempts at
shared understanding, closure and dialog—or at least the possibility of it. This is
the moment at which the fissure within Postmodernism itself—that between
architectural theory and application—begins to reveal itself as potentially
unbridgeable.

Approaching the Holocaust Memorial Museum from 14th Street, the
limestone exterior with three squared arches and square “windows” in a rounded
portico (which Freed said he’d one day realized resembled SS officers’ hats) lead
the visitor behind them only to find that it is a false entrance which is open to the
sky underneath, then visitors proceed to the actual entry point, a narrowish flat
glass doorway and turnstile. Already the deception of which Freed spoke has
begun. The rest of the exterior resembles alternately guard towers and windows
which allow the visitor to neither look in nor out68.

Freed toured Europe

extensively for inspiration and observed, “the concentration camps all had gates,
layers of lies, lies such as ‘Arbeit macht frei’” (62), and he employs the same

Freed toured many extermination camp sites, and the functionless windows throughout his structure
reference those in the ward at Auschwitz in which Mengele performed his experiments.
68

191

strategies of deception without any accompanying explanation or certainty to
recreate the feeling. Should lies and deception be the basis of our engagement
with the Holocaust or with memory itself? Freed seems to think that meaning
arises despite these forces, but the veils of secrecy and layers of untruths work to
distance the individual from arriving at some meaningful interpretation69. Again,
one is beginning to realize that there may ultimately be no understanding of this
event, and it quickly becomes apparent that this structure is not providing us the
means by which we might have attempted to achieve it.

Once inside the structure, the visitor is randomly led (“sorted”) through
one of two entryways—a meaningless gesture, since all visitors end up in the Hall
of Witness in a few steps anyway, but one which alludes to the random and
confusing nature of the prisoners’ experiences. The Hall of Witness is several
stories high, wide open, lit from above by an off-center skylight through trusses of
crisscrossing steel beams. The walls on either side are red brick, and the opposing
wall is concrete, again with square windows looking down from an upper level.
A staircase rises to the right, narrowing toward the top, referencing railway tracks
that appear to narrow in the distance, a physical detail which is visually appealing,

During my visit, my son and husband declared the structure “totally cool,” but the entire time, I felt like I
was being exploited somehow. It did not make me want to think—now I see that was Freed’s intent, but I
sure did not respond to the feeling in a positive way.
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even psychically necessary. On the walkway above, other visitors are to be seen
walking through, but one is not certain how they got there. On each of the red
brick side walls are regularly placed rounded arches and squared windows with
just enough ornamentation to distract, but not enough to satisfy or resolve. The
visitor is supposed to have that feeling—distracted, almost overwhelmed—with
no resolution or direction, but that feeling comes at a price. When speaking of
memorialization in general, I suggested that the already-known element of the
memorial, that is, the commemoration of an event or an individual with a
foundation from which to make individual meaning, is the central foundation
from which we develop our individual meanings, but rather than being absent in
this memorial museum, the already-known of the memorialization process is
turned on its ear. As if there could be no foundation from which to engage with
the Holocaust. It is as if the structure deliberately excludes the visitor and strands
him, physically but more importantly psychologically and intellectually, both
inside and outside the event. The visitor is given no guidance, there is no clear
direction to take or sense to be made of the structure. Again, this is problematic
in terms of achieving meaning because, as much as the structure succeeds in
deliberately disorienting the visitor, the disorientation then becomes the
experience. Freed sought to avoid the creation of a sort of Holocaust amusement
park in his design (61), but I would suggest that visitors are being taken for a
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version of a ride nonetheless. The irresolution seems desperate. Perhaps this
desperation accurately reflects the feelings of the victims of the Holocaust, but it
disallows the formation of a stable means by which to resolve or even categorize
the feelings.

The Hall of Witness achieves destabilization, to be sure, but it also
manipulates the visitor to no real end and instead suggests, “you can never
understand.”

This message is antithetical to healing and closure, though,

admittedly, those elements are nowhere to be found in the design or vision. Freed
and the commission do not speak of closure, healing or forgiveness, but only of
rupture, disturbance and uncertainty. The design is not intended to facilitate (or
even make space for) understanding or forgiveness—it lays bare wounds and
prohibits them from healing by denying the presence of a bed in which recovery
can begin. In a medical sense, wound healing at its most basic requires elements
of stability: first hemostasis, the stoppage of active bleeding, followed by the
inflammatory stage in which blood clots first form, then epithelialization and
contraction of the wound, and finally the development of collagen tissue and
eventual scarring. There is no room afforded for a healing process at the Holocaust
Memorial Museum, once is prohibited from achieving a form of psychological
hemostasis, even as a first step, much less any solidity, contraction or scar
formation. Of course Deleuze describes a scar as the sign not of a past wound but
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of ‘the present fact of having been wounded’” (Parr, 24), but that we as visitors
cannot even achieve the first step, much less the final one of scarring/closure, only
serves to remind us that we cannot learn and we cannot understand, and in so
doing, it prohibits communication. It isolates.

The visitor is also isolated as he walks through the levels of the museum,
always left wondering where to go next, often having to backtrack, many times
arriving in the place he just left, and though one could describe the many
architectural instances of this, in reality there is no need. It is an empty, endless
repetition of instability. It does prohibit thought, as Freed intended. The Hall of
Remembrance, however, the actual memorial part of the memorial museum, does
allow for a slightly more secure anchoring of one’s thought and provides a space
for reflection and shelter.

The hall is the hexagonal shape required by the

commission, it is of granite, the floor red, the walls arranged around open triangles
of light. Each wall panel has simply inscribed upon it the names of concentration
camps, at first difficult to see in the black stone unless the visitor is at just the right
angle. Then the names appear almost out of nowhere. Below these panels are two
long, carefully arranged rows of votive candles which visitors can light. Looking
up, one notices the ceiling again is structured with stained glass panels in
triangular shapes, lighting the interior in what is clearly reminiscent of a house of
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worship70. One is free to walk within the hexagon, approach the walls, and sit on
the two rows of steps which descend from the walls to the sunken floor or on the
slabs of stone in front of each panel. The visitor begins to feel an opportunity for
sense of security, at least a physical manifestation of it, and to recognize that this
may be a space for thought and analysis. As described, this Hall reflects many
elements of neo-Modern design and suggests that we may be able to return to
stability at the end of the journey. This seems like a good place to finally begin to
process and think.

Not so fast, however, since the choice of inscriptions disrupts us by
reintroducing the present having-been-wounded Deleuze speaks of: there is a
simple quote “You are my witnesses” from Isaiah on one panel while another
quotes from Deuteronomy: “Only guard yourself and guard your soul carefully,
lest you forget the things your eyes saw, and lest these things depart your heart all
the days of your life. And you shall make them known to your children, and to
your children's children.” Bearing witness is an important construct in Holocaust
studies, to be sure, but when a visitor who has no direct experience with the
Holocaust nor its survivors—and, according to the Museum website, over 90% of

As part of his extensive travels to Europe, Freed visited many Polish synagogues, the influences of which
are certainly visible here. And his focus on triangular and hexagonal shapes is in reference, of course, to
patches prisoners wore in concentration camps.
70
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its visitors are not Jewish—the task of bearing witness becomes an impossibility,
particularly when one has just spent hours wandering through a structure that
deliberately and systematically (as Modernist as that word sounds, the museum
design is a carefully orchestrated plan of deception) isolated and separated them
from the event, from others, and from intellectual engagement. How does one put
themselves in another’s shoes (to use a common artifact in Holocaust memorials)
when the shoes are never intended to be tried on?

Here one thinks of the universal reminder “Never forget,” an absolutely
crucial facet in how we might meaningfully come to terms with the Holocaust (and
I would suggest how we approach thinking about the entire Twentieth Century).
There can be no more important message, it seems. The difficulty with this
memorial museum, however, is that in keeping to its Postmodern theoretical
framework, running parallel to that vital message is one of “Never understand.”
Deliberate un-investigation and manufactured instability reduce the available
range our thoughts can achieve and simultaneously allow for and encourage
unprocessed (perhaps unprocessable?) feelings and emotions to dominate. While
this certainly reflects the instability and destabilization that is central to
Postmodern theory, again, when it comes to the application of that theory to
something beyond itself, the ersatz foundation of only a having-shaken-thefoundation quickly becomes recognized as insufficient ground.
197

As James E. Young writes of Holocaust museums in general, “In designing
a museum for such memory, the architect is charged with housing memory that is
neither at home with itself nor necessarily housable at all. It is memory redolent
with images of the formerly familiar but that now seems to defamiliarize and
estrange the present …” (Jewish Museum, 3). Here Young blurs the distinction
between artifact and memory, as his observation is not necessarily a circumstance
particular to only a museum and not a memorial. A memorial can be viewed as
an artifact writ large—an attempt at encapsulation—which houses memory in the
same process as a museum, only the memorial in a sense has become the artifact.
Rather than housing individual objects, a memorial may be thought to house a
representational metaphorical image, but the memory housed in both is equally
suspect and fluid. The Holocaust Memorial Museum does indeed house exhibits
effectively. They are aesthetically and carefully arranged, the hall of photographs
is emotionally powerful, and the deliberately over-crowded elevator ride is as
evocative as it is anxiety-producing. These elements, however, are more of those
of a “Holocaust amusement park,” which Freed sought to avoid creating. The
housing of the artifacts is successful, the housing of memory is not.

The housing of memory is another matter altogether, as images and artifacts
are not memory, nor is the event, nor is one’s own experience or even one’s “own”
memory. When Young speaks of and Freed designs with intent of housing
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memory, the endeavor cannot ever be fully successful, long before it. As Robert
Stern writes, “Architecture is the most public of all the arts. The most obdurate of
the arts. It is also the least personal of the arts” (61). Architecture, because of its
public nature, cannot achieve the housing of private memory across individuals;
it can only allow for a space for private memory to become introduced into the
public sphere, and even that is suspect.

If we look at architecture as Stern

describes it—public, obdurate and impersonal—it is not surprising that
Postmodern theory could have difficulty in gelling with or being of concrete
benefit to such an art. “Public” connotes an undeniable presence, “obdurate”
connotes an unyielding presence, and “impersonal” connotes an indifferent
presence.

These parameters—outlined by a Postmodern architect, no less—

demonstrate the immovable and inflexible nature of architecture, and
simultaneously shed light on the incongruity of Postmodern theory and its
application to the art. Architecture is too present, too there, to be successfully
dismantled.

In a conversation with architect Peter Eisenman, Jacques Derrida does, in
fact, describe architecture as the most present of the arts, and as a part of that
definition, suggests that it has the strongest reference to absence (Chora L, 8). The
theory is intellectually effective; the connection between presence and absence is
clear and generative of all manner of thought. However, I would suggest that in
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all styles and applications of architecture, not only memorial, these references to
absence of life, of individuals, of morality, of history, of understanding, and of
meaning are reduced, if not altogether removed, by a too-abundant presence. Too
much presence—and too much present—can preclude our ability to recognize and
acknowledge absence, and this perhaps represents the very cornerstone of the rift
between Postmodern theory and attempts at its application. Freed’s Holocaust
Memorial Museum in theory intends to illuminate the absent; it intends to
separate, to isolate and to confuse. The latter goals is achieved in his structure, the
former is revealed to be impossible to achieve. The thereness of the Memorial
Museum—its design and its very standing as architecture—demonstrate the
incompatibility of the theory with the physical representation.

These realizations arguably could not have been made at the time Derrida
wrote or even the time Freed designed the structure. Only after now decades of
elapsed time and progression of thought can the having-been-shaken structure reemerge with the clear need for a foundation.

Postmodern theory, though

illuminating the shortcomings of a structuralist position through the processes of
deconstruction, destabilization and a focus on multiplicity, was not able to provide
a foundation in terms of translating the theory into practice. The result has been
an abundance of perspectives, valuable and necessary but fragmentary and
exclusionary in their own right (since who or what theory could ever mindfully
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include them all?). The return to naming this current era with forms of Modernism
suggests that a new direction is not yet available, and in that way suggests that
post-structuralism cannot sustain its own weight and provide a sufficient platform
for progression of thought. More so than a new theory, Post-structuralism can be
viewed as a critique of a theory, a critique that ultimately could not stand on its
own. It has been my contention throughout that a return to that original theory is
necessary, that we are not in a position to move on from it quite yet.

Here I would suggest that rather than returning to an embodiment of what
Maria Lugones calls a “lover of purity” in our partial return to Modernism as a
means of defining the contemporary moment, we are instead positioned to engage
in a version of what she calls “world-traveling”. Though Lugones gives examples
of traveling between “worlds” as a woman who can shift between mainstream
constructions and others in which she finds herself more at home (3), this concept
can be extended to incorporate engagement with theory and our interrogation of
our own position in this contemporary moment as well. She discusses situations
in which one is at ease with others because of a shared history (she uses the
example of “Do you remember poodle skirts?”) that can be distinct from a direct
shared experience. This viewpoint may suggest a direction in which we can return
to conceptualizing a type of foundation (the presence of multiple worlds) without
remaining bound by traditionally dominant structures of Modernism or finding
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ourselves with completely dismantled structures of Postmodernism.

The

recognition of a shared history across worlds is to my thinking a likely path toward
a definition of our current moment. Even though—perhaps especially because—
Lugones states that these worlds may construct us in ways we don’t even
understand or accept (10), the recognition of the presence of these worlds points
to a shift into this new post-Postmodern period of Modernism, whatever we may
call it. This period is one of recognition and acknowledgement, reflection and
investigation, and we are remapping the ground underneath ourselves in an
attempt to situate this period in the history of thought. But we are not finished yet.
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Part Four: Where Are We (Going)?

In the high period of Postmodern theory, what might be termed the
‘sanctity’ of the work of the memorial was called into question—not to destroy or
minimize the work, but rather to encourage the viewer to experience the
monument, the event and even history itself in an alternate way, or as Heidegger
suggested, to cause the foundation to totter. This may have been the only direction
available at what we thought to be the “end” of Modernism and, while it was
certainly revolutionary—and likely necessary—in terms of thought, currently we
find ourselves situated in an intellectual position of “after Postmodernism.” To be
sure, after the critique of Postmodernism, it is not enough to say that memorial
architecture can be linked to a preconceived memory, a certainty of truth, or a
commonly-understood experience, however, it can be said that this critical
unbuilding has revealed that Modernist architectural form and theory have stood
firm under and after the dismantling process in a way that Postmodern theory
could not. In addition, Modern architecture has been exposed for its weaknesses
but its strengths have simultaneously been revealed. I have suggested throughout
this document that memorial architecture is most successful when it provides
space for the construction of multiple individual meanings, stands as a platform
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for the discussion of each of those meanings, allows us to critique our internal
processes of memory and especially provides room for the intellectual freedom to
examine, question and push to their limits the means of memorialization at hand.
I have argued that those goals are best served by a clearer, simpler, less
ornamented and inscribed structure and have suggested that only after the radical
and destabilizing process of interrogation by Postmodernism could this have been
realized. In other words, in many ways we have had to assess ourselves via a
return to Le Corbusier’s vision of “putting things in order,” only perhaps a
modified, more inclusive type of order.

Having been shaken but not dismantled by Postmodern theory, this
cultural moment can be envisioned as one in which we find ourselves situated on
the threshold between Modernism and a future “–ism,” which cannot yet be
named or even recognized from our too-close position within it, that may
represent a significant shift in the way we conceptualize existence. Whether that
shift will be post-human, the virtual or technology-driven, or something else is not
to be recognized at the moment. Recent scholarship is struggling to define what
to use as a heuristic term, sometimes choosing “contemporary” within the art
world (Smith, 683). This is hardly a satisfactory descriptor for the long term, as it
not one which separates this period meaningfully from any other use of the word
contemporary, but this necessity of a heuristic descriptor illuminates the difficulty
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of defining the particular naming process of a period of partial-return-toModernism-after-Postmodernism. To me, this moment is one in which scholars
ought to look more closely at where we now situate ourselves, perhaps not even
to project a vision as to what may come next, but only to begin to describe what
this moment is from within. A review of recent scholarship reveals that the new
attempts at a name always make reference to Modernism, and the idea or theory
is very loose at best in its description of where we actually are in the moment.

Scholars within the art world are primarily those who have attempted to do
the naming, though it extends to the disciplines of philosophy and language and
literature studies as well.

In a 2006 online essay entitled “The Death of

Postmodernism,” British scholar Alan Kirby describes the current period as
“pseudo-modernism” and states that this period actually “takes the world away”
through the transition to technological interactions, arguing that individuals are
both newly powerful and newly helpless (he gives the example of communicating
across the planet but needing to be reminded to eat your vegetables) to understand
themselves after Postmodernism.

He states that we are more or less self-

infantilized at the same time we are ever more sophisticated, and, while I agree
with some of his observations,71 his overall stance seems to be yet another critique

On a pessimistic day I agree with them—including his view that technology allows for a return to
“Medieval barbarism” in the posting of beheadings and more gruesome acts available at a click—though I
71
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that offers no new foundation and is arguably more inapplicable even than
Postmodernism in that the world is now “taken away” in a pseudo-Modern
situation. In his analysis, we are left without not just a foundation, but without an
entire world. This line of development taken to its concrete application would
quickly fall into the “threats of suicide” category ascribed to Postmodernism—all
cannot be virtual or become virtual in the same way that dismantling could not
actually be extended to dismantling architecture. Without an “actual” world to
contrast it with, the word “virtual” becomes meaningless, and the possibility of an
entirely virtual world is as unattainable as a completely dismantled one.

Nicolas Bourriaud, Director of the French Ecole Nationale Superieur des
Beaux-Arts, in 2009 postulated “altermondernism” as a possible name for this
moment, highlighting the role of the artist as what he calls “a cultural nomad.” In
an otherwise very difficult definition of altermondernism (from the Latin alter as
“different” or “other”), two comments seem to give a sense of a definition to the
current period—if that sense is only to reiterate that we aren’t exactly sure where
it is we’re going. The first of these is what he terms an “assumed heterochrony.”
Bourriaud says that in order to follow a period in which the grand narrative has

do think he overstates our position in terms of how far this applies across Western culture overall—and an
apparently non-reflective trajectory in our interactions with ourselves and others.
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been exposed as unstable, the positioning of human events in a setting of “multiple
temporalities” has become representative of our current position and that
altermodernism is a “positive experience of disorientation through an art-form
exploring all dimensions of the present.” Both of these statements are intriguing
in that they allude to a more expansive and inclusive assessment of our current
position, but again they fall short of making a definitive statement about the
moment. Exploring all dimensions of the present is certainly in keeping with my
attempt to introduce a platform for discussion of ideas in this moment as well, but
Bourriard is as trapped in the moment as I, and that leads us to the inability to
define what the “present” actually entails72.

Postmodernism has served a vital function as an outgrowth of and response
to Modernism, a necessary critique of a long-prevailing way of cultural
engagement, but it has not proven itself to represent a sea change in our
intellectual progression, nor a means of integration, only as an experiment of/in
opposition to Modernism and only as another possible way of affording room for
discussion of our cultural position. Here I am only considering a small segment of
the entirety of theory and discussing the inherent difficulty of its application to

Don’t tell Bourriaud I said that, he would surely find it insulting. And yet another name for this moment,
by Ben Davis, Editor of ArtNet magazine, is “Semi-Post-Modernism.” It’s worth a fun footnote for yet
another affix to Modernism, but his essay is ultimately another critique only.
72
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architectural form in terms of the end of the process. As stated earlier, the
theoretical “threats of suicide” could not be carried out in the physical
manifestations of architecture, and I am only here suggesting that those same
incongruities may extend to our ways of thinking as well. If the philosophical
language of thought is based in architectonics, the question that naturally follows
is to what degree Postmodern theory has been able to carry out its threats
regarding our structuring of that thought and to what degree, if at all, the language
of philosophy has been altered by the experience. Here I would agree with Terry
Smith and extend his observations about art and architecture to our thinking about
thinking as well. Though thought continually changes as a result of ongoing
critique, the traditional language of philosophy nonetheless remains dependent
upon an architectonic lexicon. In much the same way that a structure is restricted
by physical dimensions allowing it to stand, philosophical language is restricted
by conceptual dimensions allowing it to convey basic structural ideas. We cannot
have both entirely dismantled thought and retained the structures allowing that
dismantling to occur, which leaves us in the current—or contemporary—period of
uncertainty A different type of uncertainty, though, than that arrived at by
Postmodernism’s deliberate pursuit of it, an arguably less direct and intentional
one, and one that is at the moment indefinable. We are still struggling to find our
theoretical footing after Postmodernism, even though (and perhaps especially
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because) many aspects of Modernism have proven themselves to be solid and
reliable.

Postmodernism was a necessary development but, considering its own
name, was and is restricted by the confines of an as-yet inescapable Modernist
structuring.

While Postmodern theory shook us out of our complacency, it

afforded us nothing new to stand on. Here I acknowledge that in time it may be
revealed that I am completely misrepresenting the current position, but right now
it appears we are still entirely too enmeshed in the trees to draw up the parameters
of the forest just yet. What will ultimately follow Modernism may not even be
within our grasp to conceptualize at the moment at all. I think there is simply no
way for us to know in the present. Svetlana Boym’s “Off-Modernist Manifesto,”
which again primarily addresses art as the means of defining the moment,
presents a thought refreshing in its candor73—perhaps we are making a lateral
move, like, she says, a knight in a chess game. This is a surprising comment—the
idea that we might be moving laterally—because it challenges the notion that we
are moving beyond Postmodernism and simultaneously underscores (perhaps
unintentionally) our continual return to Modernism by revealing our inherent

Though overall the document is an off-putting and unpleasant read that uses language in what sounds like
almost a parody of Postmodernist writings in a Modernist manifesto suit.
73
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desire (mine included, admittedly) to look for a forward progress. Maybe we are
not able to tell where we’re going because we are too busy looking forward to
notice that our current movement is in a sideways direction.

Despite the difficulty of assessing the direction or name of the moment and
the direction in which we now are going, my argument throughout has been that,
considering architecture only, Postmodernism does a less satisfactory job of
allowing room for discussion to take root than Modernism. If we are to recognize
the next era when it arrives—and historically I wonder to what degree we can
successfully achieve an understanding of an epoch without a temporal distance
from it74—then assessing where we are at this moment is much more difficult
without an acknowledged common ground from which to ascertain a version of
synthesis of our current cultural position, before speculating where it is we might
be going. As we have seen, Postmodernism made that identification more difficult
to articulate.

While Modernism afforded us some room, Postmodernism in

shaking us up may have thrown us off track somewhat in being able to situate
ourselves and our thought.

And here I can’t help but think of the phrase “living history” (Hillary Clinton book or otherwise) and
how that is applied to reenactments of past events. Living through history is something else entirely.
74
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Perhaps we are, simply put, just in a period of shaken-up-Modernism.
Modernism’s arms are long-reaching, after all, and thinking that we have
somehow transcended it (or its influence) at this point seems premature, and here
as evidence stand the many names given to this current moment, all of which still
contain some reference to Modernism. Fifteen years into a new millennium, the
Twentieth Century still defines the way we identify ourselves, and in a parallel
manner, our thinking about thinking is still defined by its relationship to
Modernism. In order to begin to understand where we might be going, we have
to be able to discuss where we are now, meaningfully, in a way that allows for
variance but does not isolate based on it.

A thought excursion, only on a

longstanding cultural level, reflecting multiple times and directions and
perspectives. Maybe this period is just one of getting back up and looking around
after we got the wind knocked out of us.

Though the discussion and the process of arriving at a name surely will
continue for years, we can say with some certainty borne of experience and
reflection that Postmodernism—as represented architecturally—did not serve us
well as a definitive means of furthering that discussion in a new direction
separated from Modernism. To discuss in real time our thoughts are at this cultural
moment, in light of where we’ve been and in anticipation of what is to come,
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requires the establishment of a common ground in order to name our epoch—or,
more probably, to have it be named for us decades from now.

Because architecture is, as Derrida says, the most present of the arts, it might
be the best way we can translate our current thoughts and get them to endure over
time. And this is where memory, metaphor and especially the architectonic
language of philosophy come into play: our reliance on structures employed since
antiquity to discuss our own thoughts continue to this day, but the methods we
use to define and communicate them underwent a serious reevaluation in
Modernism. Modernism represented a major cultural restructuring in a way that,
I argue, Postmodernism did not. My only intent throughout this document has
been to suggest ways we might look at and discuss where thought is now without
having to identify exactly where we are. I’m not sure we could know.
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